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Nature and Basis of Christian Certainty.
Introduction: The Practical Bearing of Our Theme.
Though it must he essentially theoretical in its nature the following essay has «
<A.
primarily, practical purpose. If v;e read the history of the past aright, time was "hen
the work of the Kingdom of Christ was being pushed with greater vigor and intensity than
at present. Ye would not disparage the achievements attempted and completed today; for
they are mighty and inspired b; mighty conviction and mighty faith. Yet we believe that
such conviction and such faith are not as widespread as they ought to be; and though often
they are accompanied by a more intelligent and humane spirit than in the past, they Btill
seem to lack the force and impetus that made great Christian results possible in days gone
by. But whatever view we take of the comparative merits of past and present in their con-
tributions to Christian progress, we must believe that the world-wide programme of Christ
will never have successful issue unless effort and result be greatly multiplied.
As we revie- thef ' ives of those, living or dead, who by the help of Cod have per-
formed signal services for the Kingdom of Christ, one dominating impression holds us:
whether correct or incorrect in all detailed matters of faith, they possessed convictions,
so profound, a sense of the certainty of the truth of their beliefs so deep and potent
that these pressed for expression not only in overwhelming utterance in the words of
their mouths, but also in great deeds, constant, heroic, self-sacrificial. Up to the
best measure of their ability and with the use of instruments of knowledge accessible
to then, they pushed the search for truth; and, up to the best measure or their strength,
they labored to make that truth, reached by so much devotion, incarnate in human society;
so that truth, which is righteousness in thought, might realize itself in deed. 5o be
sure, though the verdict of their posterity has vindicated their fundamental conceptions,
some of the conclusions of the fathers' have proved erroneus, or if not
;
then unessen-
tial. Yet in general, unless he have some special interest at stake, no one charges
them ” ith the vice of insincerity. a lack of earnestness in seeking
.'
. ,
'
.
r ,
2truth, or a rant of heroism in attempting to embody it in the laws, the institutions,
the life of man. We could have wished for greater tolerance in matters unessential,
greater charity, larger humility, an increased measure of love for men; but we do not
question the sincerity, the earnestness, the burning conviction by which they were
impelled to so great mental labor and to tasks of such great heroism*
Our own time has suffered from a lack of conviction on fundamental things in gen-
eral and often an absence of the profound certainties in matters of Christian faith,
which aforetime stirred our fathers. Philosophic scepticism has disturbed easily
achieved dogmatisms; literary and historical criticism has overturned traditional atti-
ever
tudes toward the Holy Scriptures; and practical infidelity,' . active and agressive,
continues its onslaughts on human character and life. Materialism, agnosticism, pan-
theism, in manifold forms and many devious ways, have assisted to break down the bul-
warks of the ordinary man* s faith, which too often timid and shrinking enough in the
face of practical unbelief, is reduced to quiet, and many times, inexplicable terror,
by what it conceives to be fearful phantoms, all the more portentous because vague
and ill-defined. The practical result has been in many quarters a dismal falling off
in evangelistic effort end a consequently profound loss of vitality in the life of
many of our local churches. That which after all has done most for the establishment
of Christian conviction the possession and extension of the deep-lying experiences
of the Christian life has thus been dealt a series of deadening blows; and that deep
respect; both on the part of believers and unbelievers, for the realities of Christian
experience and the objective validity of its beliefs has in many places disappeared.
Cheap devices for giving the church a hearing and continued adaptations of Gospel truth
in accord with the specious dictates of a superficial mob-psychology have, in many
cases, caused the utter loss of genuine faith on the part of the members of the church
in the sovereign power of the Almighty Father.
As is often the case with a practical situation, even though it has most harmful
moral consequences this condition has not been without its exponents in theory. Many
« x £
'iO ' X
. s .
r
.
.
-
.
i
•'
•:••>••• iv • ' ft:) .. do t> vo.-; • *. r*;m a-.; •
.
.
:
,
: :
'
•
.
-
•
:
. ..
. : :
« • '
,
^ '
.. 2,:no' Xc"i
• »
'
1
•
• t , ..
'
,0 , ; X • r
' r . • 4 i : ;
•-
- :: X-
-.zt: . fi: : .... , 0 . , <L
.
a
u ..... .
•
- •
’
"I ' . • - • : , ... i
•
•
.:
•
- v . r .. . . •
. o. : : .
f
. n!i •; •: - ' •
*
"
’
;
'
; lo.Vi.-t • c-'..-; • .
*
•
» z:i:c i 'ivx .. K ’ : . >; . r ,-x u ..
1
of these recoiling from Unchristian illiberality and inhuman intolerance in the past
have made a plea for breadth and tolerance creating the impression that matters of
belief are items of indifference. In many quarters, as a consequence, there has arisen
a supercilious attitude toward matters of "dogma" or "doctrine" as the profoundest
conclusions of human thought and life are contemptuously dubbed, that has made for
superficial thinking unreflectively justified in the name of modern progress. It is
not long, however, before the close relation between thought and life obtaining every-
where, makes itself felt in the sphere of religion, and laxity of life follows hard
on superficiality of thought. Some of the self-constituted champions of tolerance
wax so warm in their defence of so-called liberality that they soon reveal themselves
hotly intolerant of conclusions other than their own or manifest a breadth so
broad and thin that they are positively flat. The religious faith they advocate is
in its defense of breadth so narrow that only a limited number of ultra advocates
of license can assimilate it, or in its fundamental conclusions so sublimated as to
be essentially without practical power in the daily life of men. Whatever be the
breadth of the larger end of the wedge of truth, one’s faith ought to be narrow enough
to have a cutting edge at the other.
From long experience realizing the difficulties in the way of the achievement of
a generally satisfactory Christian Certainty, ijaany defenders of the Christian system
of truth, ostensibly in the interest of religion itself, have scouted the possibility
of attaining certainty. The possession of absolute certainty, they say, would com-
pel the most antagonistically inclined to embrace Christianity; and this is contrary
to cne of its fundamental presuppositions, that the Christian life is essentially a
freely chosen life. So argues Henry Churchill King, one of the most intelligent ex-
ponents of Christian living. In his work, "The Seeming Unreality of the Spiritual
Life’ he remarks, pl49, "And if there is to be no forcing of God and the spiritual
world upon a man, this would seem to mean further, that we can expect no absolutely
incontrovertible evidences, no overpowering signsT—certianly not before the
ethical
choice. A choice will be left, some room for out own attitude of will
to have its
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effect. It is this principle which Pascal seems to have in mind when he says, [ Thoughts
and letters p.327, 355) *2od wished to render himself perfectly recognizable to those
who seek him with their whole heart and hidden from those who shun him with thdir
whole heart.* ’ Religion is a thing so great that it is just that those that would not
take the pains to seek it if it is obscure , should be deprived of it, 'Lhat do they
complain of then, if it is such that they could find it by seeking it. * And he in-
timates how this obscurity becomes a moral test:’ If you care but little to know the
truth, here Un a suggested difficulty; is enough to leave you in repose. But if
you desire with all your heart to know the truth, it is not enough, examine min-
utely.’ ' So also with approval President -Iling quotes Lotze: tLlicroscosmusVol.il p.54)
"It would not be advantageous for moral development if the binding truth of all par-
ticular moral commands, and the indissoluble connection between them, were presented
to individual minds with the theoretical certainty of an arithmetical proof, and if
it were not left for every soul to fight its way through the battle of life, by living,
believing action and effort, to this clearness of comprehension moral intuition.1 " e
discern in this very explanation, however, a further attempt to establish the Christian
Certainty, and to reduce the amount of uncertainty. Hoorn must be left to be sure, for
free choice in the search for truth and the achievement of the highest moral and spir-
itual life. But the possession of absolute certainty exerts no absolutely coercive
power on the human will, tie who supposes so has lived a life more in reflection on
nebulous theories, than in the stress and strain of a career interested not merely in
an individual life in accord with the Christian ideal, but concerned also to order the
defective state of human society by the social programme of the master of men. Ihe
question, it seems to us,may be legitimately raised whether the moral challenge of loyal
response to the Christian system of truth, accepted as absolutely certain, be not all
the test necessary to impose on man’s moral and spiritual nature. Certainty assumed
as reached, there yet remains self control of body, mind, and spirit, self-repression
or self-assertion in accord with Christian demands, study of methods and labor to incor-
porate them in human life; alertness in meeting intellectual opposition; fearlessness
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5in facing concrete antagonism; patience and stamina in the burden and heat of the day;
and increase in that mighty love which is hut a barren mockery the moment the existence
and nature of its divine Object in under any real question. Are we vigorously to argue
shat the greater the ignorance and uncertainty involved in Christian decision the deeper
the virtue? the wider the knowledge and the more assured the attitude, the more vitiated
the moral life? Are we to conclude that the almost unlimited knowledge of Christ and
what seems to us Eis intuitive understanding of ultimate reality reflects in any sense
on the moral test he underwent? Were every member of the Christian Church equipped
with an. absolute certainty, a herculean task great enough to stagger all hut the high-
est c outage would still be before it.
Y/e are free to admit that the sense of certainty does give an impulsion to prac-
tical activity. In the realms vhere such sense is most largely developed human op-
erations center; where it is least there interest shrinks. It is therefore of greatest
advantage to the Christian kingdom to develope the certainty of its citizens, ".what-
ever restrictions on this inference have been made in theory, even theorists have fol-
lowed it in practice. They have laid down limitations that, these being understood,
the certainty might appear the more unlimited. Are we to have a mighty expansion of
Christian interest and activity, then we crust have a mighty deepening of Christian
Certainty as its basis.
i
It is because I feel the truth of these conclusions profoundly that I write on
this theme and not another: a fact that in itself is an illuminating comment upon them.
It is because Christian experience is partly an effort toward certainty as a basis for
practical activity, as practical activity in turn reacts upon certainty, that a theoreti-
cal venture has such deep practical consequences. The kind of sacrifice for which Christ
calls would be irrational in proportion as it is founded on uncertainty; and rational
only as it is based on assurance.
What then is Christian dertainty and on what is it based?’ Fairly to answer this
question we must ask concerning the nature and basis of certainty in general and of its
relation to Christian Certainty.
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6I, The nature and Basis of Certainty in General.
A. Subjective and objective Elements in Certainty.
The most cursory examination of the experience of men reveals the presence of
a sense of cert' inty with regard to elements of that experience. '.Thether there be
legitimate basis for that conviction is not now a matter immediately under consideration.
That an objective order corresponds to sensation and concept; that consistency and har-
mony between judgments is a f&ir test of their validity; that the senses, the reason
,
the feelings, and the moral convictions, when in thiir normal estate and properly guarded,
do not deceive and betray us; that we can properly act in practical matters, though with
due degree of caution for fear of the intrusion of unexpected or unknown elements in ex-
perience;— these are the firm conclusions of the largest part of mankind, antedating any
analysis of experience or attempt to give rational justification to them. Our first
task therefore, will be to examine the nature of this certainty in experience, to anal-
yze its nature, examine its validity, and formulate any conclusions that may be valuable
in our study of the nature and basis of Christian cert- inty.
..e use the phrase Tin experience* advisedly, since all the data and criteria must nec-
essarily be a product of that experience whose nature and content are the basis of our
life. 7/hen, moreover, we use the term exjjerience in its fundamental sense we use it as
synonymous with the flow of personal consciousness. Consciousness is presented as a qual-
ity when "somebody ’is conscious* of something. • "Thus it seems to imply llj a subject
that is conscious, and an object of which the subject is conscious; and (2) a relation
between the subject and object which is in some sort a cognitive one. ?urther
f
the sub-
feet is either pleasantly or unpleasantly affected { in however faint a degree) by its
Contact with the object; and this feeling gives rise to some sort of reaction of motor
expression, while loth feeling and motor reaction will vary more or 'css with every var-
iation on the cognitive side of consciousness. Hence it is held that consciousness l l)
implies a fundamental duality of subject and object, and (2) consists of three constituents-
viz. cognition, feeling, will or conation. These three constituents are regarded as being
.. :
,
.
.
.
.
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*
7t present in some form in every state of consciousness, though, of course '.hey may he very
•* variously developed and combined' 1
.
(Nelson's Zncylopaedia, vol. III. p, 309;.
r
k, phis leads us to follow T."ard in his distinction between two conceptions of life
'if
contained in his masterly work, "Naturalism and Agnosticism. " "Experience
,
he says, (Vox.
II. p. Ill) "is rather an organic unity that we always, regard as self-maintained, in a
word it is life.fcL*^ -life as it is for the living individual, not life orW; the in-
* S
teraction of organism and environment, with which the so-called biologistA exclusively
concerned, and where bo*h organism and environment are objects for a distinct observer."
Further ambiguities in the tern life, however, render its use liable to misconstruction,
it is because of these that we object to the use made of it by F. J. McConnell in his
work on "Religious Certainty". now he uses the term as meaning physical life; now as re-
lating to material achievement; again as bearing on intellectual attainment or moral at-
04
titudes; and finally /to she highest spiritual experiences of the individual and of the
race. Oftentimes "that which mokes for life" in the one sense, does not make for life in
/ the other. Apart from the consideration that "that which moke, for life is piece of
evidence not a criterion* the term, while it may serve a useful purpose for popular expos-
ition,^ hopelessly vague and uncert- in for purposes of consistent and careful use.
Even the term experience is vague and uncertain. One who wrote with insight into
the difficulties of its use saw, "Experience is one of the most ambiguous words in the
vocabulary of philosophy, "hen the term Is used in "hat may be called a historical sense,
as when we speak of 'learning from experience*, it refers to the past process, by which
our present knowledge was acquired, and emphasizes especially the direct contact with
facts, which gives the elementjof reality in knowledge, and makes it more than abstract
notions, communicated to us b others. hen this usage of the term is extended to em-
(brace the present and the future, we get the conception of experience as the continuous
/ process by which the knowledge of any individual, especially as depending on his own
direct contact with reality, grows and widens. And when finally, we substitute the race
for the individual, we have the widest conception of a collective experience embracing
the whole life of the race. Other meanings in which the term is used may be
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8regarded as more or less legitimate abstractions from this comprehensive and concrete
meaning. ( Par j "The distinction sometimes drawn between v;hat is directly perceived and
what is inferred, suggests the reduction of primary and immediate experience to the bar-
est minimum of sensation and feeling while all the remainder of experience is explained
as manufactured out of these primary sense data by processes of association and infer-
ence. And the further suggestion is apt to present itself that the primary sensations
constitute the genuine reality of experience, while the superstructure is the less auth-
entic work of the mind. It is when experience is broken up in this abstract way that
the controversy arises between a spurious empiricism and the rationalism which is its
counterpart. For actual experience, whether it be wide or narrow7
,
is always concrete
knowledge, and never mere data. And the work of the mind by which knowledge grows is
never a work of arbitrary invention, but rather of discovery, so that the restilts are
equally real with what is directly given. And the distinction between the two cannot
be drawn.*'
,
It is because the substance of these paragraphs must be emphasired later that we
insert them here at length. The sensational psychology has laid stress on the preponder-
ating value of the evidence of the senses in reaching truth. The validity of such an
attitude we will also discuss later. Meanwhile we take the term experience to mean the
flow of human self-consciousness both in relatively active and passive states. Primarily
this means the experience of the individual; but also the experience of the race$, as by
the processes of knowledge v;e come into possession of what is of value here also.
V/e speak definitely, moreover, of the consciousness of the individual because the
fundamental data of experience evidence the existence of the self or ego* Personal con-
sciousness is equivalent to self-consciousness. that the consciuosness of an animal may
be we cannot with certainty decide. Ye conclude that it lacks elements essential to hum-
an self-consciousness and self-direction. That the self is an entity, the indivisible
subject of its states, is the primary deliverance of self-consciousness which neither
a sensationalist ic scepticism or an abstract rationalism has been able to vitiate. T.n..
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9Green in his " Introduct ion to Hune" has most painstakingly and exhaustively demonstrated
the failure of the sensationalist psychology, T*. H, Bradley's attempt in his : Appearance
and Xeality" to reveal the idea of the self as inconsistent has proved futile, Kis self-
complacent, hut merely apparent success ,is due to his failure to distinguish between the
self and its contents. The term "contents", indeed ,is perhaps in itself a source of error.
Its use inclines to his conclusion, that, if anything, the soul is the sum of its contents;
and since these can never he gathered up; he calls the knowledge of the soul ' inconsistent
But could we exhaust the whole content of the soul there would still he a residuum,
par truer to our experience, and therefore, far more desirable in use, is emphasis upon
the activities of the soul. Bven in its so-called passive states^—which as receptive
are still active^the soul reveals itself to itself as existing in a self-poised state.
In its more active functions it is more true to its experience to speak of it, as do
the modern psychologists, led by Schiller, Dewey, Janes, and Ward, as thinking, or seeking,
or reaching out after reality, than as the container of ideas. The latter notion has
given rise to many far-reaching difficulties, which having been manufactured by the un-
discerning, now prove a sours© of v/onderment. In the most passive state of self-conscious-
ness, which, to use Bradley's term, is an "inner core of feeling", or "coenesthesia", be-
fore the soul can be described as reflectively possessing content, when it has not de-
finitely shaped its ideas, it is conscious of its self-poised, if not self-created and
wholly self-maintained, existence. This is the primary datum of experience to which we
must appeal in attempting to explain all things, instead, of trying to explain it by an
appeal to them* To adopt the latter course is to attempt to explain the explanation, to
account for experience, which must be used to account for everything. To transcend ex-
perience is an impossibility, vihatever may be the possible experiences of other beings
than ourselves, their existence, as v/ell as that of their owners, is not even affirmable,
save as the affirmation finds some rational foundation in our awn experiences.
But self-consciousness, itself, primary to the nature of experience, reveals the
existence of subject and object, which in this unique experience are one. In the mystery
Of self-consciousness, not to be explained by experience, we find a duality in unity. In
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the words of Tard, (Naturalism an". Agnosticism, 2:112 ) ' tie start i !-or. -ith tv i" lit;” of
subject and object in the unity of experience, hat - subject • ithout objects, or what
objects rithout • subject • :ul. be, is, indeed, as we are after; told, unkno- ble; for
in truth the knowledge of either ap rt is a contradiction, ’ Before the question logic-
ally arises of the existence of objects or even: of the existence of its ideas, in the prim-
ary experience of self-consciousness, the self as subject knows itself as the object of its
contemplation, and knowing itself as object, it knows itself, also, as subject cf this
contempi.- tive activity, 7,e use the term 1 logically" because, looking back over our exper-
ience v;e re quite certain that "chronologically" the matter has not thus come to conscious-
ness, Logically, then, the self next knows, as objects, its "ideas' 7
,
or perhaps more ac-
curately and unambiguously, its activities. Chronologically, it has long been conscious
of the existence of objects, including its body—to which it is so intimately conjoined
—
as apart from itself. Through its body and sensations, defined as elemental conscious pro-
cesses connected ith bodily processes in definite bodily organs, knowledge of these objects
has been mediated, and they have helped bring it to self-consciousness. And just as self-
eonsciousness has subjective and objective aspects, so do sensations • Conceived ' ir rel-
ation to heir subject they are mental processes; conceived of in relation to their sources,
Lnd, they r bjective processes. On this
.
int ard ys mph tic lly,
(naturalism and Agnosticism. 2:112) "nevertheless 1 contend that the sensory and otor
changes or processes entering into each conscious experience are ob'etivs for the subject
of that experience; inasmuch as they can be attended to or apprehended, liked or disliked,
(2:116) "Such claim (that sensations are objective) is often disallowed on the ground that
sensations pertain really to feeling and not to cognition; or again on the ground that they
[are ho matter of experience simply; whereas the objects of cognition mus have i rm. —
Sensations have form; in other words they have inalienable characteristics, quality, inten-
sity, as peep le say again nowadays they have a ’what' ao well as a ’that*, .'.gain
they are n: t isolated; but as 1 have already urged they are changes in what— for want of a
better word— 1 have been fain to call a present > tional continuum. The so-called pure sen-
sation of certain - Taychologists is a pure abstraction; as much so as the mao-point of the
physicist, but 'ithout perhaps the warrant on the score of utility.' Here again we have a
A'
11
primary relationship behind which we cannot go. The question, then, may be asked, as
',7ard asks it, and answered, as ward answers it, (2:117). “If these primary presentations
are essentially objective, not subjective, modifications, how is the relation of the
subject to such objects to be conceived? The subject has several necessary relations to
all actual presentations, and to these we must refer presently. But as regards the bare
fact of presentation there is nothing to be said; it is that relation of subject to ob-
ject and object to subject in virtue of which they are severally subject and object. As
the absolutely ultimate relation within experience we can say either that it is inexplic-
able, or that it needs no explanation, or we may entertain the notion of an absolute'
l of whatever hind that may be; in which the unity of experience outlasts the duality.
When the primary relationship of subject and object is regarded in this way
,
no
disparagement falls upon one that does not fall upon the other. But unreflective usage
and custom has laid a stigma upon the subjective, which for reasons not the most cogent,
it has not laid upon the objective. Objectivity has generally been regarded as of itself
bringing validity; subjectivity as something to be examined with suspicion. To be sure
we inow the irregularities and uncertainties of the subjective so much more intimately,
amd are so much interested in the establishment of the regularities and uniformities of
the objective, that seldom do we concentrate our thought on objective irregularities.
These, however, a„re as great and numerous as the other, and if the subjective is to be
viewed with suspicion, in like manner must be the objective. Indeed, just as the object-
ive must be viewed as subjectively conditioned; so must the subjective be thought of as
having its objective aspects, and as objective, possessing all the validity that goes
with objectivity. Thought of singly and intrespectively as the subject of its mental
states, we speak of the mind and its testimony to its nature as* merely subjective; ’but
other minds thought of as objects, and subject to great regularities and uniformities,
are as truly objects as are material things; and there appears no essential reason why
mental processes and experiences and their testimony to the nature of the ultimate real-
ity should not be thought of as having as great objective validity as the movements of
,
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the stars or the interaction of the molecules of matter. Both are the outcome of the
same ultimate force, and therefore, if they represent, and do not belie^ its character,
both are indications of its nature. It is only on this basis that Psychology can he raised
to the dignity of a science; and on this basic only also, that History,--esthetics, and
religion can be looked upon as bearing evidence valid for our conclusions regarding life
and its meaning.
B. Certainty regarding the Testimony of the Senses.
T'e say this a,s me begin to consider the nature of certainty in general and the stand-
ards by which me shall judge its validity. It is generally considered that the testimony
of the senses must be looked upon as primary and fundamental. "Seeing is believing." In
the mind of the mass of mankind it is sxirely our sensations we must trust most of all for
our guidance in the affairs of practical life; and generally speaking no question is rais-»
ed of the correspondence of our sensations with outer realities which the sensations ap-
parently represent. It may be ligitimately asked, however, why the testimony of the senses
should be looked upon as possessing a greater validity than the testimony afforded by the
reason or the feelings or the moral convictions. Eoes the mere unquestioning consensus
of opinion in favor of the evidence afforded by the senses necessarily validate their
testimony? On this point Arthur James Xalfour in his notable work, "The Foundations of
Belief" speaks with authoritative insight Ip. 250) "Y/e are now in a position to answer the
question put a few pages back, Y.liat , I then asked, is the import from our present point
of view, of the universality and inevitableness, which unquestionably attach to certain
judgments about the world of phenomena, and to these judgments alone. The answer must be
that these peculiarities have no import. They exist but they are irrelevant. Faith or
assurance, which if not in excess of reason, is at least independent of it, seems to be
a necessity in every great department of knowledge which touches on action; and what great
department is there which does not? The analysis of our sense experience teaches us that
we require it in our ordinary dealings with the natural world. The most cursory examin-
ation into the springs of moral action shows that it is an indispensable supplement to
ethical speculation. Theologions are for the most part agreed that without it religion
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is but the ineffectual profession of a barren creed. The comparative value however, of
these faiths is not to be measiired either by their intensity or the degree of their dif-
opinions
,
fusion. It is true that all men, whatever their speculative enjoy a practical
assurance with regard to vhat they see and touch. It is also true that few men have an
assurance equally strong about matters of which their senses tell them nothing immediately;
and that many men have on such subjects no assurance at all. But as this is preciQely
vhat v:e should expect if, in the progress of evolution, the need for other faiths had a-
risen under conditions very different from those which produced our innate and long des-
cended confidence in sense perception, how can we regard it as a distinction in favor of
the latter? We can scarcely recognize universality and necessity as badges of preeminence,
at the same moment that we recognize them as marks of the elementary and primitive char-
acter of the beliefs to which they give their all-powerful, but none the less irrational
sanction. The time has passed for believing that the further v:e go back towards the
* state of nature* the nearer we get to virtue and truth."
quotation
?/e produce this^merely to make clear that our deep-lying conviction is not a matter
of individual peculiarity; but that the profoundest minds echo the conclusion, so strange
to sense bound and unreflective thinking, that sense perception may have no greater val-
idity than thought, feeling, or moral conviction, “'e dissent, however, from the conclusion
that the testimony of the senses has merely "irrational sanction." That this is Balfour’s
conclusion we may believe from what he say^ p.252, '’rational necessity does not, so far
as I can see carry us at the best beyond a system of mere ’solipsism!"
The question now arises, "That do we mean by rational sanction with regard to the
testimony of the senses?" Vvhat are the standards by which we shall conclude that our sense
perceptions are true or false as they seem to speak of realities without us? These very
questions imply our certainty of their objective validity; and it may be that if we dis-
cover some satisfactory criterion relating to the testimony of the senses that it may be
used also to apply to data coning from other parts of our nature.
Yet before attempting an answer to this question let us note that some of the great
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supporters of Christian certainty assume without question the validity of sense perception^
and so miss the search for that standard of truth that in its application brings final sat-
isfaction. So it is with F. H. R. Prank in his great work, "System of the Christian Cer-
tainty. H concludes (p#57) that "Cert ' Condition of the subject does not arise
without the presupposition of an object of which it assures itself.' (p.58) "For the Chris-
tian by virtue of his faith, by virtue of all that which makes him a Christian- the objec-
tive reality in the first place of the spiritual world in which he lives and with this at
the same time also of the physical woAd, is decided; and the Christian consciousness will
therein always remain in harmony • ith the ordinary natural consciousness. In connection
with which then to be sure, the nearer defining of the manner of this objectivity remains
reserved. And in addition to this the other cobs iderat ion has to be taken into account,
that the explanation must yet always so take place, as though the world of material things
assumed by the realistic hypothesis, really existed."
We do not object to this conclusion: to conclude otherwise would be preposterous;
and to the unthinking, superficial sense-bound mind, merely to raise the question involves
us in abject idiocy. We merely ask on what basis, with what "rational sanction'
,
if any,
we can hold this conclusion, "hy not embrace "solipsism," and be done with it. Ihe an-
swer is that such a course would not be "rational;" it would not prove "consistent" in
the sense of the term, we shall define at greater length later. Let a man with solipsistic
notions start out^ the days life, and he will soon have a practical demonstration in a
thousand ways of the untruth of ’solipsism. The testimony of his senses and his reason,
the constant interplay of his activities, his appetites and their satisfaction, his man-
ual labor with things as materials and instruments, his intercourse with others would all
be preposterously "inconsistent" on solipsistic grounds. ' Analysis of the nature of this
inconsistency nukes it clear that between ideas which have objective correspondence, and
those that do not there is a vast difference. Ideas which, as he knows them, have no
correspondence to things he may handle as such in experience: he is never compelled to
face them as if they represented corresponding realities. But when the ideas appear to
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represent realities without, it is neeessary to deal with the ideas not merely as subject-
ive possessions, but with the things corresponding as if they were reslities. To treat
differences as if they were similarities is to be as deeply inconsistent as anything can
be; as a consequence he concludes that the differences being real invclvesthe existence
of external objects. In consistency thus pragmatically defined, of which we shall treat
»
at greater length later, we find the rational sanction, and the only rational sanction,
for belief in the existence of objective reslities.
Before we go further we must point out that the adoption of consistency as a standard
thus interpreted, proceeds on the basis that this is the most fundamental criterion of our
rational life. We adopt consistency as a standard because in the nature of the case, we
can find no other. But why should we suppose tha.t it is a valid test? Only by making
appeal again to the same test can we find adequate answer: it would be inconsistent to
suppose otherwise. But the application of the test proceeds on the basis that this is a
consistent world. r?o dissent from this conclusion we can do no more than again make appeal
to the test of consistency, ’.'hen the matter is discussed in this logical way, everyone
assents without debate. Yet we must point out that just here where no more seems at stake
than the proper formulation of logical criteria there may be implicit all the answers to
our manifold question. Logical criteria imply faith in logic. Consistency as a test
implies a deep conviction that this is a consistent world. In the lives of mspy of the
great thinkers, in so great contrast to the cold, hard, barren attitude of the logic-
chopper, there has existed a deep moral faith, amounting to a passion, in the innermost
trustworthiness of the universe. In the fusion of a great personality, intellect, feCling
and will have launched out in the great philosophic quest, thus helping formal logic to
survive in as little interest as it now holds among the academically inclined. 7/e have
here in germ all the difference between certitude and scepticism, between optimism and
pessimism, possibly between Christianity and infidelity. Belief in consistency and ap-
plication of it as a test arises from a deliberate choice without which any rationality
is forthwith impossible: complacent acquieflence in inconsistency means the abandonment
of the search for truth; tlie one stands for the hope of ultimate mental conquest; the
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other signifies a despair at the very root of life that nothing hut a total change can
cure.
Instead, therefore, of speaking of faith, as is often done, as something added to,
superinduced upon, or transcending reason, or as something contrary to or antagonizing
reason, faith must he pictured as a presupposition of reason, as a prerequisite to all
thinking. If faith, therefore, he found to lie at the basis of the testimony of the senses
and
?
as lias bee# intimated, at the basis of the testimony of thought, then it will hot be
thought a natter for derogation, if it be found at the foundations of Christian certainty,
C. Certainty Regarding the Testimony of Thought.
In our discussion of the testimony of the senses we have already passed over to the
testimony of thought; for the testimony of the senses is nothing apart from thought. We
do not gain knowledge through the senses alone it is only when the mind wakes up to the
meaning of sensations, and is able to put them together and interpret them that it gains
any knowledge,” Sensations, to be sure, have their objective aspects; but they are also
subjectively conditioned; and apart from thought are nothing. To attempt tp establish
therefore a wide disjunction between thought and sense is to fly in the face of experience.
In experience we find the two conjoined in such a unity, that we must speak not of a dual-
ism but of a duality in unity. For purposes of abstract thought it may prove profitable
to separate them, but to treat them as essentially different and incompa tible is to over-
look the actual unity in which they coexist and to put off explanation of their nature
farther than ever. Instead of asking what they are apart from each other it lends to great-
er insight to inquire on what basis there can be such a duality.
The consideration of this question, however we postpone for the moment, as for pur-
poses of clearness we continue to examine the nature and basis of the testimony afforded
by the different parts of our nature. This of course is by abstraction; they are all con-
joined in an operant unity, their functions inseparably interlocking. Judgement, the fund-
amental activity of the mind, is founded on the testimony of the senses. As I sit writing,
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my mind arroused by a rapid succession of explosions, reacts in that essential activity
expressive of the very nature of thought, and concludes, "That is an automobile." Ex-
amining this mental process we notice that thought thus represents some work that is done,
something put together and a conclusion drawn. Propositions are nothing but words embody-
ing concepts that are the result of judgments previously made. The language used is mere-
ly a symbol, serving as a permanent record of the judgment or the concept, itself a men-
tal construction due to the processes of judgment through which we have gone. The infer-
ence is merely a complex of judgment exhibiting the grounds on which it rests, it is a
series of judgments resting on previous judgments. "It may be urged, however, that not
every judgment can grow out of previous judgments in this way. For if we go back far
enough we must reach some judgment that is absolutely first, and which presupposes some
antecedent judgment. This is like the paradox regarding the origin of life. If all judg-
ments are derived from antecedent judgment, how was it possible for the first one to a-
rise? It will perhaps be sufficient answer to deny the existence or the paradox, con-
sciousness must be regarded as having from the first the form of a judgment. No matter
how far one goes back in the history ox consciousness, one will always find, so long as
consciousness is present at all, some reaction, however feeble, upon the content, and
something like Knowledge resulting. liven tne consciousness of the neviy-born infant re-
acts or vaguely judges in this way. These primitive judgments are of course very weak and
confused, but they serve as starting points in the process of intellectual development.
Growth in knowledge is simply the process by means of which these vague and inarticulate
judgments are developed and transformed into a complete and more coherent experience."
(Creighton: An Introductory Logic, p.272)
Y.hen now we inquire, "What is the standard by which ve can be certain of the validity
of a juagment^the response is, "Consistency." In so^ar as judgments harmonize with
that system of more or less completed thought we call knowledge, they are true; and in so-
far as they fail to harmonize we call them false. Apparent disharmony leads to a reex-
amination of their nature; a new contact with the realities they are supposed to repre-
sent; and finally new processes of inference reaching out to other primary judgment. If
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we cannot \ ork the new judgment into agreewent with out system of judgments to which we
grant the name of knowledge, then we reject it ec untrue. If it harmonizes re call it
true. Should we discover in our reexamination of its nature in contact with reality that
it appears to re. , in tn ©
,
though in disagreement with our system, then we examine anew'
the elements of the system, and revise them; and thus the nature of our conclusions change,
knowledge increases, and we are said to approach the truth. In proportion as we reach a
system whose judgments and inferences hang together in a harmonious whole, more or less
in contact with concrete reality, we achieve that consistency which we make the mark of
truth.
It is not strange, therefore, that when we examine the mein characteristics of judg-
ment and
#
the laws of thought and inquire concerning their validity that we should reach
again this same standard. The logician commonly speaks of universality and necessity as
the chief characteristics of judgment. By the universality of judgment he means that its
conclusions are assumed to he valid for everyone. On this basis all argument proceeds;
the alternative is pure scepticism; and according to it, no standard of truth can exist
and thought is at the mercy of the momentary judgment and caprice of the individual. These
conclusions we freely admit, hut inquire again to what standard we appeal. 7,‘e naturally
reply that^while scepticism may flourish in some academic circles for a time^in a vacuum
where formal doubt can live^ii&ftt the practical demands of our lives soon compel us to
vacate it for a healthy gnosis. Scepticism soon involves us in so many practical incon-
sistencies in emergencies that call for immediate action based on certainty, that even
the academically inclined is soon sick of this boon companion and his conduct inconsistent
enough to permit of action based on practical certainty. Moreover, his attempt to make
sceptical adherents reveals no foundation for appeal apart from that universality of judg-
ment which to deny he has learned to he the height of inconsistency.
The second main characteristic of the judgment is generally called its necessity.
By this is meant that when we judge we are not free to reach a conclusion by caprice. Some
times we say we feel certain a. thing is so,
hut its necessity, in logical terms is due
thus identifying ourselves ' ith the judgment;
,-,o its premises, the reasons which support it.
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Tliis merely means that it is consistent with facts we regard as true, with judgments
previously made^ and, as far as possible, verified. In ordinary life unreflective individ-
uals do not make explicit the reasons supporting their judgments, hut in order to make
their necessity manifest the reasons must he made explicit, and thus the simple judg-
ment expanded into an inference.
Inference, then, or reason, roots back in sense perception, which is never anything
wholly apart from the mind, though on the other hand, never to he called "merely subjec-
tive." On that account it is not strange that the same criterion by which we judge the
validity of sense-perception, should apply to the validity of the
'
processes of reason. If
we would properly evaluate an argument we coramomly ask whether it he a consistent one. In
formal logic we make arjpeal to the laws of thought, the law of identity, the law of con-
tradiction, the law of the excluded middle. 7,'e commonly regard these as axiomatic prin-
ciples, hut we assume them, also, as the result of the demand for consistency. The law
of identity is stated in several forms: "Whatever is, is; everything remains identical
with itself; A is A." In logical discussion the terms are conceived of as having a per-
manent character; in practical life it is our experience with things that determines for
us their character as permanent and unchanging, an experience involving a succession of
judgments that must he mutually consistent. Reflection on the nature of the lav; of Iden-
tity m?kes it quite clear that it merely expresses the fundamental nature of jiidgment in
sojfar as every judgment is, in its turn, the expression of an identity between subject
and predicate.
The law cf Contradiction is merely the negative form of the law of Ide^ity, and in
its use calls for the application of the sme test of consistency. The law does not state
that It is impossible to unite a and not-a in the sense of a and something different from
a, hut a and not^a in the sense that they are contradictory. But her-' again we note the
relation of the theoretical to practical experience. To one who deals in abstractions, to
tfcb logic chopper whose intellectual legs are never long enough to reach to the ground,
appeal to the practical is a source of horror and alarm; hut reason as falling back on the
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judgment, and the judgment as rooting hack most largely in sense
—
perception must neces-
sarily make appeal to the practical. This even the logicians of the day re recognizing,
Relative to the matter tinder discussion Prof. Creighton writes: "It is not hy any means
easy to decide what things are merely different, and therefore compatible with each other,
and what contradictory or opposed. Logic can give no rule which may he applied in every
case. If experience shows that two things, or two properties, are at any time united, we
say that they are merely different from each other; if they have mever been found in
conjunction and we are not able to conceive how their union could take place, we eall
them opposites or contradictories. It is worth noticing, too, that no terms are in
themselves contradictory, except those which are in the form a and not -a, vise and not
wise. But they become contradictory and exclude each other when they claim to occupy
the same place, in some particular system of facts. Thus ’maple’ and ’oak’ denote trees
of a different variety, which are however, so little opposed that they may exist aide
by side. If both these terms were applied to the same tree, however, they would become
contradictory. By claiming* to stand in the same relations, these terms become rivals,
as it were, and exclude each other. But a knowledge of the particular facts involved
is always necessary to determine whether or not two assertions are really incompatible.
"
lAn Introductory Logic, p. 29?;
7,hat is commonly known as the law of Excluded Lliddle is merely a cor^oUary from
the implications of the other two. Between contradictions there is no middle ground.
B excludes not-B; every judgment plays a double function; it both affirms and denies.
As has been said logic affords ho rule for determining whether two things stand in re-
lation of mutual exclusion. That. is a matter for the practical judgment to decide;
and it decides again in accord with the criterion of consistency applied in a practical
way.
Again we point out, as in the case of the testimony of the senses, that the neces-
sary adoption of consistency as a test is due both to a fundamental faith in the valid-
ity of the operations of the mind and the consistency of the universe upon the da.ta
of which the mind operates. Such a faith when rightly understood is no mere languid
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acquiescence in a formal logical standard the acceptance of which carries with it no
one
far reaching consequence, butAwhich involves a theory of the ' hole universe, it may he
of its source, operation and final end.
Sceptics, like Hume, however, protest that an essential difference exists between
the evidence of the senses 2nd of thought. Hume maintained that all knowledge rests upon
sensations. Ideas that reproduce percepts are to he regarded as representing valid know-
ledge; hut their pecu2 iar ability to combine with each other and produce nev. ideal con-
structions never presented in perceptual experience^ he regarded as due to a propensity
to feign, and such constructions were to him, therefore, vicious and invalid. But we
have already seen that without the activity of thought there can he no sensations,
a conclusion which T. H. Green in his Introduction to Hume substantiates with pains-
taking care— and that if thought of a higher constructive nature he vicious, sensations
must also he vicious. As in the case of sensations such thought will he judged by its
consistency, consistency fij£st between the ideas and conceptions viewed in abstraction,
it may he, from sense experience; and consistency, secondly, as these conclusions work
out in experience and are thus related again by actual contact with objective reality.
If in practical experience a system of thought continues to cohere without sign of un-
harmonieus and contradictory elements we shall continue to regard it as true; if not we
must declare it false and make necessary readjustment.
D. Certainty With Regard to the Testimony of the Reelings.
In the vocabulary of certainty no terms are used with greater frequency than those
which relate to the feelings. "I feel sure", "I feel absolutely certain," "I feel con-
vinced," are constantly changing forms of statement involving the feelings, he are never
more certain of truth than when we say, "We feel certain." This is due, a little reflect
tion convinces us
;
to the fact, that vigorous action of any kind is possible only when
strong fedlings urge it; and that practical action is ever more decided and resolute,
where certainty of its need is greatest. As preliminary certainty begets feeling and
feeling action, so action enlarging the evidence at hand makes -or greater cer. inty.
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Indeed, without action of some kind, conscious or unconscious, . ill ed A indeliberate, cer-
tainty would not he generated. The certainties of the child arise from the instinctive
and unconscious movements of the limbs and other organs of sense which furnish the data
upon which his mind plays, gradually organizing the evidence into a whole, and more or
less applying the test of consistency.
But in what sense does the existence of strong feeling validate our conclusions
regarding the truth? To determine this matter an analysis of the nature of feeling, in-
cluding the higher emotions, is necessary. e have defined sensations as those elemental
conscious processes which are connected with bodily processes in definite bodily organs.
In their simplest form they imply mental activity as well as external stimuli with their
consequent impressions in the sensibility. An idea is a mental construction involving a
complex of such sensations. An affection is a conscious state involving pleasantness or
unpleasantness, arising from sensation or idea. But it is contrasted with sensation in
that it has subjective rather than objective bearing; it is coextensive with consciousness
rather than local; It is killed by repetition of stimulus, rather than thus interwoven
into the texture of the mind; it is eliminated by the concentration of attention upon it,
rather than thus made clearer; and finally,as sensation is stronger peripherally, it is
stronger centrally. Yihat we know as feeling is a complex process, comprised on the one
hand of perception and idea, and on the other of affection, in which affection plays the
principal part. The feelings necessarily issue in bodily expression either in instinctive
and spontaneous ways or in consciously determined and perhaps systematic action. As re-
lating themselves to lower types of sensation we think of them as including the special
feelings; as related to more complex ideas, involving cognition, judgment, memory, in
a word, apperception, we call them the emotions.
T
,7hen now it is asked what gives valid nature to the certainty that inheres in feel-
ing we respond that this is not found in the physical aspect of feeling, but in the in-
tellectual. The same test applied to thought in general, must be applied to the ideal
elements in feeling. If these be consistent one with another and with the other con-
stituents of experience, then we will call the feeling valid; if not, then lacking proper
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validity. This avoids the difficulties providedby the superficail irregular, and tran-
sient elements in our feelings. On the other hand, room is made here also for those
high and constant feelings the outcome of which is ever the enriching and ejiobling of
life. Insofar as this result he looked upon as giving evidence of the nature of ul-
timate reality, they must he looked upon as affording data for metaphysical inquiry.
At the same time it is consistency to which we finally appeal.
. S. Certainty in its Relation to the Testimony of the Moral nature.
Among expressions of Certainty current among men none is more emphatically in-
dicative of assurance than, '’It must he so." "It ought to he so, and therefore it is, :
is another form of the same conclusion. Has such certainty genuine validity? The ex-
pression is generally used of a factbr presumably somewhere existent, hut not immediately
ascertainable through the senses. It is implied, however, in the factors of a system
already experienced, a system that would not he complete without the existence of the
missing factor. Therefore we conclude that necessarily the missing factor is in existenc
also. Eere the appeal again is to consistency. If consistency is a valid test of truth,
and certain known factors consistently point to the existence of another unknown or par-
tially known factor, then it must necessarily exist.
This of course implies also that the universe is an essentially honest one. The
value of the testimony of sense or of thought or feeling depends on this very fact. If
the world in relation to sense were so constructed as to make for error then the appli-
cation of the canon of consistency would he of no avail in giving us the truth; and so
also with thought and feeling. Our senses sometimes deceive us; hut the deception is
only discovered hy the employment of the same instruments* t£e use of which brought us
into error, with the faith that the deception was due to their illicit, and will by- cor-
rected by their proper
, functioning. Our processes of reasoning sometimes go awr„ and
yield us falsehood, hut this is discovered only as again we use the same reason, proper-
ly guarding Its operations, hut should the universe be so arranged that, by the employ-
ment of our faculties, now one conclusion could be reached and now another entirely
.
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contradictory from precisely the sane oper tions, the standard of consistency would
have no value, and its use would never bring us to truth* Universal scepticism we ld nee- •
esoa: ily result* formal doubt of the author^titiveness of our test and the validity of
truth, so-called, is always possible but in Bradley's words, (Appearance and Reality p. 137)
’ The doubt is seen when we reflect to be founded on that which it endeavo’urs to question
and it has but blindly born witness to the absolute certainty of our knowledge about reality 1.1
Consistency then, is our absolute criterion of truth, a standard, the application of
which depends ppon faith in the honesty of the universe* Raith cannot be said, as in com-
mon thought, to be something that is added to knowledge but some tiling that is the very pre-
suppo-ition of the attainment of knowledge, Moreover, the test of consistency is not applied^
supported by faith, in a vacuum but to a content whose material is obtained, not merely by
passive observation, but by active, determined search* wile consistency is the formal test
of truth, a material test is also necessary, the presence of all available material to which
the test should be applied. It is ^ossible that the test be applied to a limited content
and yield false conclusions, rectified later by the increase of the material, and the reap-
plication of the test. It is only, therefore, when the mind hr.: beer, open to all available
material, when this has been consist ntly dealt with, when the conditions of further increase
of material have been observed, when none of the data has been blinked for individual rea-
sons, and a determined effort has been made to include all the evidence, that the sense of
certainty may be looked upon as valid. Much will dep>end upon tb h r of the seeker,
and the willingness to be led into further realms of truth whatever its attainment ill cost.
If this shoul I : prove ie of Christian! certainty, there will, therefoi
„
be o cause
for surprise,
„e note again that such search and such life, at times first the results of instinct,
although afterward of conscious purpose, presupposes ago in honesty and consistency otf the
part of the universe. If peradventure, of necessity, accidentally or ith malice- afore-
t, its regular processes ’. ere deceptive ^ the test of consistency would be of no avail.
Such faith in the essential honesty of the universe is as rational : reason, since reasonJs
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criterion presupposes its existence. Jo venture on such faith is as rational as making
application of consistency as a test.
The existence of such faith is as much a primary datum as a material fact. It is
as much an expression of the feature of the world energy as a so-called objective thing.
Cons ide vi from one point of view, as we have said, the constitution of our mental nature
isa subjective matter; but from another it is also objective; and if the inorganic and
animal universe testify to the nature of ultimate reality why should not the whole cosmos
of rational life and mental processes? If now it be asked how shall we distinguish be-
tween this fundamentally rational faith and other faiths possibly irrational, we reply by
correlating them with new facts, if possible, in the flow of experience, as we shall see
in a moment, and again applying the test of consistency.
. I?. The Criterion of Certainty: Consistency Pragjnat ically Defined.
Thus far our examination of the various constituents of our nature, abstractly con-
sidered, has all pointed to consistency as the test of truth. But v/hat do we mean by con-
sistency? This to s,ofiie who know its current meaning seems a superficial question. It
is a state of compatibility and harmony between facts in a system of reality or proposi-
tions in a system of thought. In logical terms it implies the absence of contradiction.
But hov. shall we know when ’.e have found it? Absolutists like F. E. Bradley think it im-
.
possible of achievement save by the absolute mind. An investigation of his definition of
the term in his "Appearance and Reality," yields most remarkable results. He says, for
instance, p. 132, "Everything so far, which we have seen has turned out to be appearance,
j
it is that which taken as it stands proves inconsistent as it stands, and for this reason
cannot be true of the real,'
p, 187. "How appearance is content not at one with its existence, a ’what* loosened
froi its ’that’. And in this sense we have seen that every truth is appearance since in
it we have divorce of quality from being."
p.455. "There is but one Reality and its being consists in experience. In this one
whole all appearances come together, they in varying degrees lose their distinctive natures.
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The essence of reality lies in the union and agreement of existence and content, and on
the other side appearance consists in the discrepancy between these two aspects* And
reality in the end belongs to nothing tut the single real. For take anything no matter
what it is, which is less than the absolute, and the inner discrepancy at once proclaims
that that yon have taken is appearance. The alleged reality divides itself and falls
apart into two jarring factors. The what’ ana the ’that* are plainly two sides t hich turn
out not to be the same, and this difference inherent in every finite fact entails its
disruption. As long as the content stands for something other than its own intent and
meaning, as long as the existence is actually less or more than what it essentially must
imply, so long we are concerned with mere appearance and not with genuine reality. 1
p.14-8. "I nay say for the present that taken in the abstract the practical standard
seems to be the same as v hat is used for theory. It is individuality, the harmonious and
consistent existence of our contents; an existence further, which cannot be limited be-
cause, if so, it would contradict itself internally.''
p. 542 "Our criterion is individuality or the idea of a complete system."
These extracts give us a fairly clear notion of what Bradley means by consistency
aid inconsistency. To him, "inconsistency" means "content not at one with its existence,' 1
"a ’what* loosened from its ’that*” "a divorce of quality from being," which constitute
an inner discrepancy, "hat he means by this is clear enough; but it contains unwarranted
assumptions hidden in his definition of terms that necessarily carry his conclusions with
them. If the assumptions are removed the conclusions fall. T.Te notice first the assump-
tion that thought has the power to separate the "what" and the : that" or content from
existence, which he himself, in another connection, declares inseparable; that thought has
the power in a. judgment to apply a content belonging to one existence to another. But why
should anyone suppose that the idea of a reality and the idea cf a quality should ever
coalesce when the nature of the ideas prohibits their identity f Naturally because they
do not belong together they will not come together. Here, then, we have a failure in thought
and in judgment, an inconsistency that must be surmounted in the absolute. Tor where else
can inconsistencies be surmounted? £0q s not Bradley postulate his absolute for this
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purpose? But how such inconsistency is resolved in the absolute he does not point out.
In reply to Bradley’s assumption it should he noted in the first pi-, ce that thoughts pow-
er of abstraction is ideal only, Then we use the term ''ideal’, moreover, v/e do not use
it in Bradley’s sense. To Bradley an idea is "a quality made loose from its own ex-
istence" and working free from implication from that. To us an idea, if it be an idea of
quality, is the conception of a quality made loose from its own existence, Tut other ideas
are possible. They may include conceptions of quality plus existence. Thought can
never be the same as its object, for by definition subject and object are always implied.
The nearest we approach such a state is in self-consciousness, but no one would conclude
here that the thought of self is oneself. But to Bradley, because subject and object are
by definition other— were they not they would not be subject and object we have, there-
fore, an inconsistency which must be resolved in the absolute.
7/e get closer to the nature of the fallacy under which Bradley labors whta we con-
sider his discussion of the nature of judgment, which he introduces to make clear his
explanation of the relations of the ’what * and the •that”. ' In judgment,' he s-=ys, 'an
idea is predicated of a reality." The point is',5 he says again, "whether with every judg-
ment we do not find an aspect of existence, absent from the predicate but present in the
subject, and whether in the synthesis of these aspects v:e have not got the essence of
judgment. Judgment is essentially the reunion of twfo aides ’what* and ’•that’, provision-
ally estranged." Time is not given here to enter into a long discussion on the nature of
the ’Judgment. Bradley’s notion is the old one that a judgment is a proposition made up
of three parts, subject, predicate and copula. In positive judgments the last joins the
others, in negative separates them. Bearing on the general matter we submit this paragraph
from Creighton, "An Introductory Logic, p.271. "The view which regards the judgment as
a compound of two parts— subject and predicate— rests upon the substitution of words
for thoughts. It analyzes the proposition (the verbal or written expression of the judg-
ment instead of the judgment itself. In the proposition the parts do exist independently
of each other. The subject usually stands first and is followed by the predicate. But
there is no such order of parts in a judgment. Then one judges' it is raining* or 'this
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.
is a arum," the piece of knowledge is one, and indivisible, And the act by which this
knowledge is gained is not an external process of joining one part to another, but is
an intellectual reaction by which he recognizes that something not previously understood,
has a certain meaning or significance." We should say, then, in response to Bradley’s
statement, of the relation of the ’what' and the ’that* in judgment that judgment is really
a process of pointing out in the predicate (which by the way may be a ’that’ as well as
a ’what*,e.g. "Fnis horse is a white horse"), what was evidently present but before un-
noticed in the subject. 1 1 is not a real alienation of the ’what* and the ’that*, but an
affirmation by the ideal power of thought that they are combined in the subject in factual
unity.
Referring again to the quotations which indicate Bradley’s notion of consistency,
we notice that by it he means further, "individuality", "the harmonious existence of our
contents in an unlimited whole, otherwise they would contradict themselves internally"
But consistency as absolute harmony, individuality, all inclusiveness, infinity, we never
reach, and consequently we can never know wh&t consistency really is. To apply it as a
test is, therefore, impossible: we can never compare the finite idea with infinite truth.
This in substance is the charge the pragmatist makes against all absolutist systems
of thought, T'e are not to be held as supporting all that so-called pragmatists have said
in defining and defending that attitude and those conclusions generally gathered together
under the term'TPx-agmatism." Prof. Lovejoy, in more or less good faith, enumerates seven-
teen different kinds, and Prof. James, one of its most brilliant exponents, is by no means
always consistent in his expositions of it as a system of thought. We subscribe to that
which follows, however, which is a synopsis of the cape for pragmatism as presented by
Prof. A. W. IToore in his work, "Pragmatism and Its Critics,"
As a theory of knowledge designed to become a test of truth, pragmatism is an out -
come of modern scientific method, and a reaction against idealistic absolutie®. Against
SH
absolutist it brings a charge involving two principal counts. Pirst absolutism furnishes
no satisfactory criterion for the determination of truth; secondly it shows no interest
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in, or vital connection with our practical affairs
,
the demands of which brought it into be-
ing. Pragmatists in general believe that the search for correlation between things and
unity throughout all is the outcome of an intellectual demand for knowledge of the laws
of the universe that should make possible a better control of the elements of individual
and social experience. And as Plat o argued for the existence of a metaphysical world
of universal and immutable reality to save society from the disintegrating evil of Sophis-
tical scepticism, so the modern absolutist, to find fixity in this changing world f^^to gain
the authority of an all-embracing truth in the face of anarchical scepticism^ evolved the
doctrine of the absolute, and now ignores the very practical demand that brought absolu-
tism into being.
In general the absolutist makes the universe the product of an absolute mind, hold-
ing past, present, and future in indivisible unity, an eternal idea, comprehending all
that has been, all that is, and all that will be. This makes the universe static. Pro-
gress may seem to be going on in time, but as time is only phenomenal, progress is appar-
ent not real. The duty of the search for truth, then, involves approximation to the ab-
solute idea, making man’s ideas copies of it. But this the seeker after truth can never
accomplish, as his mind is finite, as liis mental processes are many not one, and occur in
succession. Yet absolute truth we know there is affording a safe haven from universal
scepticism.
How ensues a rapid fire of question and answer between the pragnatist and the ab-
solutist which serves to bring out the pragmatists position with clearness and force.
Pragmatist: Y/hy is it a duty to search after the absolute truth when you can never attain
it? Absolutist: Because from its possession, even though not absolute, high practical
values result.
Pragmatist: Y/hat do you mean when you say that some ideas are true and some are
false? Absolutist: Our ideas are true when they coincide with the absolute thought and
false when they do not; relatively true in proportion as they coincide; and relatively
false as they do not. The true idea is the one which would require the least revision.
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.
the least change, to make it coincide with the immutable reality.
Pragmatist: And how shall we know when they do or do not coincide, more or less?
Y.'e appeal to the facts, the plain everyday facts of history and science. If we wish to
know what ideas would suffer the least revision by the absolute reality we have simply
to go to history and science, and observe, as a matter of fact
,
what ideas and judgments
have been and are being, revised.
Here the pragnatist temporarily rests his case, believing that its force is based
in the answer he has drawn from the absolutist. Y/hat we call truth is an ideal abstract
of the working of the universe as we find it. If the universe be phenomenal, represent-
ing some more ultimate reality back of it, such operation is an expression of its nature,
and, if fundamental reality be personal, of its purpose, if there be any question of the
validity of truth as we hold it, then apparent truth must be related back to the facts,
either new or old. The pragmatic attempt is merely to test apparently consistent con-
clusions by correlating them to new or old facts in changing experiences, if the universe
be a consistent one— and only thus is the test of consistency of any worth— then truth
will work in the sense that experiment will reveal it as agreeing with the workings of
the universe, the nature of the physical world, inorganic or organic, and the constitu-
tioxi of human nature. If the old conclusions harmonize with the new facts, our certainty
of their truth grows; if not, we must make new search and possibly revision. It is a
matter of fact that in human life a theory can hardly be made to work unless first it is
accounted true; but it is also a matter of fact that unless true, however first accounted
true, in the long run it will not work, as not squaring, with the practical situation in
which it is applied. As a consequence a preliminary test is generally one of consistency
in ideas; a second test is an experiment to see how a theory will work, of consistency in
practice, llany times, indeed, a theory, apparently inconsistent in idea, working out in
practice, will unearth new data, making it quite clear that instead of being inconsistent
in theory, it is quite consistent here also.
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Summarizing, nov;, the results of our discussion, we should say that a valid general^
certainty depended on the presupposition of faith in the honesty of the universe; an at-
titude of the will, the willingness to know the truth and increase our data; and finally
the application of a test, consistency as related to the data of experience, if we de-
mand these for the establishment of certainty in general, it will not appear strange if
they are needed also for the establishment of Christian certainty at the nature of which
we shall nov: take a glance.
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Part II. The ITature of Christian Certainty in Relation to Certainty in General.
V.e have canvassed the grounds of certainty in general. It is nor necessary to ask
rhat re mean hy the specifically Christian certainty, and what;* if any, is its relation
to certainty in general. Then we speak Christian certainty we instinctively include
a more or less definite area of propositions and experiences of which the Christian feels
as certain as he does of anything: belief in the existence of God, an infinite Person,
altogether good, who in holy love and loving righteousness and justice, creates, sustains,
and orders all; the facts of revelation, including the incarnation g&rfnaHB and the ex-
istence of the Trinity. We think of Christianity’s teaching concerning man’s nature as
sinful and needing redemption; as an heir of immortality with its hatural consequences in
eternal welfare and condemnation. V.e think of the fa.cts of Christian experience, and the
processes of faith, conviction, repentance, regeneration^ and sanctification. Restrained
by the limits of our paper, we can deal with these alone. To exhibit them in their mutual
coherence and congruity— if as in the case or certainty in general, consistency be the
te;t that must be applied to the Christian certainty— is a task that requires the utmost
condensation. Volumes have been written on each of tnese subjects, and even on inor de-
tails connect d with them. To establish their consistency, as we have defined it, is to
establish the Christian certainty, hut having done even this we shall rail short of
logical completeness, to attain the latter we should also have to consider Christianty’s
teaching concerning man, not only as an individual, but also m the social aggregate, and
of its programme, for him in this social capacity with its description of the nature of
the kingdom of heaven, 7/e should also have to consider the nature oi his cooperative
labors in church and state xor Christianity’s extension. Finally we should have to ex-
amine the conviction that in its essentials Christianity will never be superseded, that
whatever are the changing conditions or human existence, the gospel message and method of
life will he adequate for them all.
in
"e note A ;he first place that part of the objects of the Christian certainty, as for
example, the belief in personal Deity, are also objects or cert inly in general. They are
presuppositions oi Christian experience, concluded to be true, on the basis of which the
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.venture of the Christian life is made* By common consent entrance into that life does not
radically change the nature of our mental processes, or the standards by vhich v/e judge of
truth. It introduces us into a ne’ sphere of evidence that may change our conception of
the truhh, but does not change its criteria, When one enters the Christian life it is in
response to the demands of sense, of thought, and of moral conviction, and as in the case
of. the extension of the sphere of evidence in the realm of natural certainty, it is by an
effort of the will, by a practical venture that for its subject is in the nature of an
experiment. Consistency operating In a vacuum would yield but little truth: it is but the
formal condition or knowledge. The material condition is the evidence afforded by exper-
ience, and if the natural man deliberately refuses to embark upon a new sea of evidence be-
cause of the personal cost involved, if he does not respond to the demands of consistency,
as applied to evidence from sense, thought, feeling, and moral conviction, he need not
complain that the criterion does not yield him the same results as it does the Christian*
At the same time for the Christian there is no other standard of truth, The senses
may be purified and so yield nor luminous evidences; -thought may be quickened and mental
insight enlarged; feeling may be deepened and enobled; moral conviction grow more intense
in the struggle of maintaining the integrity of the Christian life; and the field of evi-
dence largely increase. Yet few Christians have laid claim to any direct divine illumin-
ation, any magic increase of insight, any immediate powers of intuition other than those
common to man*s normal intellectual and emotional nature, ’.That h. C. Sheldon says on this
subject in relation to the direct intuition of cod will apply equally v;ell to all so-called
directly intuitive knowledge. 'If the intuition or direct mental vision is regarded as
common to men, it ought to have secured a much more uniform conception of the divine nature
re'llan is found to have actually existed. If the intuition is allowed to be exceptional, an
explanation of its limited presence may reasonably be asked for. Moreover, there is a cer-
tain intrinsic difficulty in conceiving ox such an intuition. A limited mind, though it
undoubtedly has the thought of the infinite cannot be regarded as competent actually to see
the infinite. An intuition of cod in His infinitude is therefore excluded. .But if the
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intuition is not of Gou in His infinitude, it is of something less than God, This lesser
something may indeed partially reveal God by way of token or suggestion; hut it cannot he
anything more then a limited theophany presented to the inner vision. Such a theophany,
as veil as any Other partial disclostire, would need to he supplemented hy rational infer-
ence; end the question could he raised whether it would he a surer ground of inference than
that which is provided in nature and in the moral constitution of man. It would in any case
need to he well coordinated with a system of objective reality before assurance could he
given that it was due to anything more than a peculiar subjective affection." (System of
Christian roctrine£>.7E)
Such a conclusion is not only in the line of rational inference, hut in accord with
the practical needs of the case in presenting the truth to others, and follows the teach-
iiig of Divine-- revelation. The need of embarking on the great Christian experiment for the
increase of data makes fair appeal to his reason, when a standard no different ,and there-
fore not incomprehensible ,is urged. Sufficient witness can he produced reliable enough ;o
to jncite to the venture as in any other field of scientific discovery; and the decision
made to depend on the self-evidencing power of the new experience.
Ghat professes to he Divine revelation, also, calls for the progressive increase of
certainty Ijr the enlargement of knowledge hy efforts of the will in practical activity. The
invitation of the Psalmist is, "Taste and see that the lord is good." The teaching of the
Old Testament cn this point may he summed up in the words, "Then shall we know, if we follow
on to know the Lord." At no one time can society or the . individual he looked upon as pos-
*
sessing all the truth. Insofar as Eradley is thinking of the possession of all possible
data, and so must postulate an absolute mind,his definition of consistency, in terms of a
peculiar, all-embracing individuality is sound. "I have yet many things to say unto youfi,
said Jesus to his disciples, who were growing in their ability to apprehend his teaching,
hut whc needed the turn of practical affairs to make them sensitive and receptive, "hut ye
cannot hear them now." 'l.ct by their roots, hut hy their fruits", is Prof. James paraphrase
of the oft-repeated words of Jesus. Christianity presents itself to-day as the result of
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the progressive unfoldnent of a revelation extending over centuries. Only on fundamentals
does it take a final position. Of other realms of reality it says, 'Tow we look through
a glass darkly/ Said Jesus at the feast of the tabernacles, indicating the material stan-
dard by which one can attain certainty relative zo Christian fundamentals, "He that willeth
to do his will, he shall know of the teaching whether it be of cod or whether l speak of
myself." In saying this he took it for granted that the achieving of truth was conditioned
upon the proper attitude in life to the ’-ractical issues. Insofar as we live in accord
with the truth, as it becomes apparent to us, we grow in ability further to attain it.
7,'ords of the apostles, a. few of which we quote may be similarly construed* 'Trove all things
says St. Paul, "hold fast to that which is good, abstain from every ion- of evil," in these
words implying the practical nature of the test. Likewise St. John says, ; Beloved, believe
not every spirit, but prove the spirits whether they are of God; because many fr lse prophets
are gone ;ut inxo the world; and then he sets a test which has gener lly, though not always,
proved an eminently practical one. In like manner the author of the Bpistle to the Hebrews
exhorts, "Take heed, brethen, lest haply there should be in any of yo" an evil heart of un-
belief/ also implying that continued hold upon truth is dependent upon our practical atti-
tude toward it.
Eov; such a venture, either in new experiences that furnish additional data, or in the
reapplication of the criterion ox consistency, does not proceed without the exercise of the
same kind of faith which we concluded was prerequisite tc certainty m general. In the lat-
ter case it meant a self-committal to truth as an ideal; in the Christian sense it means a
self-committal to the person of God as revealed in Christ of .hose nature truth is merely the
expression. In both cases such a faith is something more and deeper than an intellectual
assent to any given number of prcpositi'ns; it is a presupposition,- and personal dedication
to it,—involving the honesty of the universe, that alone makes knowledge and certainty pos-
sible; without which existence is an enigma, a joke, a huge farce, devoid of either meaning
or explanation. But in the Christian sense, instead of being directed toward an impersonal
honesty pervading the universe, the faith is in r verson or \tfhose nature honesty is the ex-
ho therefore may be looked upon fcoth 01 1£ •• -* ental
.^nesty
or consistency
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and the guarantee or its continuance.
if faith in the essential honesty or the universe, an attitude of will issuing in
activity of the life in accord with knowledge already gained to increase the amount of
evidence, and continued application of the criterion of consistency, are needed for the
establishment or certainty in general, we need not be surprised that they are needed for
the establishment of Uhristian certainty, i]ach ox these xundamental elements has its own
implications, which we will consider as we apply the test or consistency to the fundamen-
tal positions ox Christian thought and lire. The field here, however, is so vast that what
we say can only be suggestive and implies a wide understanding of •‘11 the issues at stake
and the evidence at hand, un many or the points or interest on which we cannot touch huge
volumes have been written, but all any of tnese efforts can do is to show an open and
persist -nt mind to all available evidence and to indicate Its place in a presumably con-
sistent system; a constant correlation of new results with evidence that has already been
gained, and agiin the application of the criterion or consistency fcs we have already de-
fined it.
but why should we conclude that there is always tne same relation between the theor-
etical and the practical in the field ox tne religious life as in the sphere of the mater-
ial world, so that knowledge of how theories work gives indication ox how the world is
actually constituted*’ in reply we point o r that much ox tne evidence put to tne test of
consistency is a/ tne outcome 01 desire, impulse, and conscious and determined search
to satisfy the religious instincts as well :: the instinct for theoretic few.
. juch re-
ligious instincts, when permanent * d regualr.are t; be lonce it l as s outcome of the
operations of ultimate reality as much as is the constitution of our strictly intellectual
nature. The religious—or rather irreligious— sceptic inquires scornfully ""hy should
it be imagined that the -hole universe was built for tl V f n fthe upbuilding of
his moral and sp ritual nature?” To be sure -ithout such faith civilization might soon col-
lapse, morality might soon be no.more, and the race, perhaps, soon become extinct, but -hat
of it? That relation hr • such utcome to truth? It might as well he bed, “Why should it
be conjectured tint 'he hole universe ’ t bean built to correspond to t'v: cognitive
instincts of man, ' o n~spond
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to the test of consistency? measured in terms of numbers, t'-.i c interests, in the purely
intellectual ae coup aratively few. Suppose speculative interest should cease V V.liy should
truth, so-called, he regarded as any-thin_ more than a great desideratum? The adequate
answer in both cases is, not merely that human life, would come to a standstill without
response to both instincts, but that the results gained from response to their impulse just-
ify themselves in- experience, A close relation, such as one would expect, if all phases of
life were built together in unity and consistency, is seen to exist between the true and
the good, between theistic and Christian conceptions of the universe and admittedly higher
phases of human life; and contrariwise between atheistic conceptions and the admittedly
lower forms of human life. T.'e conclude that our theories of the natural world are true
when we find that the actual operation of the ''objective” world illustrates and confirms
them. By the same logic we must conclude that our metaphysical theories are true, not only
when they are illustrated and confirmed by what we call the natural and material universe,
by
“but^the world of human nature which is one function of a whole objective order. It is a
matter of fact that in human life a theory can hardly be made to work unless first it is
accounted true; but it is also a matter of fact that, unless true, however first accounted
true, in the long run it will not work, as it sets out to work, as not squaring with the
nature of the practical situation in which it is applied. Thus the tests of theory and
practice must continually supplement each other, and the truth determined by consistency
between the parts of each respectively and between each other. If in construing the uni-
verse morally and spiritually religion be accused of anthropomorphism, science in constru-
ing it logically and rationally is open to the same charge. The form of this statement is
a he common disjunction between religion and science. Better, because
far truer, is the statement that we cannot deny our nature in any part; that it, in its
highest and most constant aspects, is an indication of the nature of ultimate reality; and
that of the many kinds of anthropomorphisms possible, since some kind is necessary, that
is most consistent which is forced on us by fidelity to the facts.

3e
.art III. ?h* tion of the criterion or Certainty to Christian Experience.
A. To the : Objective 1 Truths of the Christian System.
1. belief in God.
belief in God, as an infinite Person, limited, if at all, by self-imposed restrictions*
altogether holy, who in perfect love creates, sustains, and orders all, is the cardinal truth
of tne Christian system. Granting this, all else may easily folio?:; denying or doubting
this, Christianity is no more. Is belief in God consistent with all tne data that the ex-
perience of the individual and the race affords? In accord with the analysis that has gone
before, consistency must be the test, faith in an honest universe, the presupposition, and
a willingness to obtain ail available data the moral characteristic of the investigator.
Peeper than these none can go* and without them there can be no progress m certainty, but,
in their turn, these have their deep-lying implications. They are expressions ox the pro-
foundest constitution of human nature. It surely is an expression oi the nature or ulti-
mate reality, as we have said, considered apart irom individual irregularities and pecul-
iarities, it has its objective validity • s a piece ox evidence. If any material ract is to
be regarded as a pie«e ox valid evidence so must the nature of tne human mind, if it be
looked upon as bearing a possioiy false message, so also must the physical fact, indeed, if
the former oe under suspicion, tnen douoly so tne latter, as less immediate than the iormer,
as at one rarther remove^ xrom the most fundamental experience of selr-conseiousness and
self-activity. Por our oniy knowledge of physical fact is dependent upon the experience of
self-activity, giving assurance of our own existence, and tne interplay oi that activity
with activity from without; just as the knowledge oi the existence of otner persons is de-
pendent upon the interplay of their activities and ours, in other words tne category of
causality is an expression Of our active nature, as it may be tnat tne category ox substance
or oeing is tne expression oi our more pas. ive self-consciousness, if then we can trunk
at all oi tne existence nu activity ox any ultimate reality it is only because ve believe
in the honesty of the universe, of which tne whole or human nature may rightly De called a
function; and seize upon the clue afforded by our nature, lio reason exists, furthermore,
why m similar manner we should not conclude concerning similar aspects or its n: cure, grant-
ing that we make due allowance for our limitations ana its iniina^de, our
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possibly inferior choices and its possibly superior creative activities. The adoption of
consistency as a test, moreover, postulates consistency in the nature of the world-ground*
As Bradley points out, in its highest form and at least in some sense, consistency means
individuality and comprehensiveness. It points to unity on the part of the ultimate reality*
This need not mean unity of Being necessarily, a. substance without any interior distinctions
or sishstances without mutually '"terior distinctions, "but certainly points to oneness of
purpose and of activity. Otherwise consistency has no worth as a test.
T'ith equal legitmacy, if in consistency these be needed as an explanation of experience,
we can postulate personality, self-consciousness and self-direction of the ultimate reality;
indeed ethical intensity with all the higher characteristics summed up under the term "holy
love." Actually, without such postulate, we cannot consistently explain our own existence.
Our experience of activity convinces us that the operating power to produce an effect vaiies
in accord with the product desired, but is always, in a real sense, adequate. So also must It
be, we conclude, with the ultimate reality. If personality^ thical intensity, holy love are
parts of our nature, then they must also, in some sense inhere in the cause, 7‘e cannot
otherwise explain the peculiar fundamental nature of our mental life and experience. At
bottom this rests on self-consciousness involving a duality of subject and object. Can
unconsciousness bring forth self-consciousness? Can absolute unity without interior dis-
tinctions bring forth a duality of subject and object? Can ehance or necessity bring forth
freedom? Can ethical indifference bring forth righteousness* or selflessness, unselfish love?
One can think of no reason why we have a right to postulate in ultimate reality the existence
of qualities corresponding to the consciously lower, though these be regarded as essential,
and not to the higher, if these be regarded as just as essential.
e have put what we may call the argument from human nature first because all the others,
the argument from interaction, the cosmological, teleological, moral, and religious, depend
upon it. The argument fro- interaction postulates the existence of an absolute
,
which though
immanent in the interacting parts of a system, is yet also, in some sense, transcendent. It
must be neither one of the parts nor their mere sun. Such a demand arises primarily from the
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conscious experience of a rersonality in control of its voluntary organs, a system of in-
teracting parts, in which, in the mystery of psychophysical unity, it is "both immanent and
transcendent. It is neither one of the members, or like a dead body, their aggregate.
Secondarily, the argument is the result of the experience of putting together rarts of a
machine, whose operations are immanently guided by the purposive idea and trsnscendently
directed by the creative personality.
The cosmological argument is merely a narrow form of that from interaction. It de-
mands a cause, and an adequate cause, to explain the existence of the world, the inorganic,
and the organic, the m&teril, plant, animal, and human, severally functions of a whole, the
others no less objective in their natures than any one. It is no sufficient criticism of
this argument to say, as one has said. (Schulta j Outlines of Christian Apologetics, p.10#)
"To our thought, inseparably bound up as it is, with the lav; of causality, the right must
be denied of making assertions concerning a. being that is to be thought of as exempt from
precisely this law." 3ut such exemption is conceived to he due. to the fact that this cause
is self-sufficient and eternally existing, a truly first cause, not involved, as is a sec-
ondary, in >a causal nexus, but thought of as the presupposition of the whole. In this the
mind can consistently rest as it could not in an eternal regress.
The teleological argument, or argument from design, roots back in our own purposive
experiences. This does not militate against it any more than the fact that our exper-
iences of individuality and consistency furnish us our intellectual criterion. Reaching
out, we find apparent signs of design operating in the world, and, if we discover nothing
apparently decisive to the contrary, we must conclude in favor of design; for apparent signs
are all the signs we have one way or the other. At great length, and with greater skill
and surpassing insight, Janet has worked out the argument in his great classic, "Final Causes
A subpoena to evolution and natural selection has not broken down its testimony. Evolution
is but the description of a process whose beginning and end can only be accounted for on a
theistic basis, and RafwIn himself .could not explain the tenancies to variation without the
aid of purpose. To call upon chance is to discount scientific law—which is nothing but a
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description of vfoat regularly happens without, in response to experiences ’ at gularly
happens withii - a d to fly in the face of . ~o evoke the help of necessity is
to fall hack upon ignorance, and to start upon an eternal re res where the bl t
end is vher it was with. us in the beginning of • our recession.
V.lien we demand, moreover, an ethical nature in the absolute to explain our moral
nature and justify its categorical commands, we but respond to the demands of consistency.
So Sidgwick concludes in his masterly work on "The Llethods of Ethics" (p,472) "Still to all
this it is fairly and conclusively replied that the existence of these, however elevated
desires, does not furnish a proof of the existence of their object: indeed, it can Scarcely
afford a strong presumption in favor of this conclusion considering a large proportion of
human desires experience shows destined to disap] ointment. But it must he urged eg' in that
we do not fully .conceive the argument in favor of the assumption that we are now considering,
if we mer ly represent this as satisfying certain desires, ' e have rather to regard it
hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fund "mental contradiction in a vast system of be-
liefs: a contradiction so fundamental that if it cannot be overcome the whole system must
fall to the ground and scepticism be triumphant over one chief department of our thought,'
3o finally also when we call for an object for the high satisfaction of our religioxis
n bures we merely ask for what genuine consistency demands, he speak not now of superficial,
irregular, and transient desires, impulses, and feelings, but prefound and permanent ex-
pressions of human nature on its consciously highest plane; not merely the product of one
age, place, or atmosphere, but of all tines and climes, and often arising from the most
fetid moral conditions; expressions of human nature, that, if the trend of our reasoning be
sound, are also expressions of the nature of the absolute. Abandoning these we must aban-
don j : ,f andoning ..... y, ba v '•* j ...l.
It may be replied, as it has been replied, that such conclusion is pose if 1- alone cn
the basis of a tremendous faith, and demands further the continuance of a great practical ven-
ture to justify it. Our response is that, though not alwajgyo discerned, tl e most superficial
application of the c^non of consistency at bottom implies a similarly tremendous faith, gen-
erally overlooked because the practical risks are small; and in its essential nature, as
great a practical venture
,
though no degree of heroism be involved.
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It remains for v.s o inquire whether any fonp of inper: civ lism will consistently ex-
plain ourselves and the universe. Sidgwick "or instance hintm r t this las do other when they
talk of the " suprape rsonal—whatever that nay he) when spe-’ing of the fund- i c h • 1 moral in-
tuitions: (Methods of Ethics p.470) 'I find that 1 undoubtedly seem tc perceive as clearly
and certi inly as l see any axiom in Arithmetic and Geometry that it is right and reasonable*
and the * dictate -of reason’
,
and ’my duty’ to treat every man : - 1 should thinl< that i myself
Ought to he treated in precisely similar circumstances, and tc do what I believe to he ul-
timately conducive to Universal Good or Happiness." To hold these, however, in consistency,
he must believe in the existence of a supreme being who will adequately reward him for obey-
ing the rule of duty or punish hi:, for violating it; or in the existence of an impersonal
Law that -rives guarantee of such reward and punishment'.' In a foot-note he remarks Ip,470)
"It is not necess ry, if we are simply considering ethics as a possibly independent science*
to throw the fundamental premise of which we are now examining the validity into a The is tic
form. ITor does it always seem to have taken that for in the support which Positive Religion
has given tc Morality. In the Buddist Greed this notion of the rewards inseparably attaching
to right conduct seems "o have developed in a far more elaborate and systematic manner than
it has in any phase of Christianity. But .as conceived by enlightened Buddhists these rewards
are not distributed by the volition of a Supreme Person, but by the Katural Operation of an
impersonal Law."
Let it be said in the first place that in any discussion which goes down to the nature
of ultimate reality, ethics or any other discipline cannot be considered as a possibly in-
dependent science. Consistency reouires that it and its conclusions must be related to all
other fields of knowledge, made harmonious with these or modified. Too often the scientist
starts on his investigation with metaphysical presuppositions that are no necessary outcome
of his science or any other. If the business of the scientist is to register the coexistences
and sequences of the phenomenal order, and not to attempt to explain then, ultimately, then
the moment he reads his postulates into his conclusions he transgresses on the sphere of
philo sphy and surrenders his scientific authority.
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In the light of the nature of thought and the widest experience is it possible to
speak consistently of the natural operation' of impersonal Lav* The conception or natural
lav is hut n ; bstracticn from the regular operations of cur lives, the self-chosen reg-
ularity of our several personalities and, as Ward points cut, arises by analogy fi*on civil
lav. The term in its common use presupposes a self-running universe in accord with a fixed
method. But lav is merely the statement of the nature of a process; it initiates or con-
cludes nothing; it is not a source of efficiency. The enforcement of human lav depends on
personality. On vhat does the operation of so-called natural lav depend? Only three ex-
planations are possible; on chance, necessity, or personality.
To explain the vorld by chance has nov become so grotesque as to meet everywhere with
ridicule. Chance and consistency are mutual enemies. In a vorld vher ‘ ce rules and
anything may happen, consistency can hardly be expected. Lav, of vhich ve are trying to
give some explanat ion fand chance are incompatible and mutually contradictory; where chance
reigns there can be ho law. '.Ve need merely appeal to the tine-vom illustration of the im-
possibility of a series of throws of fonts of type producing an Iliad to scout the possi-
bility of chance producing a universe.
Our second recourse is to necessity. But with appeal to necessity to account for lav
all intellectual life and all genuine moral life must disappear. If so-called moral action
is absolutely determined, the*j, true human responsibility disappears. If the universe pro-
ceeds by necessity, then, as thought is but the product of the movement of atoms, valid dis-
tinctions between truth and falsehood disappear. What ve know as error is as necessary as
vhat ve call truth: no standards of truth are of any genuine value. The apparent poising
of the mind and balancing of evidence, the application of a criterion, the influence of our
character as it opens or bars the door to new evidence, all this is as mechanically deter-
mined as the movements of the parts of a machine without regard to the mind which constructed
it. But the primary witness of our own experience is that of c:u 1 activity and self-di-
rection; and to impose upon ourselves the abstractions of our own regular operations, used for
practical purposes to cls.rify the operations of the universe w ithout, is to proceed in an
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order reverse to the testimony of experience. Talcing the clue from our on: eoqperience, the
regularities of which, as far as its abiding elements are concerned, are as objective as
any possible elements from the world without, for definitions sake we may concede that what
we call the natural, is a description of what happens without, and conclude, if this appear
consistent, that the regularity is one personally directed. That we call the natural will,
therefore, be the uniform in the operations of infinite personality, and what we call the
miraculous a departure from such uniformity.
On no other but personal grounds car. we adequately explain the nature of the categories.
It is because he attempts to explain these in abstraction from personality that Bradley finds
so many theoretical inconsistencies in what to us, as matter of experience, is practically
so consistent. Unity, personally interpreted, is the expression of self-conscious oneness
over against the plurality of mental eperations and states; identity is the consciousness
of such unity, persisting amid all change, the self-equality of intelligence throughout
experience; causality is the expression of the creative activity, the initiating power of
the human mind in its self-determining capacities, Impersonalisn cannot construe the rel-
ations between permanence and change; personalism finds these in the abiding nature of the
self in its manifold experiences.
These epistemeological and metaphysical objecti:ns may be urged against all anti-.-
theistlc theories, Positivism, Agnosticism, Materialism, Pantheism, as far as they involve
accounts of the nature of ultimate reality. This Positivism resolutely refuses to do.
Cf its strange religion of humanity as proposed by Comte we need not speak* The deep
demands of practical life, closely related to theory, have passed judgment upon it, and
it has duly found its place in the museum of religious curiosities. It pioffcsses to know
of nothing save of phenomena and their laws that describe the constant resemblances that
link phenomena together and the constant sequences which unite then as antecedent and cond
sequent*’, covered by the general term science. But Comte, its chief representative, finds
it entirely impossible to aviod metaphysical questions. Phenomena are appearances of
something to somebody; they are not affirmable as such without Epistemological assumptions
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of which Comte never things; and, as affirmable, have implications the fczistence of which
he never suspects. Law, as we have seen, is a term that implies much, and is impossible
of rational understanding s?ve by that introspective knowledge, now dignified as the science
of Paedology, Whose piriSU ' 111 5 ccstfa would not allow, But whore otherwise do t the
- notions of simultaneity and sequence, than from consciousness and its activities? Che
question whether mind is necessary in its action or freely directs itself he never answered,
because he never truly understood the problem of knowledge: he assumed the validity of
knowledge in a naive realism long since discredited. Positivism must of necessity adopt
the test of consistency as the only test of truth, and still refuses to accept its primary
implication, a consistent universe, at bottom honest, open to scrutiny, and thus subject
to valid knowledge.
Like Positivism, Agnosticism, of which Herbert Spencer is the chief representative,
assumes a naive realism which overlooks all epistemological problems and their implications.
It never asks how the mind gets its knowledge, and what are the conclusions that must be
drawn from its nature and activity. Instead, moreover, of observing a neutral attitude
toward the question of theism, which a presumable ignorance calls for, it concludes that
ultimate reality is ’unknowable’; but in the attempt manifests what John Stuart Hill calls
prodigious amount of knowledge concerning the Unknowable. Prof. H.C, Sheldon in his
''Unbelief in the nineteenth Century” Ip. 101 j thus sums up the foundations of Spencers Ag-
nosticism: ''The grounds of Spencer’s doctrine of the Unknowable’' -re derived in large part
from the speculations of Hamilton and hansel. Appeal is made to Hamilton’s doctrine that
to think means to condition, and that consequently the unconditioned, whether infinitely
great or infinitely little, lies entirel.- beyond the sphere of thought. The like doctrine
is cited from hansel, and the same scepticl believer is drawn upon for the demonstration
that the absolute and inrinite.as having a possible existence out of all relations, cannot
be consistently regarded as a cause, or a self-conscious subject, or indeed as the bearer
of any intelligible predicate. To considerations of this order dpencer adds the assumption
that knowledge always subsists in and through the classification of its ODjects, and that
the ultimate reality, as being incapable of assignment to a class, is plainly Unknowable."
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But as Prof. Sheldon likewise points out, to think does not mean to limit; it may
indicate the absence of all limitations, as to enumerate the attributes of the infinite
may be but to exhibit from every possible p^oint of view that the object of thought is un-
conditioned. So with Dean hansel’s definition of the absolute as not involved in relations.
Such an absolute would not e affirmable. But its relations are not to be conceived of as
necessary but as freely-chosen and self-imposed. All that is needed is independent and
self-sufficient being, accounting for all things adequately; but certainly what is needed
is not a vacuum, interior distinctions, illustrated by the variety in unity, characteristic
of our highest known existence, may ohly exhibit its surpassing richness. Horeovefc, the
absolute as unique is not possible of classification. Things may be defined through contrast
as well as similarity; as similar, in that they are represented by the highest categories;
as contrasted, in that they possess these in infinite measure, Thile formally denying all
this, Spencer is compelled actually to make large admissions. Phenomena as manifestations
must be in relation to the unknowable; and it, to be of use to him, must be one, must be
power, must 'ce infinite, must be eternal, and must he creative in the sense that from it
all things proceed, indeed, as Bradley points out, the mere adoption of consistency as a
test vacates Agnosticism. The postulate that reality is consistent, while apparently mean-
ing little, we have already seen to mean much.
Though repudiating the charge of materialism, Spencer’s philosophy has more affili- -
ation here than anywhere else. He relies upon matter in its arrangment and movement to
account for the universe, inorganic and organic, unconscious and conscious. But the cause
is not adequate to the effect, and Spencer’s showy rormula ox evolution upon examination
fails to yield results. The doctrine or the conservation of energy, as ,.ard points out, is
not an axiom but an induction, whose all-inclusive range depends upon the finite nature of
the world. The doctrine or the instability oi the homogeneous is a contradiction in terms
and a gainsaying or experience. Absolute homogeneity means absolute stability, a changeless
condition unless moved upon from the outside, which, when the homogeneous is all-comprehen-
sive, does not exist. "Evolution”, he says, "is an integration or matter and a concomitant
dissipation or motion; during which the matter passes rrom an indefinite, incoherent
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homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity ; and during which the retained motion
undergoes a parallel transformation 1 ’’ (hirst principles, par. 14b;. put the mere arrangement
of material molecules, th*ir rapid or slow motion, lends no insight into the passage from
the inorganic to the organic, or from life to mind. As prof. Koyce summarizes the matter:
"The requirement of the situation is not that the philosopher should tell us (truly encu^i)
that evolution involves both shrinkings and swellings, both mixings and sortings, both var-
iety and order, but that he should snow us how these various tendencies are, in the various
types or evolutionary process, kept in that peculiar balance, which each time constitutes
an evolution. This is what Spencer seems nor ro have done." (Koyce, nerbert Spencer, An
Estimate and a peview p. 114,11b. quoted by Sheldon, ’Ihibelief etc. p. 117)
Spencer 1 s failure to lend insight to the passage from the inorganic to the organic
he admits in his reference with ludicrous erfect to two missing volumes or the Synthetic
Philosophy, those on inorganic Evolution. "The closing chapters of the second or these
volumes,’ he says, "were it written, would deal wish the evolution of organic matter, the
step preceding the evolution or living forms, habitually carrying with me in thought the
contents of this unwritten chapter, 1 have in some cases, expressed myself as though the
reader had it before him; and have thus rendered some of my statements liaDle to miscon-
struction." (principles of biology sterotyped ed. vol. X p. 4e0) his further failure to
make the transition from life to consciousness, needs in rhe same way no comment except his
own words describing the supposed beginnings of consciousness. "Those abilities which an
intelligent creature possesses, of recognizing diverse external objects and of adjusting its
actions to composite phenomena or various kinds, imply a power of combining many separate
impress ions. These separate impressions are received by the senses— by different parts of
the body. It they go r.c further than the places at vhich they are received, they are use-
less*- That an effectual adjustment may he made they must all be brought into rela-
tion with one another. But this implies some center common to them all through which they
can pass; and as they cannot pass through it simultaneously they must pass through it in
succession, so that as the external phenomena responded to become greater in
'
ore
complicated in kind, the variety and rapidity of the changes to which w.is common confer Ox
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communication is subject must increase- there must result an unbroken series of these changes
there must arise a consciousness."
Much, the sane, speculative difficulties, holding against materialism we may urge a-
gainst pantheism. While materialism makes matter all that is essential, and mind but its
effect, pantheism makes both the coordinate expressions of s unitary being. But both make
change the result of necess- ry evolution, and find no God outside the physical universe
other than as coming to expression in finite consciousness. Pantheism will not ascribe per-
sonality to the Infinite. All the speculative objections, therefore, against necessita-
rianism may be urged against pantheism, and all the felt speculative need for personalise also.
The relation between the theoretical and the practical is abundantly illustrated
in the foregoing aiscussi_n of theistic doctrine by the disproportionate stress placed
upon the doctrine of the personality of God. At equal length we could speak of other at-
tributes; but personalism absorbs attention because around- it controversy has most largely
centered. Take for granted honest and consistent personality back of the universe, and
much ioIIows without lengthy debate. Immutability naturally follows from this; spirituality-
if anything more than is implied by personality- from the insufficiency of matter; unity
may be predicated from interaction; omnipotence admitted, though a finite world, however ex-
tended, only hints at, but does not demand, an infinite God, and though free will imposes
temporary limitations on his ultimate purposes; eternity is presupposed by the transcenden-
tal nature of the First Cause, out of the causal nexus as the precondition of interaction,
ana by the ideal nature of time; omniscence from His personality no rsnme of His power;
righteousness and l.ve from the testimony of our admittedly highest nature, which could not
be as it is unless these qualities were also attributes of the Divine personality. On these
attributes of God, therefore, abundently treated in works on Christian doctrine, we need place
no further special stress. One, however, must engage our attention, as illustrating the
practical nature of the considerations that sway even the most theoretically consistent, the
limitations necessitated by our mental constitutions, and the deepening mystery that surrounds
all the fundamental problems of our lives. It is the attribute of omnisc'ence. The Arminian
or Catholic view of omniscii
.ence makes it an intuitive laiov ledge that transcends the temporal
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order and does not reason fro::: cause to effect, but takes in • '.1 re lity at, prestat, and
future in ne indivisible grasp. This doe.* rot necessitate wh t Is lorcnonly kno n as
scientia media, Tod’s foreknowledge of events under any supposable conditions. Calvinism,
as involving neces ity end canceling free choice, finds no difficulties - ith foreknowledge
since Tod is assigned to reason from danse to effect. But any form of all inclusive determin-
ism, as we have noted, also cancels the validity of thought and moral responsibility; and
must therefore be rejected both on theoretical and practical grounds. The third viev;, that
Of ocinus, favored also by P.othe, Martensen, and L. D. McCabe, affirms the proper contin-
gency of the acts of free-will, and excludes foreknowledge as not essential to the idea of
omniscience, just as the performance of contradictions is not essential to the idea of om-
nipotence. The moral reason given b. ohis view against the Catholic attitude that foreknow-
ledge impugns the divine benevolence and justice in that God creates individual Deings whom
He forsees will be eternally miserable does not seem to be well take*. For if he has for-
seen them as eternally miserable, it has be rn only as he has seen them first created, end then
freely choosing a life leading' to eternal misery. The objection that *"e cannot construe thor-
ough-going timelessness may also be dismissed; since it both involves less ifficulty thah
any theory of the re lity of time; and since also, while we are temporally constituted and
our experiences come in succession, a single mental experience, involving one pulse of the
mental life and including in one grasp manifold logical relations, is ef a timeles: nature,
"hile we cannot construe the relation of the timeless to the temporal as implying succession,
practical experience furnishes an intermixture of the two between which e are constantly
oscillating; so that insight into the possibility of the relation is at least given. But
granting the elimination of all temporal elements from experience, as far as with temporally
endowed natures we can think of such a condition* I, for one, can affirm no insight into the
possibility, not in temporal* phrase of ’foreknowing what will be, when it possibly will not
be’, but in untemporal phrase ! knowing what may be,* when freewill concedes that it possibly
’may not be’.
Let it be noted that this does not affirm an absolute divine nescience, but a nescience
only of properly contingent acts, and not of determined acts, which even the stoutest Arminian
will concede xQfm a large part of human life, in which evil acts are ma^y times determined
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by evil character, as good acts in part are determined als. by good character. A practical
situation such as we now describe is quite possible. ..ithin certain splieres, fixed by de-
finite limits of influence, God may allow the operations of the free-will of individuals, the
exact results of which He is ignorant until determined or performed in accord with the con-
ditions of His own self-limitation. Within that sphere He allows each free creature to make
his free choices and mold his character, creating a reality which is genuine enough, but de-
pending on God’s permission, and which might have been otherwise. But in the nature of the
case, the influence of such reality is not allowed to flow bejrond the fixed limits of its
definite field, and so cannot affect the final results of God’s great plan, coordinating a
countless multitu.de of such spheres to the great purposes which in holy love He contemplates,
'‘And Thou hast appointed his bounds that he cannot pass," Indeed in this view, nothing pre-
vents, save previous self-limitation, from interposing in any sphere, guiding, where Ho can,
without transgressing such self-limitation, the free-elements involved, the good against the
evil, and so altering the nature of the final outcome even within the compass of a single
sphere. Thus He could make the wrath of men to praise him and restrain the rest.
Such a situation meets the two primary practical objections against the doctrine of an
unqualified divine nescience and has practical advantages of its own. It does not present
god as "dwelling largely in the dark" and "incapable of forcasting the outcome of the schemes
which He has initiated." The outcome in a is mind is quite clear. He is by no means in the
dark, save as in the nature of the conditions of a voluntarily chosen experiment, somewhat
of twighlight is temporarily necessitated, while details have not been fixed, the general
outcome is sure and known as any certainty may be known. God is still omniscient : He knows
all that there is to know; but He does not know what is not and what may not he. Such a the-
ory, moreover, coheres with all the scriptural data, which cannot be pressed into unequivo-
cally affirming foreknowledge of strictly contingent events.
Finally we may say that this theory has certain practical advantages. It affixess in
a striking way, that affords insight, that while a single man’s cooperation with God will
not necessarily make the final outcome different in kind, it may make it different in degree.
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The sul) total of reality rill he good anyway, hut it will he better if he does his part, and
does it to the best of his ability. Should he refuse, while he does not change the general
result, he advertizes his own attitude as rebellioxis and recalcitrant, and in a real way,
limits the sum total of the good, even if he does not destroy its quality. In conclusion it
should he stressed that of course no measure of absolute necessity exists in support of this
theory. It merely attempts to avoid what to us, limited by temporal natures, must remaan
either an inconsistency or a prefound mystery. For the strongest advocates of the foreknow-
ledge of strictly contingent events admit that the doctrine involves the deepest mystery (cf.
E. C. Sheldon; History of Christian Doctrine, 2:310), Our suggestion continues to maintain
the omniscience of God; and adds genuine incentive to our creative activities. ..here rational
considerations do not urge or compel, where the Scriptural data are not cogent, we seek sn
explanation that from the human point of view is consistent. If any others feel compelled
to affirm the existence of a mystery in this connection, we can only reply that to us both
our data and consistency, our general criterion, does not seem to demand such affirmation.
Sven in this theoretical discussion of belief in God that has preceded, the close rel-
ation of the theoretical and the practical, that, save by abstraction, cannot be broken, has
already been illustrated. In the argument from the nature of moral effect to the nature of
the moral cause, it is again strikingly emphasized. V/e can conceive of those who have so
transgressed against their best features, so violated their highest moral judgments and noblest
impulses, so suppressed the natural tendencies to affection and obligations to love, that,
having elinifeated them from their own lives, and become sceptical of their existence in the
lives of others they no longer feel the necessity of postulating a catise for them. To such
the world is consistent enough, but consistently evil. This outcome, however, is the result
of an insincere, and, therefore, inconsistent, response to the demands for consistent con-
duct, and its individually subjective nature is made clear by the absence of those universal
and abiding effects that flow from genuine selfcommittal to a personal God as we have tried
to present Him.
These are revealed in the practical test of this fundamental belief in God ma&e in
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,
accord with our pragmatic definition of consistency which proceeds on the "basis that theory
and practice m ist "be closely related. Ve point out, however, before going further, that
before being practically tested, a theory must have some claim to. theoretical consistency,
and so be regarded as antecedently true. Only thus will it work as it sets out to work. In-
deed, false theories may be made to work for a time, but, insofar as they are false, t&ey
antagonize abiding elements in human nature and in the physical universe. At the same time
also, a true theory may not work for a time, because not believed in as true. To give it
practical efficiency what may be needed is a deeper demonstration of its theoretical truth.
This is often so with faith in God. Belief in God, followed by a consistent self-committal
to Him, is the only one that offers the deepest incentive to the operation of our mental
processes, to the activities of moral living, and alone affords hope of a desirable future.
Thinking is not a commodity of which we have had too much in the world, and fundamentally
consistent thinking is at a premium, a worthful product, the results of which humanity ea
„erly siezes. To continue it unremittingly requires a gathering together of the ripest pow-
ers of man, the concentration of these to one end, and toilsome application that tells on
convenience and health, that calls for large sacrifices of money, time, and energy. Despite
all the large material and social rewards that follow careful thought great proportions of
mankind cannot be induced to do much thinking. ’.That then would be the case were its validity
cut away from underneath? But with appeal to chance both the universality and necessity of
thought, and, with them true consistency, must be abandoned; and, with appeal to determine
ism, would come the paralysis of all mental initiative. In personalism we have the only
guarantee that our thoughts are of any worth, and the incentive to continue what must ever
be an srduous duty to the most eagerly inclined. Then, however, mental processes are looked
upon as the seif-poised and free activities of the human mind, made possible by the self-
poised and free activity of the Divine mind, and when thought that is finally sifted and
tested, is understood to be valid and therefore supremely worthful to con, then however
difficult the labor and arduous the task, it will be continued and completed. That those
without theistic faith have persisted in such work throughout past ages may be attributed
not only to instinct, desire, amd immediate practical return, but also to an oversight of
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the implications of atheism. Atheistic ideas have not "worked" as they "set out to work"*
So strong has been the consistency of the working universe, that it has overpov/ered the
inconsistency of many minds; and so "brought about a theoretically inconsistent, hut practic-
ally and happily consistent, result." But, however happily impersonal ism may operate for a
tine, in the long run it makes for falsehood ^na intellectual apathy.
In many way’s the difficulties of high morel living are greater than the obstacles to
active and constant thinking. Only as we understand men to be our brethren, because we are
children of a common heavenly father, do we find adequate incen ive to guard their rights
and grant them their proper privileges, I!b one respects highly the rights ana privileges
of an automaton, 'Vithout theism, moreover, there can be no rational basis for the fundamen-
tal ethical intuitions; either for the first as expressed by Kant’s great moral maxim or
by the (lolden Pule, or for the second that calls ror universal altruism. On examination,
impersonal law, as we have noted, is seen to be a contradiction in terms, personalism alone
gives proper guarantee of consequences in penalty or reward, individuals may for a time,
or in rare cases, all their lives, acquit themsleves well toward their fellows on other than
theistic presuppositions, in such cases early Christian training and example are large fac-
tors in their conduct. But in the long run theism has alone rurnished appropriate stimulus
to the highest morality.
This is especially so since theistic foundations alone furnish the aid to morality
commonly afforded by religion. Agnosticism and positivism offer mo proper objects for the
religious sense; humanity in the abstract excites no more reverence than humanity in the
concrete, Materi&lism presents nothing to worship but a vast machine, with its most attrac-
tive features robbed of their highest significance. Pantheism, though it speaks of God in
theistic terns, find:- him coming to highest consciousness in human beings; and while not
thus elevating man, it degrades Goa; for while man is made no different in the change of con-
cept ion, God in his proper sense in gone.
It excites no surprise, then, that theism alone holds out hope for the future; and that
when it is denied pessimism soon emerges. As a theoretical explanation of the world we have
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.
not given pessimism, as represemted by Schopenhauer, its chief exponent, any place at all.
In making the ultimate reality blind impersonal, aberrant will it lays itself open to many
of the strictures against materialism and pantheism. In its theoretical details it is full
of inconsistencies, which begin with the notion of impersonal will, a vicious abstraction
that finds no basis in experience. In experiences, will is never manifest save in connection
with self-consciousness. The best end that pessimism can offer to man, afflicted with un-
satisfied will, relieved only here and there by interest in music and the arts, is annihilation
Such an attitude of despair, as throwing consistency to the winds, .is more the result of a
mood than of reason. As a mood, it cannot be refuted by argument; it is the negation of trust
and can be removed only by the creation of a fundamental faith. The moment even faith in
consistency as a test is possible, the human mind tends to cry with .Bradley, "Where every-
thing is bad, it must be good to know the worst*’ and "There all is rotten, it is a man’s work
in
to* at inking fish.' Bven.^uicide, the consistent outcome of a genuine pessimism, a type of
faith, though of low degree is noticeable. For the victim of his own theoretical or prac-
tical despair, must still believe* and commitj; himself to his belief, that the pistol, or
dagger, or poison will operate with aecustomed uniformity, and his system responc with all
due regularity. Theism, as a consistent explanation of the universe, affords appropriate
foundation for optimism; and Christianity, with what it adds to theism, finds genuine reason
and some comfort even In misery and suffering. If calls upon men to fight evil everywhere;
but where^evil imposes itself from without, it gives strength to endure by its doctrine of
an overruling Providence, cooperating with every true and earnest effort to break the power
of dishonesty and injustice, hate and cruelty. ’While it absolves CrOd from complicity with
evil, it tells of the possibility of developing long-suffering and stable character, whose
sincerity has been tested by adversity, and eannot now be accused of a low self-interest.
That Being, Who does noo allow? man’s freedom to exercise itself beyond fixed bounds, and
Those sovereignity makes possible an unseen direction or concrete situations, too complicated
to be comprehended, by man’s narrow vision, and too hepeless or solution by man’s limited
power, is ever in Eivine wisdom and omnipotence unweariedly bringing light out of dakkness
and truth from error and good fro* evil. To individuals whose lives, from an earthly point
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of view, end in despair, as the temporary victims of malevolence and injustice, theism
holds out the possibility of another life where readjustment shall be made in response to
that moral sense of mankind, which, in its assumption of an honest universe, underlies the
test of consistency, and exerts as imperious a demand for its satisfaction as the intel-
lectual nature of mankind calls for truth, e turn out attention, then, to the strictly
Christian elements in a system we are striving to represent as consistent.
2. essential Facts of Kevelation,
'i'he probability of special Divine revelation founds itself on the nature of the Divine
person. From the preceding discussion it might be inferred thab^no other revelation is
necessary than that offeree by the physical universe and humar nature, ith personalistic
conclusions postulated all phenomena, including human nature, are manifestations of some-
body to somebody. But let it be remembered that discussions like the above are possible
only through the intellectual inheritance of ages, and training that is given to few, aided
by the additional insight afforded by Christian presuppositions and life, Without such train-
ing, few could follow, much less conduct, such an argument; and all like to find confirma-
tion in experience with the concrete events of the world’s life, The fixrther test of seeing
how theories work is in accord with the _ragmatic mode of defining consistency. But to have
conditions of such experiment at their best there is need of that vital faith in God that
increases the hunger for ultimate truth and sharpens and cleanses the instruments of know-
ledge. The method we have adopted is the logical method of approach to the religious life,
but it is not the usual one. For the mass of mankind a simpler and more direct method of
revealing the truth concerning God and mankind seems necessary; a revelation that not only
brings light but warmth: one that not nly illumines the intellect, but arouses the feelings,
and puts pressure upon the will. It would be contrary to the nature of the Divine Father,
vitally interested in bringing to successful issue a kingdom of righteousness, to deny to men,-
indifferent to truth, under ordinary circumstances, morally impervious, and with inefficient
instruments c ic 1 " e help that comes throu 1 r unique method of revel? tion.
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Difficulties with such revelation have usually arisen from pre-conceptions as to the
nature of the method rather than with the antecedent probability of the fact. Some would
take as the revelation what is merely the record or revelation; and so call for a theory
of verbal inspiration, some so distrust the operation or human faculties that they demand
infallibility. Some so far forget the progressive nature of the lire or the race and the
necessary limitations or men incidental to this, that they demand a parity of authority
for all parts of revelation, and a scientiiic background for those parts in ail senses agree-
ing with tne modern, nut the scholarship oi the world will no longer allow that these claims
are theoretically consistent, so that, where they are still ma.de among the intelligent as
ess ntials of Christianity, the Scriptures have lost some of their practical influence. It
is worth commenting on the fact that it is their practical influence in the past that, has
made them a storm-center ; and, should that practical influence ever cease, all that has
been ritten about them would tend to become so much intellectual lumber, and they them-
selves but historical and literary curiosities for the academically inclined. Only as they
eommeM themselves to both the thought and life of the race, as worthy of the nature of that
God, insight into "hose being and character has already been reached in .some sense indepen-
dent of them, shall they be continued, as on the plane of special revelation.
The intrinsic necessities of the case require that to have commanded the intellectual
respect of the times in which it was first mediated, and so gain s ' -• rin for its nor 1
and spiritual messages, a special revelation must have beon clothed in the scientific con-
ceptions of its own day. As pedagogically adapted to the moral and spiritual development of
its readers, it necessarily included elements, imperfect from the ideal point of view, but
ring the way for fulness of revelation. Unless, moreover, we postulate an unthinkable
magic in ivhich the normal mental nd spiritual processes were entirely superseded, ins far
as the mediums of revelation were intellectually snd morally imperfect, its fulness would be
11 lited. Granting the operation of such magic, the difficulties would not cease; since with
return to the normal state, the means cf insight into tl eir authorii i
laying them upon the hearts of others would be one. Insofar also, as the medium of revel-
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the moral and spiritual necessities c .....
commonly called the Eoly Scriptures, seems to reveal the presence of these needed elements#
culminating in the revelation made by that most uniq; e character, Jesus of Kasar th.
Fairly to consider the evidence brought by his unp. arc llelea life and consciousness,
we must be able to believe in the historical nature of the records which make them access-
ible to us. Again we note that it is because of the potency of the practical influence of
Jesus that the largest part of the most vigorous Biblical controversy has centered around
the genuineness and authenticity of the four gospels. The hind of evidence that would make
clear the authors'*..* nd hisf • : nature of the ospels is of the same " ind that 'ill de-
monstrate the authorship and historicity of any ancient whiting. On account of the much
* ider influence of tl ospels, 1 ver, id the tremendous practical issues at ke, the
discussion centering about then has been fiercer and more prolonged than that about c ny other
ancient works. Around the points at issue a vast critical literature has grown, striving to
establish or demolish two conclusions: first, that the gospels .ere regarded as genuine and
authentic by contemporaries and did not materially alter during later generations; and sec-
ondly, what is in part a corrollary from the first proposition, the efforts of some
critics to disprove their genuinenes nd historicity has failed. If the gospels were
received by contemporaries of their authors as genuine and authentic we should expect
little question of these matters^ until a slightly later period, and then only in an inci-
the se
dental way, taking items partially for granted,
rind. I
J
bout ICC A.D.
,
Bishop of the
Chruch of Lyons in Asia Minor from A. 2. 178-202, in defending Christianity against the
Gnostics, assumes the historicity and authority of the Gospels and quotes copiously from
them. Ee outlines the testimony of Papias, Bishop of Eierapolis, '•horn he describes as a
man of the old time, a contemporary of Polycarp lA.h. $9-155) who knew the daughters of
Phillip, either the apostle or the ova: gelist, and who had be n a disciple of John the Ap-
ostle. According to Tapias, John related that Mark had v/ritten the sayings nd doings of
Jesus o.o the "interpreter" of Peter, that "Matthew wrote the oracles (logia) in the Hebrew
tongue, nd everyone interpreted them as he could." As Tapi::- was dealing merely • ith the
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no reasonc t i - ju 1 ' . ; . fcher ! believ that he did
not iscribe all of the present Gospel of Matthew to tl r s? e ant! rsl i_
,
2 spec: llj - he does
In Marc ion, 1 o came
-1. [inor to Rome, A. 140, bile Meeting the first t* o Gospels
genuin and hi t ri it r c f Luhe . r.nive: llj
historically uni hahle. So 01 ‘1
,
t
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assumes the authenticity of the four gospels; and th: •- foilor him in thi : conclusion Ter-
13 Hortl (A. .160); the Muratorian fragment of Roman origin .v fitter. about A,
X). 170; the Peshito, the Bible of anc'ient Syrian Christianity, collected about the ssn< ti ;
and so finally, also, Jtistin Marjryr, writing two apologies about 1.. D. 152, draws from the
life end teachings cf Jesus, as continued in what he styles the Memoirs, which mast be identi-
ty e Gospels, his references to Jesus, hen arr nged chronologically, f :
1
life of Jesus, tallying with the account given in the four gospels, end ith but scant;; differ-
ences to be accounted for by the incorporation or oral traditions not lluded to in the gospels,
It is a matter of real significance that the authorship, cr the Fourth Gospel, ' genuine-
Joh *s, was not radio lly uestioned until 1844 by Bam'. Almost unci 13 :eptation
it exist nee from the earliest centurlds* Then with Baur be- n tl t do art— fro;.,
the ortl odox position, including the worl cf Strauss Renan wl ieh ends in Heim with a move-
ment " ?.ck to the Catholic position, fhe first free of these oritic be« the: ! itl
istic and naturalistic presuppositions, uh onistic the: : les. In
nd JEJaur, Hegel’s influence was most marked. Henan as not: profour ugh
philo hie llj hav 11- "h. Id vie
,
but
_
oj oi ted from Kant, Hamilton, Comte,
and Hegel# .ill scouted the personality oi God no she possibility of mirables. necessarily
they had to eliminate them from the gospel narratives.
i omplish thi bj pf u3 'a
_
h-making 1 :d oy; f
,
if at all, btei
ed to explain the records of the miracles by me- ns of psychological lav: - hich, he affirms, in
the ca. :• of the authorship of the romrtjt Gospel, makes possible its authors sincere belief
in f fictitious •. erh of his ima'lnatiu
,
trying to establish an^.identy
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between the Gnostic logos and ,the historic Jesus; and Cenan finally, -as driven to the
theory of deliberate imposture. They all notice the differences between the Lytioptic gos-
pels and John’s; and- with naturalistic premises that • ill not alio1 : f miracles, lay em-
phasis on detailed discrepancies that can he accounted for as easily as re the difference^
in detail of most competent witnesses in the court-room, and the assumption of points of
vievr and purposes on the part of its- author that still stand in need of confirmation, they
conclude that not John, hut someone else was the author of the Fourth Gospel. But the
supposed data and inferences that follow are mutually destructive, and lead Keim, in meet-
ing the difficulty, provided hy need of a data of authorship as early as 98 A.B.,to dis-
pense with the universally received tradition that John the Apostle resided at Ephesus
during his lest years. Into the details of criticism we cannot go in this paper. e must
content ourselves with pointing out that none of these critics do Justice to the unique
personality, life, and influence of Jesus as described hy Heim himself and summarized hy
H.C. Sheldon in his "Unbelief in the Mnteenth Century'p, 320-322. 'chough denying the
supernatural conception and the pre-existence of Jesus, and defining him in essence as pure-
ly human, Xeim hardly stops short of a worshipful eulogy in the tribute which he pays to
him. He accepts the facts of his sinlessness, and declares that this hy himself puts him
ahone the category of the mere religious genius. Any small infirmities, he says, hich may
he thought to have been manifested by Jesus, were not real sins, hut only natural incidents
of the human constitution in Jesus, and of the historical situation. As regards the hidden
life of his earlier years, we can reason hack :.o its exemption from the st:in of transgression.
Che one who in his sinless manhood felt no smar.t over his past record must have been distin-
guished hy a blameless youth. And in respect of p^osi-ive endowments Jesus stands equally
above the ordinary level. In the characteristics of his inner life and in his historical
signigicance he is without parallel. Ee represents a new stage in the development of the
human spirit. In his person a divine miracle IDae ..under Gottes ) is disclosed. Che spirit
of sonship comes to perfection in him, and he had in full measure that sense of human aig*-
nity ana of divine love which exists in others in marred and fragmentary form. He stands
for a ne\ creation in humanity, a completion of the divine image. Ee is the divine man in
whom the stirring of God after complete manifestation and the restless struggle of man to
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grasp cod came to a satisfuing result, lie exemplefies the hi hest attainable stage of the
inner union of GOd and man, and one is merely giving place to rn unv/orhy and impertinent
dream when he supposes it possible for another to surpass Jesus in achievement and person-
ality. In his transcendence of the conditions of his time and the char cteristics of his
contemporaries, he makes the impression of a mysterious uniqueness, a superhuman marvel, a
divine creation. To view his person is to view not merely a work among many works of God,
tut the most peculiar work, the specific revelation of God. In harmony with his extraor-
dinary standing He attributes, even in the face of seeming downfall, eternal validity to
his own personal cause. He is the basis of rest and the spring of motion in the world, the
creator of a new,higher cosmos '. hose days are reckoned by milleniums. Even his opponents,
in so far as they strive for the worthy, are compelled to fight under the banner of the nan
who, after the fashion of God, called out of nothingness, as no other beside him has done,
a orld of life."
In accord with this estimate we have a miracle, as remarkable as any to be conceived
Of in the physical world. On a theistic basis, which we must postulate, if our previous
discussion is of any worth, involving divine self-consciousness, self-direction, and imma-
memt working, what we call the natural Is $ttt a description of God’s uniform and r< gular
working; and what we call the miraculous, His departure from such uniformity; but both root
back in the Divine purpose, will, and pow-er; and neither more so than the other, if d ivine
purpose demand, nothing can prevent the miracle; and it is not therefore a, priori' incred-
ible. As the miraculous in the physical world, just as in the case of the natural, finds
adequate explanation only in personalism, so the miraculous m human experience, with the
self-consciousness, the eitemal life, and the subsequent influence of Jesus, can find con-
sistent explanation in theism alone.
Granting the genuineness of the gospels, the testimony of the evangelists coneerning
the nature of the self-consciousness of Jesus, as well a' of his life and more objective
teaching, is in itself evidence of their authenticity. His self-consciousness is absolutely
unique
,
and its invention ".ore marvellou| ' an the fret itself. ::oreovey t it is not some-
thing extrinsic
--nd adventitious, hut all-prevading, and lends to the gospels their peculiar
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unity. For their testimony the disciples underwent extreme suffering and even death: this is
evidence of their sincerity. In sober colers, free from the exaggrations of later Apocrypha,
which stand in great contrast, they tell of the wonders of their Master* s life. For believ-
ers In theism, these are not a priori incredible, and coupled with Kis personality, so
unique as to be miraculous, they are altogether appropriate and quite congruous. The hypoth-
esis of delusion is impossible in the face of the objective character of the narratives,
which lay emphases upon the limitations and human weaknesses of Jesus, ""e note nothing
resembling rhapsodic deification of their Master in their discrip.tion of His Agony in the
7-arden. Tie impression of this objective nature of their story is increased as they tell
of their own veaknesses, their slowness, and their dullness in appreciating the meaning of
Iiis teaching, their misunderstanding of the spiritual nature of the Kingdom, their worldly
horror at the thought of Jesus crucifixi:n, their ambitious rivalries, the denial of Peter,
the desertion of all at Christ*s arrest, and finally their utter hopelessness at the time
of the resurrection. '.That could give greater impression of the factual nature of their re-
port than these items? Never did they forget their peculiar functions as witnesse to which
Jesus had called them, and which they were constantly under obligation to fulfill. Linking
this with the impressions always made by remarke.Dle personalities upon their fellows and the
lasting memories made even by the smallest details, we must affirm deliberate fraud or real
authenticity.
A glance at the vn^ue self-consciousness of Jesus in its transcendent phases, totally
different from anything ever witnessed to by any other human personality, however exalted
his station or nature, lends the impressi~n of direct divine insight and authority to the
revelation he cane to bring. This peculiar self-consciousness manifested ifself in t ! e claims
He made on humanity in general ana on His disciples in particular, in His assumption of
Divine attributes such as j're-cxistence, omnipresence, and omnipotence, and finally to such
a dignity that, if we regard expressions of its nature a. tfcue we are compelled to raise
Eim to the category of Deity. His demands upon humanity to follow Him were most imperative
and unqualified. He told men that, if they loved father and mother, sister and brother,
houses and lands more than nim, they were not worthy of Him. He was absolute in His sway
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** over His disciples.
,
T
.
ray friends .if ye do whatsoever I oemraand you. " He ordered his di '_Jcs to ;o into all
-'orld
.
roach the gosgftl knowing that the. re 'Id go 1rule ir. the midst : " olveo,
hut witl the promise that fie would draw all non unto Himself. •He instituted the s ora nt of
the Lords supper, saying, : I)o this in rener.hr: nee of me."
As no other man that has ever lived, and had respect paid to his pretensions He laid
claim to direct nd conscious insight into His pre-existent state. "And no ... n hath ascen-
ded up to heaven hut he that same down from heaven, even the Son of i.::n which is in heaven,
phis was often done in a most incidental way that reveals the na.tu.ril node and the unforced
expression of such consciousness. ”7,hat and if ye shall see tie Son of Han ascend up where
he was before? " Again in teaching the Jews he remaKcs, "Your father Abraham rejoiced to see
ray dayss and, he saw it and was glad. Then said the Jews unto Him, "Thou art not fifty years
old and hast thou seen Abraham? Jesus said unto them verily, verily, l say unto you. before
Abraham was I ara. ’ " In the great prayer at the close of His life he asks, "Ana now, 0 father,
l me ith thine • self with the glory hich i had with thee befoi th orld i
. r
In all this, moreover, there is no systematic attempt at an abstract gr: :wrt- ticn of
such attributes, natural to Deity 'lone, as characterizing his ownperson. from the midst of a
Ion, His i lity, rent] ti lned by human limitations, is constantly
pressing, We notice this in connection with statements concerning His omnipresence, Conjoined
with the authoritative demand to preach to all nations is the sure promise following it as a
condition, "And lo, 1 am with you alv/ay even unto the end of the ••orld." Connected ith the
promise of answers to prayer is the statement or His presence even with a small group gathered
in His spirit. "Where two or three are ther in u . ' • l in .1 list.
In the same wy in maintaining to Hicodenus the range and authority of His message and the in-
tuitive insight on which it wa based He couples His transcendents of the usual pacial limita-
tions 'ith fc] e statement of His pre-existence* "Ho man hath ascended up to heaven, hue he that
cometh down from heaven, even the Son of Han '..hich is in heaven."

Apart from the miracles of physical healing and material chnge p- v . od "by Jesus
in common with others who did their or) in the name and r So* , lf-
ge of er and authority utterly tr ns u
af stion, 'All _ - ’is ginen unto
en and in earth.*' John testifies with even greeter elaborateness to the nature of this
self-consciousness; "^S-the Father raiseth up the dead na guickenetk them: even so the
Son guicke etl "ho:.. He will-.- ferily, verilyj 1 saj unto yoi the h
is, when the dead shall hear the voice f the Son of God; and they that hear shall live.
For as the Father hath life in himself even so he gave him authority to execute judgment,
because he is the son of man. Marvel not at this: for the hour cometh when all that ; re
in the tombs shall hear his. voice and shall come forth, Therefore doth my Father
life th« t I might take it again. Fc man taketh it from roe,
hut I 1:-' it lown of myself. I have power to lay it down and I have power to take it
g( in." Suph was His control not only over His o :"n destiny, but the ulti te lestiny
0t3 rs
' H ild lud hem, :; I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never
ish, it hall any man pluck them out of my hand.” It r ii iccord ith this at-
titude of final authority that He used the words of the great high-priestly prayer, "Father
the hour is come; glorify thy Son that thy .on may also gl:rify thee: as thou bast given
him or over all flesh that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him."
It • • entir&jfcy congruous with such self-consciousness, moreover, not merely that Christ
should perform miracles, with an attitude at times wholly different fro prophetic prede-
cessors; but that in His ova. name and author ii; He should forgive nan their sins. Such
action the religious leaders .f his time rightly interpreted as indication of His assumption
of Divine equality with the Father, and, not billing to accord H bl is position, they rank-
ed Him as a blasphemer.
The attributes we have mentioned are in entire accord with the • ttitude He took to-
minenoe « itl , 3 e ense of the sanity and s briety hich the orld
•• F Him, thi ti ’ • oulc reveal an egotism bordering on insanity. But
meekness, humility, and self-restraint, joined ’ith the most marvellous sanse of personal

G4
7, was. one of the chief narks of Jesus. With cue wave of His
hand lie "brushed aside the non-es sent iris of the.iiosaic law, details over .which learned
LVb] foi ... . Dees - iver had said thus and so, "but He,
One, incomparably greater, struck a fundamentally deeper note. He was Lord, of the Sabbath,
Israel’s most important religious institution, and he proposed to readjust it to mans deep-
est needs even int’.efrce of the most violent opposition. Moreover, not merely did He, "ho
had been trained in reverence for God in r devout Jewish home a.nd constantly indicated it
in others, permit orship of Himself, but He enjoined it. '.hen Thomas cried, ''Uy lord end
my Go& !," there -as no rebuke forthcoming from Him. On the c-ntrary His attitude on this
point may he summed up in His own words os follows: ‘'The Father hath committed 11 judgment
•onto the Ton that oil men should honor the ion even a they honor 'the Father. lie that
honoreth not the Ion henoreth not the Father wl icl sent Him.’ It tl is claim to deity
that helped to arouse the worst nature 'of the Pharisees against Kim and in the light of
which His words, “I and the Father are One' must be construed. It is true that, divorced
from His Jife, teaching, and unique self-consciousness, they may postulate ethical unity
only. But with these in our thought as the Jews had them in their thought, our conclusion
must be like theirs. John dramatically represents the whole stiuation, as on these ords
of Jesus, each of the Jews grasped a stone with which to kill Him for arrogating ;o Him-
pl ce of Deity. "Many good works have I showed you from the Father," cried Jesus,
’•for which cf there works do ye stone me?" The Jews answered and aaid, “For a good work '
we stone thee not, but for blasphemy, because thou being a man, makest thyself God."
v
"e have dwelt at this length on the unique self-consciousness of Jesus, since his
conception of His transcendent nature is of even greater importance than the sinless per-
fections of His humr-ii nature, emphasized hymen like Heim, in validating the Hew 5 tdment
X&t1on from led to man. Still, the two y ' e said mutually to support each other:
the balance and sanity of His human r.atur lend credibilit to His report of His divine hat-
ure; and His divine nature provides a background making for credibility in those perfections
Of his human nature, which ? re rather suggested than in all cases detailed, inch self-con-
sciousness, moreover, is, as we have ss id, the ouSfcst ndii g mir le, a i n
,'
,
i
.. 'I I
»
.
, ;
•
.
*
,
.
- •
-
,
.any physical wonder, and liko all miracles to be accounted for onl; on per ona.list grounds*
The ipemory of the expres: ions of His self-consciousness, furthermore, remained with His dis-
ci; les to the end, and led to their further attempts at Christological construction in the
e pistolary literature cf the Hew Testament. But while they evidently postulated the union
'
of the human and the Divine within the compass of His personality, it remained for later
r tions to attempt an insight into the possibility of t! i union,
of Christianity has largely defended upon belief in it, as well as in the Scriptures as re-
relation, lo Lea] i y 1 irgely 1 e attributed to los cf belief here. Hafta
in we note the intimate relation of the theoretical and the practical. In time, loss of
practical power means further loss of theoretic! belief, a: Christianity tends to foil in
that vital influence necessary to stimulate to the study of her doctrines.
"hat, then, eai id in all consi on the subject of the incarnation os it
relates to the subject of the union of the human and divine in Christ. .. satisfactory theory
must take into consideration both historical evidences and philosophical conceptions of the
nature of personality and the essential attributes of the human and the divine: Prof* H. C.
Sheldon, having already discu sea the subject of the Trinity, to which we shall come in a
moment, after an eminently candid and fair canvass of the data., thus summarizes the results:
(System of Christian Doctrine p, 358) "(l) Having postulated a finite human nature in Christ
re are not permitted in good logic to take this out of the plane of finitude and represent it
as a bearer of Divine or infinite attributes. (2) Having represented the Son of God as truly
Divine, and therefore as possess'd of the attributes which are proper to a necessary and
immutable being, v;e cannot with rational consistency suppose those attributes to be laid a-
side or suppressed so that their original subject may descend to the conditions of the grow-
ing, the cc t, and the immutable. (5) Having assumed that a Trinitarian life is in
essential mode of the God—Head, wo cannot consistently suppose one of the Bivine Persons to
undergo a metamorphosis which logically involves Kis recession from the Trinity or a reduced
function ther in. 14) ' hile theology accepts the fact of and incomparable union of
the human and the Divine in Christ, it he. no means of clear insight into the ..ode of the
union, it car. el best only an approximate explication, anc accordingly cannot properly
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stamp as dogms any hard and fast theory on the subject., At the close or all constructive
effort m relation to ChristiolG&y the discreet thinker will he inclined to recall the re-
le mystery of Christn person is he ond 1
.
,
and very likely also ’beyond the grasp bf the entir - creation o ' celestial powers/ As a
formal Christolcgical definition Prof* Sheldon Submits the following; "In Jesus Christ we
contemplate the unique meeting point of the human and the divine on the field of history—
a being in horn the human and the divine subsist together in extraordinary and wonderful,
but no unnatural union,"
Help to "approximate explication" Frof. Sheldon finds in four cons iderat ions. First,
the doctrine of the ideality of space makes it unnecessary to suppose that in the incarnation
the Divine v/as locally confined. Secondly, that Christ's human nature was constituted in
union with the Divine. This does not necessarily mean that human nature, regarded as imper-
sonal in itself, received its personality from the preexisting Logos, but that the hhman
consciousness in its increase of capacity, not only received from the Divine, but could thus
be enlarged to extraordinary capacity. Thirdly, the inexplicable relation of soul and body
provides some help, though' it does not afford a complete parallel. In this case the body is
merely the instrument of the soul; in the other human nature is agent also. But in the in-
carnation it is mite possible that, while the human soul was metaphysically distinct, it
was also so obedient to the demands of ideal conduct as to be practically the instrument
of the purpose and will of the logos. Such relationship in the fourth place, is illustrated
by the relation of the Holy Spirit to the soul of any Christian. But hers again there ex-
ists a difference. For we must conc.'ude that the unique union of the human and Divine in
Christ was a matter of Eis self-consciousness, whereas the Holy Spirit, though immanent in
the sanctified soul, does not come into the sphere of its self-consciousness.
It must ho remembered also, that the effort to construe a unitary consciousness for
Christ, which consistently combines both the human and the Divine, is not the direct result
of any demand of Revelation. Vie have noted the difficulties that accompany the relation
between the temporal and the non-temporal order; we shall dwell on the theoretical difficul-
ties of the doctrine of the Trinity; we cannot adequately construe our own its
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rOd« ill tl
doctrine of revelation, there are practical values that cannot he ignored, that have led to
/
* past, hear he truth*
An untold number of practical advantages flow from belief in the Scriptures as a Revela-
tion from God* While we must determine by a priori canons, arrived at by considerations not
explicitly stated in that revelation, that we shall regard it as divinely authoritative, still
a written record for pedagogical purposes is of tl •• greatest value* The evidences and criteria
that lear to our belief in revelation are in large part those that lead to our belief in God
and his nature. But opportunity and inclination prevent access to these in their formal as-
pects on the part of the largest number of men; and it may be said in general that those ho
attain them in this form have, received antecedent aid from the life and influences shed abroad
by the Scriptures themselves. The logical and metaphysical in thought does not generally com©
first in human experience; and many times never at all, hut the Scriptures, while not tending
the intell : ppeal to the practical m. e ienwes, the deeper instincts,
and the finer feeling, which, often not explicated by the intellect, are still leading life
in the groper direction, Many ti$es it is absolutely necessary to say to the sin-stricken
spirit, debauched in life and ith power of consecutive thougnt almost gone, as well as to the
innocent child needing practical guidance for its life, "Thuf saith the Lord," Under either
circumstance metaphysical reasoning is of no avail, to leave the practical direction of the
spiritual life of either class to chance until appreci: tion of the highest intellectual con-
siderations is possible would be like postponing the use of the tooth-brush till mature years,
when not merely inclination to its use, but the teeth themselves, would be gone. That the
good end great of all ages; that the learned as well as the unlearned; that the superior civ-
ilisation hav 3 made the highest use c the Bible as .making' a response to the
ens e o f men
,
but is
f in the deepest theoretical sense an attests- ion of -p- Divine .uthority of the Scriptures, For,
granting theism, the deep end lasting needs of the human heart arc the outcome of the purpose
and will oi' God; anything th^.t meets such
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need in a pure and high sense must he regarded as the outcome of His will and purpose
also. At the present day, therefore, the v/ell-nigh universal use of the Scriptures at
stated times tmcohs trained by arbitrary ecclesiastical authority ;the constant examination
to which they are subjected; the consciousness that at any regular hour of service mil-
lions of others join under their inspiration in medi ation and worship; all this is prac-
tical and truly objective validation of their authority. They give confirmation to our
deepest instinctive, or more highly reasoned, conclusions concerning the nature of God
and the constitution of man, Uever do we find them departing fropj personal conceptions
of God’s nature. Indeed, under their inspiration an atmosphere has been generated that
makes it seem an absurdity to the mind untrained in philosphic processes to construe His
nature in any other erms.
It may be objected that it is not strange that the Bible meets the needs of human
nature when it is nothing but an expression of that nature itself and thus offers merely
subjective evidence. But we have already noted the fallacy underlying the notion of that
which, is called "merely subjective." The expression or human nature in its deepest and
most constant form is also an expression of the na.ture and purpose of ultimate reality,
if this be conceived or in personal teafins. Indeed we may say that the highest expression
of hhman life, in its most fundamental nature, has an objective validity, as representative
of the nature of the absolute, even greater than that of the material world; since the
material world without human nature as interpreter has no significance for the finite,
whatever it may have ror the ini mite; and since also in human nature shades of meaning
can be more easily discriminated. As a matter or ract, ii the Divine uses the human as a
medium of revelation, the highest representative of human kind must be thought of as the
fittest instrument of the Divine message in its fulness.
This last consideration leads to the thought of the practical value of the doctrine
of the incarnation as it pictures Jesus the supreme revealer of truth and the highest
ideal of life. It provides a definite practical standard, without the necessity of an
appeal to technical epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical criteria, by which to judge
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in matters or theological doctrine and ethical principle* Does the uld Testament fall
short in tis conceptions of Sod or in its maxims, for man’s life? Insofar as it rails
it
to conform to Christ’s teaching must be regarded as imperrect. His message provides a
correction and completion of its necessarily unideal nature. Did the apostles always
speak with Divine authority, or did the imperfection of human nature curtail their insight,
even though under the direction of tne Divine Spirit? Appeal to the standards of Jesus
provides the great test. Has churchly tradition much or unauthontative and perhaps harm-
ful nature? The fundamental principles oi tiesus must in the long run determine. He mir-
rored forth the father as no other; so that whoever enters freely into the spirit or Jesus
understands the nature of cod. desus* daily life of unbroken communion v.ith the father and
loving obedience to His will presents the type for the Christians life. As graphically
pictured in relation to many and varied coner its situations life is furthest removed
from the indefinite and the abstract. His life and death of implicit obedience provides
a norm of highest ethical intensity for mans life and o^ens the .ay to forgiveness on
rational grounds and v-ith ethical safeguards. Thus it makes for a feeling of nearness to
God and yet prevents presumption. Such nearness is increased by the thougl t of tl e infin-
ite condescension of God in uniting Eimself with human kind, and provides also for a new
sense of the dignity of man in his possibility of bein^ thus joined to Deity in the life
of on:, of its representatives. And whereas the Divine might- appreciate the difficulties
of human life without an incarnation, by means of such incarnation man at least under-
stands, by help of the knowledge of that High Priest who is not untouched with an exper-
imental feeling of human infirmity, that God appreciates the limitations of human lot*
Concerning the practical value of the mystery of His perron we will speak in con-
nection with the mystery of the Trinity and its j r ctical value. Meanwhile in the name of
tl non ‘ ncy, which pi pj lag n ' anest, also calls for - consis , t -
iverse, and a personal Absolute, projecting it into being by the free and loving ewreise
of His power, if Jesus Christ was not as He represented Himself, : "is disciples repress, t-
im, 5 Ha v.r repi ext Him tl ut the a s; J think of
a universe which has been the theatre of a career such as His and an influence such as He
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alone hac exerted? Granted what it is impossible to concede that literary criticism
could dissolve away the historical Jesus as presented by the Gospels, • -e still hr re his
h ] torj t< f . Princip 1 Fai bairn puts tl )bl : t loquently.
Philosophy of the Ghristian Teldgion, p. 14) :Tor Christ h to be fitted into our scheme
of Tings and we have to explain (l) Eow Ee whom we have resolved into a mere Jewish peas-
ant came to be arrayed in the most extraordinary attributes vhich were ever made to clothe
mortal man; 12} how His historical action has correspended to His fictitious rather than
to Eis real character; (3) and what sort of blind accident or ironical indifference to
fight can reign in a universe which has allowed to ficti.n greater powers than have been
granted to truth, The question does not relate simply to the apotheosis of Jesus; that is
a process which the indolent intellect, if it be also ingenious, can facilely describe. Ce
admit that the process may be stated in terms of such amazing verisimilitude as to turn it
into a cogent probability. The question becomes urgent only when the dcificatory process
has been completed. The deification, if we map so call it, though the term is radically
incorrect, has all the effect of the most finely calculated purpose formed after all the
needs of man and the whole course of his history has been considered. There is nothing in
nature or art that can so well illustrate design or adaptation to an end. And thougl it
be illusory pet it works not as an illusion, but as truth and for it, in a most miraculous
way; true men receive it, ere made truer by it, so use it ss to build the -orld up in the
love and pursuit of the truth as it had never been built up before. As unconscious fiction
it is as void of substance a.s a dre m yet it acts upon humanity as if it were the nett sub-
ntial ' i a had ever descended upon it out of heaven. And how, by what right, at
whose instance, did this thing, the apotheosis which has proved obscure happen? dor it is
the apotheosis which has proved the real or : ive factor of “ ... Jesus
of ITazareth that hat- so powerfully entered into history; it is the deified Christ Clio has
'
e n * elieved, loved and obeyed as t] ' Of he world, Tie act or process of apoth-
eosis, then, created the Christian religion; and who was responsible for it? If the im-
aginative peasants of Galilee, they mere doing a deed no .l&ss wonderful than the creation
c . ' hi T . 11 , o do it was 1 rie-
, .
govern
-^cn anc make-believe tc Areason and form character.
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"But what kind of feflexicn is it upon the linker and Lla; ter of the Universe if • e
conceive Eire a consenting to do this tl ing? Say, in hat sort o ligl t tes it n,
if • e imagine it capable of being so deluded and deceived, seduced to martyrdom or compelled
to enthusiasm by a mistake . indeed, if the doctrine of the Person of Christ v/ere explicable
as the mere mythical apotheosis of Jesus of Eazareth, it would become the nett insolent and
fateful anomaly in history. Tor it could not stand alone, it vould affect all thought and
objects of thought# ’Eero’, men would say, f a mer< cl pter the
ns nest figure
s
1
* of. literature the most otent person of all time, the source of a series
of illusions which have exercised the most transcendent influence upon the life and des-
tinies of men. If accident and illusion have played such a part in history, what bharacter
must we attiibute to the power which rules the world? Order in nature is an insignificant
idea compared with the idea of order in history; hut how con there be an order of the per-
sons who created it be, in the very degree that they are potent, themselves the mere crea-
tions of chance, fiction, and pure phantasy?"-
3. Che Trinity.
As in the case of the incarnation the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is most large-
ly a matter of direct revelation. Rational considerations may lend insight into its truth,
but are not of an absolutely necessary cogency, be assume that the ITev Testament, ascribes
personality to father, Ton, and Spirit respectively and places each in the cate .
The doctrine of the Trinity, then, is an attempt tp reconcile the qjity of the Godhead with
the fact of some kind of three-fold personal destination. After discussion of all the data
involved. Prof. Sheldon formulates what he deems intelligible of the essential doctrine as
follows: lSystem of Christian Doctrine p. 22?) "Corresponding to the threefold manifestation
of the father, Son, and Spirit, there subsist in the Godhead, in a certain .logical order,
eternal and necessary distinctions which enter into the divine consciousness and determine
the perfections of the divine life. To affirm less than this is to fail to do justice to
the total data of the subject. To assert much more is to resort to unintelligible categor-
ies, or to an unintelligble combination of categories,” e have here a most carefully
phrased formula that reveals the candid mind of Prof. Sheldon in endeavouring to soy neither
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.
more nor less than is warranted. let this seems, indeed, more or trinitarian doctrine than
is strictly speaking intelligible; for what eternal and necessary distinctions other than
the personal may mean vre cannot say; and into the self-conscious: and seli-directing unity
of three self-conscious ana self-directing beings re can have no insight, lar ely perhaps
because of the peculiar nature ox our cm personalities, i’rof. Sheldon guards his xormula.
hov.ever, by the following qualiiying statement: Ip. 226) "The conclusion that the Trinity
is unique, or without exact counterpart in the sphere of finite reality, involves the in-
ference that the word "Person ”
r
as used in Trinitarian terminology, is employed - ith some
measure of restriction. The assumption of an eternal dependence ox the son ana the Spirit
upon the .-ather and the absolute exclusion of the possibility of contrariety oi feeling, will,
or purpose on the part of the pather, "on, and Spirit enter as limiting notions into the
use oi the historic term, so long as tnese limiting notions :re firmly grasped, the employ-
mnt of the word ’'Person” cannot leaa seriously astray; ior they saleguard the fundamental
unity ox the CJodhead. in permitting them to rule our contemplation we keep clear of any real
tritheistic implication. The thought of nod is diversified to us by a warrantable trinitarian
representati ;n, but not at the expense of compromizing the conception of a unitary ground of
the world."
It is clear from this statement that tne difficulites oi tne aoctrme depend upon our
conception ox personality. With just what "measure oi restriction” we are to use the term,
prof. Sheldon does not clearly indicate. ..hile "the assumpti.n of eternal dependence of the
son and the Spirit upon the Patner" makes a demand for unity, it lends no insight into the
problem of three self-conscious and self-directing personalities existing in seii-conscicus
and self-directing unity, nor does it indicate valid restrictions on the tnought of person-
ality that makes siich existence appear possible from tne point of view of human experience.
Moreover, absolute exclusion of the possibility of contrarieity of feeling will or purpose'*
would seem to cancel genuine self-direction on the paort oi one or two oi tne : persons" in-
volved. hile, in the light of nod's ethic- 1 nature, we can speak of certainty in prefer-
ence to the term "probability” in this connect i_n, the term ’impossibility would seem to
cancel proper self-determination. The
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thought of an eternal organic union, if v/e nay coin a descriptive phrase we have never be-
fore seen, may form an appropriate background to the thought of absolute ethical unity,
but unless we eliminate genuine personal distinctions, which we have postulated, while we
may believe in an absolute certitude we cannot believe in any absolute logical— as opposed
to ethical necessity. The difficulties in the case Horace bushnell seems to reel in his
sermon "The Christian Trinity a Practical Truth 7’, (building Zras in Religion,- literary
YarietieslII) As he labors with the conception of personality in its relation to man and
God. He contends that the term strictly speaking ia applicable to man alone and not to
god; and -hen used of God it can be used only in a figurative sense. He does this however,
on the ground that the term person must ever be associated with the thought of finitude.
Just here we must take issue; for no necesssity of reason demands that self-consciousness
and self-direction, the essential marks or per : onality, cannot be regarded as attributes
of the Infinite, On the chief of the difficulties we have just raised Prof, Sheldon com-
ments privately in a note under date of Jan, 24, 1916, with his usual candor he sums up
the matter in a most satisfactory manner, "'.Vith reference to the exclusion or possible
contrariety d'fwill- feeling, or purpose, on the part or the Divine rersons, i would note that
:he ground of the exclusion is aDSolutely notning else naan tne limitless perfection of the
Persons. As the category or perfection applied to God generally excluded the supposition
of possible lapse into sin or error, so it excludes the supposition or schism between the
Persons or the Godhead. An exclusion or this kind, you will observe, amounts rather to the
shutting out of defect or impotency than to a limitation or real power. The Son does what-
ever He sees the father doing, but He does it with innnite cordiality and energy or volition
Dhile it is impossible for the human mind, moreover, in its finitude to perrect a psy-
chology of the Divine in His infinitude! the philosopher "is under obligation to postulate
suitable conditions ror the ivine lire as well as to search ror unity!’ And hhis at least,
by analogy from human love and fellowship can be daid for the doctrine or the Trinity. If
God be love and love demand fellowship, and fellowship or the highest kind subsist only be-
tween persons on the some plane then Zivine love*gets a suitable object and response only in
a plurality of Divine persons. That such fellowship should be by means or a Trinity is based
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on the contention that fellowship has she most perfect conditions where three are so con-
joined that each knows that in the loving contemplation oi another he has the unqualnied
sympathy of a third.” So much for any insight into the rational necessity oi the Trinity.
As the remit oi our wnole discussion we conclude that the .Divine Trinity is sui gen-
eris; and that the mode ox such existence remains a mystery to man; a mystery in the sense
that we have no saxislying insight into its nature. This does not mean that the doctrine is
a contradiction, hut that raculties and data are not given fully to construe it.' we may use
Bushnell’s words, "The three are persons evidently only m some sense tnat recognizes a
radical unity of subst nee, which is not true of any three men, some tropical or instru-
mental sense, that needs not anyway to he, and cannot be exactly, aeiined. hut there are
mysteries and mysteries? Some serve no purpose save to iurther perplex and contuse; some
h ve incalculable practical advantages, some are wholly opaque and altogether resist in-
sight; others lend themsleves to some measure ox insight into the reason for their exis-
tence and tnus provide nelp for the human race, uf tne latter type is ,r the mystery of the
Trinity’.1 The fact that it is apparently a matter of spontaneous Divine Revelati n, and
not the projection of the atmosphere oi the time m which it was urst enunciated; that
no previously existing and analogous conception provided a basis ior it;, that it was wov-
en into t e fundamental attitudes oi one who proxessed direct insight into tne fundamental
mysteries oi ultimate re r lity, nis nature and purposes; all this lends prima facie evi-
dence ox the truth of tne doctrine.
But it has practical advantages all its own, and some in common with the other mys-
teries oi the Christian xaith. As we make a briei survey oi these we note again the close
connection or the .theoretical and practical, separable by abstraction for any special
purpose in hand, but the one ever immanent in the other; theory, if true, ever working
out in practice, ana practice, ever illustrating the truth or theory. The doctrine or the
Trinity conserves the unity ox cod and avoids tritheism, rolytheism not only involves
thought in inextricable difficulties, but provides no method Oi luting iron men the lim-
itations ox which tne; are so keenly donscious;. Surrender to one sod, .he, as sovereign,
ccntrols all our limitations makes ossible tneir removal or tne lightening, of their burden-
• *• inn*
•'
-
• f: 7. 0 . *
.
•
-
: :i i: r - ’
.
'
.
?
‘ •
. err ,.r 307: 70 ’ ?;:x ex , •: ' 1.*
, ... .
5
..
.
. .
*.•
.
0
373:-' 3 . j
.
- :.v .1
. :
- ,
.
, 11 . 'V
;xc 7
"
,'.'01 '
. o- i : : ; ..
» - »-'il
.
.
-XAf « - . - .
' ’
'71
. .1 *.
75
power. '.‘he doctrine tends to safeguard the distinction "between God and nis world, and
so helps to avoid all the theoretical difiicnlties and practical dangers oi' pantheism* TO
satisfy the demands of infinite love no demand for a necessary evolution or tne orld from
C-od is felt; the universe exists as an expression of His xree act. in the Trinity the thought
of God is diversified for us, and some insight into the Livme life, in which the human mind
can at least rest, is given. The threefold manifestation represents to us in graphic form
Goa in nis ' orics, ;od in human history, and God in personal relationship. If moreover, human
fellowship points toward some kind of fellowship within the sphere of the divine, the rivine
fellowship in turn tends to dignify nd snohle cur human rel ionshij . This is not reason-
ing in a circle; it is extracting everything of value from realities revealed as essentially
congruous, chat tne rivine fellowship is in some sense c prototype of the human provides a
sense or tne eternal litness ci cur human relationships, dome are already on such a high
plane, and their value is so clearly realized, that they "ill continue unbroken - ithout assis-
tance. hut thousands of mem need, to "be urged from lives essentially self-centered ana selfish
into circles of mutual helpfulness ana self-sacrii ice; and the fellowship oi the crinity may
he presented as furnishing an inherent necessity bcrderir.g on compelsion.
'.hen, no’", we come to the thought of the practical value of the mystery of the Trinity, -
and indeed the mystery of the Incamat ion-we are led to remark that we cannot equally capita-
lize :.11 mysteries. Those whiel pj to he - ide, tuitous it] ' neces-
_
”
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stery cf the Homan Catholic mass,— * -hi oh. have no cl Ivi
lonaiity that guarantees their reality as mysteries and r aveils them, while not u
contradictory, till uperhtunah and trs nscending the limits of human faculties— f!
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"Bj asi : ’sons instead of one
,
also instead of none
,
it sect- res at once the
1 infinity of God, ' ' 1 3 15 of God . l&ti
‘ee-fold grammatic personality, the mind is throm in a maze of sublimity, and made
to feel at once the vastnes:
,
and ith that the close society also, of Cod, He is not less
personal than He would he under the one pern onality of unitarlauism, and is kept mean file
hy the threefold personality from-, any possible denomination under the literal measures of
the figure: for Cod cannot become either one person or three in any literal sense, hen
as 1 ct!.'.' The doctrine of the Trinity, he continues i a revel tion tff
hov to heap alive the profoundest, most adequate sense of God’s infinity, and, at the same
time, the most vivid and intensest sense of his social ana mutual relationship as a person,
,*nd this, if 1 am right, is 1
.
ore to say than cep. Id be said of any ether hncr. or possible
denomination for God, E
_
rd( 3 : pi; lft
once the profoundest practical expedient eVer adopted and the highest wonder ever accom-
lisl :d in human language,’ Too much mystery, "here there ought to be light, cis» ipr-tor
li p] DV 3 ies no ground for a rational faith. But ystery
would expect it, and under conditions that nshe it seem a necessity, emphasizes our finite
nature, lays stress upon the limitations ;f our faculties, and gives us a new sense :.f
dey endence
.
4. The Hature of Han in Moral Matters.
Belief in God as personal,: the highest expression of whose nature' is love; in the
facts arf a special revelation from Him, the record of v/hich we find in the Bible; in the
Incarnation of. the Son; and in the Trinity provides a consistent basis for the distinctive-
ly Christian doctrine of man. Theories other than the theistic reveal their insufficiency
here as they do in their relation to the nature of ultimate reality. They not only fail
theoretically to reconcile fundamental elements in man’s nature, lab they also fail to pro-
vide incentive to consciously highest living.
The Eiblical doctrine of man’s nature affirms that God created man in the divine
image. He is like Goa in the sense that he is self-conscious and self-directing; that
within limits he is a true Creative agent; that he is under obligation to respond to the
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law of love, the expression "both of Cod’s nature and Cod’s will. He is the highest re-
presentative of the earthly creation and holds a delegated sovereignty over all lower forms
of existence. This position would hold good on any theory of inspiration. Iven thong' it
he affirmed that the Biblical account were merely the spontaneous expression of man’s
deepest insight, upon which succeeding exonerations have set the seal of their approval,
then insofar as man’s fundamental jnature is an expression of cod’s purpose, the doctrine
is altogether true. Apart from Biblical revelation the conviction cf the dignity and su-
premacy of man ir. the natural order is the result of instinctive feeling; and e carrot
consistently as’,: l im to look at the universe from any other joint of view. The most is-
gusting and intolerable examples of human egotism are best explicable on the baa is of a
perverted greatness, Non-theistic and anti-theistic theories of the universe fall short
of proper anthropological theory because they fail also in adequate theories of the 'uni-
verse, with the feature’ and ends of which, the nature and ends of nan must be intimately
connected. The theory of evolution when understood as a description of process ~nd method,
with cod at the beginning and His goals for man at the end, does not militate against the
Christian theory of man. As Prof. Stearns puts the matter { Che evidence of Christian ex-
perience, p. 75) "V.e object only to the illegitmate use of the theory of evolution, and
we claim that it is: so used, when it is asserted to be a sufficient explanation of the high-
er nature of man. If the verdict of the scientific man is needed, we confront the one dis-
coverer of the principle of natural selection with the other, Darwin with 'allace. But it
is rot a matter of science. Tot a particle of scientific truth has been adduced to show
that man in his distinctive characteristics is derived from the animal. It is not a mat-
ter that can be settled bp the comparative sizes of human and brute cranuims or the com-
parative weight of their contents. It cannot be settled by sfeo i' in the brute instincts
and intelligence the rudiments of the mental powers of man. To exhibit in the calls and
cries of animals the beginnings of language does not help the i atter. ill these facts lie
in the s
:
here common to the animal and man. But when it comes to his distinctive quali-
ties, his self-conscious personality, his reason, ith its intuition of universa.1 princi-
ples and its power of unifyihg knowledge and transforming the dead mechanical orld into
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' practical incentive it offers to mankind, Th t . *eated
in the ir..: ge of God lays upon jis the obligation to live G-od-like live . To be perfect, :s
Fa her is., i feet, ns merely that p rfecti . pos ib] to cur pe
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vith God, though operating in a restricted sphere, :e can strive for perfection in ethical
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hired with their spontaneous conviction of personal .orth, has e^er given rise to hope and
ip ti f tl - afel i • - t of high cl r cter. Agnosticism . os itivi , laic in
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* in a life destined to succeeding annih.il' tion is the sole incentive it offers.
* Yet the moment *. e hold uj to if nd c] ieve ent of -
character that moment a sense of our ov.m inadequacy of attainment takes nos: ©s sion cf us.
It consists or a spontaneous consciousness or an essential ilaw in our constitution that
makes the natural and easy attainment of the ideal impossible, it is this consciousness
of a vitiated nature that the Christian story of the Fall explains. To serve this pur-
pose it matters not whether the story of tne rail or Adam he regaraed as historically ac-
curate or as parabolic in its nature. To regard it as anything more than an inspired par-
able, true to the deepest and most constant elements of man’s experience, and therefore
serving the highest possible purposes, seems to me preposterous, it is not even necessary
to maintain a raonogenist theory or human origin to hold the doctrine or the rail and its
influence on the subsequent history or mankind, m general anthropologists seem to in-
cline to the monogenist theory, though this question receives little attention from them
at the present time. It is merely necessary to maintain—what is both possible and quite
’ probable— tie existence of a vitiating factor in all human life, propagated by hereditary
tendencies, due ~c the prostitution ox rree will or creative energy, in rebellion against
felt obligat i:n on the part oi one ox the earliest of mankinds representatives, who by
intermarriage contaminated the whole race with a sinful predisposition. '..ho dare presume
to underestimate the corrupting results ox an attitude, of immoral self-- assertion or uneth-
ical self -surrender on the part ox one individual only upon the whole oi the race, sensitive
as a barometer to slightest influences to good and evil, and able to increase the amount
of such good and evil as a heritage of joy or an incubus ox woe.? Following evil predis-
position men have continued m liiul transgression for which they have f&lt individual
responsioility in proportion a. the evil act has seemed a matter ox rree choice.
Such an account both explains tne presence oi constitution i contaminati n, and
emphasizes the need of a radical change in human nature as the beginning of new tendencies
in the life. A little reflection make: clear, the inadequacy cf any other theory to gen-
erate this ser . c of need. They must all acknowledge the corruption, but as unable con-
sistently to explain it, they can oner no dequate remedy, and generally attempt some
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palliation. '"To clap purple patch of rhetoric on the running sores or humanity" may
temporarily eliminate the sense ox need, hut it does not cure the disease, and merely
puts off the evil day when the burden ox woe is doubly increased and it is perhaps too
late to apply the proper remedy with tne test r-sults, "Sin is due to a survival of ani-
mal tendency which will disappear with the progress oi evolution", is one cry. hut many
or the most damaging forms oi willful evil have no intrinsic connection with the body.
Moreover, no impereonalistic scheme or the 'universe Offers a warrant for a continuous ev-
olution upward, it speaks confidently or reversions to type, but never with greatest con-
viction oi increasing approximation to an ideal. As a matter oi discrimination, however,
the term ''retrogression',' instead ox "reversion to type is a preieraoie one, since an-
thropologists differ in their explanations ox tne status ox tne lower xoms oi mankind.
The theory growing in acceptability is that tne lower forms oi men represent a railing a-
way rrom,ra~her tnan a return to, the original type. "The diificulty is with human en-
vironment is anotner shiboleth. hut no student ox hxiian nature or worker ior reiorm has
ever Deen atle to produce outward conditions that alone will stem the tide oi wiixui mis-
doing. An efrert to this end nas its vaiue, as ail me is necessarily iniiuenced oy tne
general conditions or its living; but suen imiuence on tne bent ox the mi is not prim-
ary. "The need of the race is education," is a third cyy of tne closet philosopher, whose
experience with the rank and file of human kind, has not been at that ciose range that
brings the realisation that men in general do net deeply desire academic education, and
that it mer: ly increases eificiency ox tendencies already operating. "hile it makes tne
sincere man more capable m goodness, it neips to make tne rascal only more* periciously
destructive. All suen tneories admit tne presence of a need, but do not describe it as
a deeply vital one. under tneir tutelage a profound sense oi destitution is postponed,
and in many cases altogether eliminated, in the atnospnere generated by tnem spiritual
apathy and irresponsiveness become a chronic cunditiun. un tne other hand tne Christian
doctrine ox the fall and its constitutionally damaging results ciannes ratner than con-
tuses the mind; stirs the ieeiings to a sense or tne need or assistance irom a source nigh-
er than the human, and arouses the mind to a conviction of its responsibility.
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xtndivid i; poi ing ' If in ' 111 £ tion; c pable of rational choice;
'
-hie to select one out of tvo or more ends in action with ta&erstanding o f V eiv nature and
hips; ith full capacity to have chosen otherwise; in short, possessing truly
cr atiwe or riginatlve power. ”’e noted that to this category of freedom the categorj of
lity on the sonception of natural law is secondary. Causality is s category th fc is
seen to arise logically from this consciousness of creative enerr- and the experienc cf
impact ith the world outside the sftlf. Moreover, the conception of causality founds it
upon t: : ."perience of r- self-chosan regularity, made possible hy the el f-de term ining power
pf t~ e in&ividurl; and secondarily, hy analogy from civil la* which ic itself codification
of mandatory regularity, the expres-ior. of the self-poised deliberation of some, laid down
dor o bl rs. ¥3 r he tural 1 i ' to il per-
ceived regularities in the material world; hut it gives not the slightest indicat i*n of the
o ture of tl iting these uniformities. Qulf previous investig ti n it
h ’ore - rson To btempt as do the aeteminists, to roh
lity in the 3 ran n sphe] it : rj 1 ts, sel f-de I ru-
mination, hy the help of the category ox causality and th: conception of natural law, to
both of •which or: : rwllty, is to indulge in the most ludicrous inconsistency. e conclude,
then, that the fundamental evidence for himan freedom arises from the primary experiences of
self-conscious acticity. Yet in addition we find it neceassry adequately to ewplmin the facts
of respensihi ity as felt by the individual and as assumed by society; the experience of
mental deliberation, and as we notes before, the deel-lying conviction of profound differences
between truth and error, and the r.-pidity of great mor-- 1 transitions either to* **rd good or
evil ‘ adequately pi ins by le mot of arbitrariness. If, though -oh in
sense, ham n person ltiy, like Divine Fereonality, is an originative agent,
s such it i bsolutelj involved in a cauial nexus. As Ulrici puts it, "Every pure
self-nov r rent is at hotter a. creating coot 1 of nothing."

e2
'Gott und die Hatur p. G2C. Quoted "by E. C. Sheldon System or Christian roctrine p. 297.
)
2his of course, implies in, .xv licn.ble elements, hut so does ever.- other item of experience
thi t •: cannot involve in i causal nexus, lotze strongly enplasizes tl is lays,
"Every deteinination of a free will must, as respects its origin, he inexplicable, for to
explain means noticing else than to show that a particular event fillers from its antecedents
ocordance with universal lavs. The incomprehensibility of the free determination is there-
fore no obstacle bo accepting it, hut a consequence of its proper idea "Grundzuge der praktischeu
philosophie, 2 te aufl, p. 29, quoted from footnote in above,.) This does not mean that the
past of any life does not influence its present or future, or that environment does not affect
it in any ray. Constant choice of either good and evil tends tov;ards fixity of character;
and present character largely determines future action. He that freely chooses evil becomes
the illing slave of evil; ana he that freely chooses good the voluntary servant of rood. Both
final states are what we might expects the one represents an abuse, the other the use, of a
Divinely beneficent law. Moreover, the assertion of freedom In relation to environment means
merely that no outward circumstance compels to moral evil. Environment provides the theatre
of moral acting, hut it does not -. rite the play. But whatever he the fixity that character
attains, it is a genuine question whether a finite being can ever reach absolutely _ er.c.anent
moral stability. hile we must postulate this of God as absolutely wise and holy, it is no
necessary characteristic of men continually changing for better or ror worse. At the same
time no reason prevails why continuance in good or evil may not result in such permanence that
the impossibility of further change is practically certain.
Thus far we have viewed tha Christian doctrine of freedom as a speculative necessity to
explain human experience adequately. But counted true as such, it is also a practical exped-
ient for -generating a much needed sense of responsibility and of bringing men to a realization
of crisis in the issues of moral good and evil. In this wry ex . vrnent in practical living
truth of theory. The doctrine puts the practical responsibility for moral evil,
it *1 elii
,
on the perverse action c f men’s wills. It emphasizes the fact that the past
is largely the .roduct of such action, and is yet possible of recreation by the cooperation
_ bl ter food-will of tl Infini F I us call c r-pos-
session, self-poise, and r surrere outuut of
/
s:
genuinely creative energy in meeting . te of life, it lays stress upon the
(fact that the moral aspects of environment are also largely the result of nan’s rill; that
he ought resolutely set his face -gainst those things that tend toward evil; rise superior
to them and so reconstruct the whole that it will more and more tend toward the good, -"uch
challenge acts • ; a tonic to the normal moral life, and proper response to it invigorates
character. If it he objected that - refusal u; on the part of any rightly to accept such
challenge makes for lines o J’ demarcation in the social fjrder, and - conse me t
antagonism ud hostility between men, it must be answered t’-.st such lines hrv- ••lroady
be-n implicit; that response of one kind or other to the challenge merely indicates the
ex istence of^but does net create, the lines; and that expli.< it: kno tl . ] •• r for
clarity of vision, and a proper estimate of the forces of Ovil that must be met. Such
seems to have been the method of Jesus, TTho never complacently suffered illusions as to
the nature and power of evil and the necessity or constantly ccm 1.. -tin;, it with the practi-
cally limitless energy of a resolute and yiger us rill.
t'.'ith such a background of truth as we have been describing,-— the existence of an
•ell- loving and oil- righteous Person, back of the universe ‘and yet immanent in it, with a
- la ion of m n'a natv.ro and cud through His only begotten don, Jesus Christ, with man’s
first nature, made in the image of -god, capable of restoration from second nature, with
nan endowed with regal creative powers that largely fix his ends here,— there can be no
rational question a to what the consista&t destiny or the good man must be . in the future.
Granted a consistent universe, and though we have had experience in nly one part, re may
a.in ol hat
,
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,
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1 1 i £ i th th is : *t i-
ude, founding itself upon|the nature of God, that Jesus speaks of the general f -t of
Ban' s inn ortality, "Now that the de ' rai sed, c**cn Hoses shewed at the bush, whei
called the Lord the God of Abraham, and the "od of Isaac, am. he God of Jacob, .or he is
not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto higw'* It is because gov is
’ He is, and man is 1 ; t he is, that immortality must supervene upon mortality. It is
this that makes the argument from the universal desire for immortality hi hly cogent. Non-
theistic philosophers may argue that the fact of immortality, deduced from the universal
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desire for it, is a non sequitur: there is no necessary rational connection "between the
two • But such a conclusion holds merely for an atheistic system. Believing, however, as
re must, in theisn, we must conclude also that the God, .ho endowed mankind witt i univer-
sal and permanent desire for -immortality, cannot "be true to Himself and deny man what He
thus has implicitly promised him. The non-theist, inde d, cannot account for even the ex-
istence of tl e desire, as the clumsy efforts of Herbert Cpencer make quite clear. That man
should dream of those vhoqi he has loved and lost seems quite natural; and that the dream
should beget a vivid "belief in immortality seems equally nafttoral. 3ut why he should love,
as well as lose, is a deeper question still, which Spencer cannot answer, "because, as we
have seen, "being unable to account for beginnings, he cannot account for ends; and, as we
shall see in a moment, t£e desire for immortality is not merely the result of bereaved hum-
an love. But he that as it may, if our preliminary analysis has been sound, the existence
of a genuinely universal and permanent desire in the race is an indication of the nature of
ultimate reality, and a piece of evidence, not merely subjective but having bona fide ob-
jective validity.
Yet ,ar we have intimated ,this universal desire is not merely the product of affection
it. is also with deeply ethical natures the result of a consistent demand for a prevailing
justice and righteousness. Save for purposes of Clearnes: by help of abstraction, no need
exists for : disjunct in between love and righteousness; for response to righteousness must
in the 1 ng run ever be knit up with the highest kind of love. Both love and ri ' teousness
demand that there be a readjustment of the plainly manifold injustices of the world; that
evil be xolucked from its seat of temporary power and righteousness elevated to its throne
of perpetual sovereignty; that the incomplete results of the cooperant toil and sacrifice
of man and god, should take on full-orbed completeness; and that those who spent their en-
ergy, their anxieties, their tears, and mayhap their lives should live to see this glorious
triumph.
In satisfying these demands, we also satisfy the ae pest demands of our intellectual
natures for consistency. bhat hind of a would would this be in . v._ch the maniiestly deepes
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and highest parts of our affectlonal and coral natures, attesting themselves as such by
their admittedly self-evidencing power, were destined to final and complete disappointment?
Prom the point or vie’., of human reason and human experiences raid it is the only point .of
view from which v:e can look certaihly not a consistent world! V.h:n, then, we add to theae
disappointments those that, under such conditi.ns, must he gusts ined by the s ectificolly
reli pious nature,-- that which relates us to God in loving loyrlty— the sense of total fail-
ure ana frustration is complete. Christian love to God has for its objects hot! tl . hianan
and the divine. It is a love for "the man Christ Jesus;" it is a love also for the eternal
Son. pl?it. It is mixed with the most .holy sense of awe, reverence, and humil-
ity that prevents presumption; it is blended with the most lively realisation of favor that
begets joy, gladness, and freedom. In Father, Con, and Spirit, are the foundati ns of life’s
highest meaning and values but experienced only in part now and seen through s glass darkly.
Only as in another wchfrd we see face to face, and know as also we are known, shall satis-
faction come tc desire, affection, intellect, and moral nature In their human relati nships;
and only as thus v.e live more immediately in the presence of God, v;ith the temproarily im-
posed limitations tc perfect expressions of love done away, shall we all continually love
Cod as 're ought with heart, mind, soul, and strength, to bar human nature at this point
leaves the universe in an opaqueness like the blackness of mid-night.
Po this conclusion the revelati n of Jesus, as or One possissmg intuitive insight,
most emplatically testifies. ith the truth of it Me involves the integrity of His own
moral character with t:-e v^palified affirmation, 'If it were not so I would hsv told you.
kith it, also, the apostolic writers agree. Without a life tc come we. arc ,: of all creatures
most miserable." kith it, finally, many analogies from the natural orld, a.ll the deductions
from the superiority of spirit over matter, all the historic facts of resurrection, and ail the
implications of the almost universal survival of the belief in its truth— are in most hearty
concord.
The survival of the doctrine witnesses to the practical ne d oi it, and, insoiar as the
practical needs oa human nature reveal the constitution and purpose cf ultimate reality we
• elieve hat ev^ence for doctrine h: s objective validity. In its Christian form it
is indissolubiy jcinea with tne possibility of a ivw lire here; that life is made over

v ith nighty spiritual power here? is an ividence t: r z it c r r. be continued in bower beyond.
At the seme tune a changed lire here provides ot itself no rational warrant for continuance
of life hereafter, father, does tne doctrine of immortaiit: provide rational stimulus to
that attitude of the life here that fashes continuance in a regenerate state possible* If
we are to die like the beasts the whole tendency of the rank and file or mankind is to live
like the beasts* Append Ixm mortality, however, and yon alter life’s whole per-
ppective. Successrul episodes and triumphant accomplishments which would loom large -ere
this life to end all become insignificant in the light of eternity. Educators with genuine
insight into the needs 01 youth in its relations to mature lire are emphasizing the need
of such perspective in the preparation even of shhool curricula. On the other hand, with-
out such perspective, labor, self-denial, and self-sacrifice, even unto death, ior the order-
ing of life in accord with theistic postulates would be irrational: for, as we have seen,
immortality necessarily follows upon Christian theism. To live in th high dignity of a sen
of Sod, in the necessary self-renunciation, the adequate self-rertraint and the proper self-
arrertion one must be able to live in the re t ho; s of eternal heirship in sod. It is s mat-
ter or common historical knowledge that when the hope of immortality wanes, despair takes hold
of men, and worthy living in this life becomes well-nigh impos'ible.
jrom what we have said .n the geheral subject of immortality it must not be inferred
that we maintain that imm rtaiity follows from the constitution dr man. As life is a rree
gift of sod and its continuance conditioned upon his immanent working, so life after death
must also be conceived ox as a free gift and its continuance dependent on nis will, more-
over, as the continuance of life here is possible only on human compliance with conditions
fixed by cod, so we must regard eternal life also as made actual not merely by God, but by a
proper human regard for rixed conditions also. Immortal lire is then, as the new Testament
in parts represents it, in the nature er an achievement, no necessity rests upon ~od to
continue the existence of one who remains persistently rebellious, and who ,moons tantly suffer-
ing the results of his voluntary violation ox the laws ox God, men and ox his own nature, ev-
entually becomes a blot and a. stench in a normally beautiful ana wholesome universe
.
• /
>
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These considerasi.ns must limit our view ox the ccriptural representation of the
destiny ox men m tne next life* Christ assumed an everlasting retribution ox tne irretriev-
ably wicked. iheir loss is to oe conceived ox as lrrer.araoie, not oecause the loving heart
or cod is no longer open to appeal, or oeoause at any time He becomes other than the Father,
of everlasting mercies, but because, practically spea&ing. ,it is quite possible to think or
a man, who has reached such a state oi perversity by constant and wilful rebellion against
lis sense ox duty, that the good no longer makes an appeal to him.' and that therefore, he
will not make appeal to cod. it is tnis state oi perversity that Christ describes as an
eternal sin', blasphemy against tne noly spirit", "which hath neither forgiveness in this
life nor in the lire to come." nut aiter due tribute has been paid to righteious love no
rational necessity remains to mar the universe xurther by continuing the e istence or mon-
strous disfigurements. e can conceive ox man, eliminating their capacities ox soul, suf-
fering, as they do m tnis worm, the results ox wilxuily transgressed law, completing this
d-
work oi voluntary self-re s tract ion! until they are allowed to flicker out of existence, like
a candle. That this result is quite consistent with human reason and experience would ap-
pear from the attitude of one like fror. dames, who showed u too much personal sympathy
with the Christian system of truth. in particular tnis' query has always come home to me.
May not the claims of tenaer-mindedness go too far? Hay not the notion of s world already
saved in toto be too saccherine to stand? May not religious optimist: be too idyllic? Is no
price to be paid in the work of salvation? Is the lest word sweet? Is all* yes, yes 1 in
universe? Doesn’t tie fact of ’no’ stand at the very cere of life? Doesn’t the very ser-
usnee tribute tc life esn that ineluctable n losse foi J of it,
that there s genuii ifi swhere, and that some thing perman itlj ‘ tic
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light cf consistency pragmatically defined re do not ;e-n practically in the s use of
it 'by 1
'
‘ r 1 1 ' . sen v
judge by its red <ticns of consistency with other verified or verifiable truths also, r.d
v C examination reveals no incons i c toncy#
Lbuti . 11 o' - Ifil re ic 5
.
r anothe in thi )rld 1 • -
hysical, nt 1, id spiritual la all s by duly 1 galiz (3 lty;
reason is forth coming why, analogously it should, not follow in the next. The ravages of
sin reveal thenselves in r. decrease of bodily health ana vigor, in declining 'mental strength
ilertnesr, :id insight; and in s loss of spiritual capacity and sensitivity. A human'. ill
consciously fixed in rebellion to God inevitably means alienation from Him here; and persis-
tence in like attitude in the future must inevitably mean alienation and accompanying mis-
ery there. If the doctrine is in part a failure now, and does not "work" it is because it
has received so little stress due to timidity and confusion of though that it does not
'work 1 -' because it is not applied as "it set out to work* 1 ’ Our difficulty in this regard is
ith the ’tender hearted* who have been so removed from the realities of human intercourse
in its vici us and perverse aspects that they have not been willing to be driven to the
conclusion with kich Prof, James t ough-mindedne s s agrees. On this matter be concludes:
Abo • ay of escape on this system is n< t by getting it ’auf gehoben ’ or preserved in the
whole as an element ess KlaT but ov a. It is by Irppping it our altogether, " ring
it overboard, and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe th t sb 11 forget it::; very
name
'
•1?C9. TT
ot maint in that the dactrine furnishes the high iv 1 Cl isti 1 living;
but that in the present condition cf human nature it offers a necessary -nd ;wfectly leg-
To tl ' ce, ' li to years, of stress on this doctrine on the part of those
who profess tc believe it we may attribute xm - tl 1 resp siv •- ss f tl : of the
le of this land Christ! ppeal. !Chat- it i it the u ' Chris-
tian principle of love goes without saying to those who do not insipidly reg-rd love a; a
va. id : isi . Jkii ;1 us .. 1 i intensity of Christianity, fo-day that
uuig&e spiritual Cer-ius "Silly Sunday" makes deep appeal to great multitudes m v.T.ich he
V
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places proper emphasis upon the doctrine of retribution with t sm- ;’:s • t t ir.o :• : f that
which is indeed ,: the preposterous theory or liter 1 hell fire.* His 3o gres tion
poor, the ignor nt, the unsophi seated, hut largely also of the we11thy,
of the learned, and of men and women of the world; and in f e rei i rkable S] iritual tnosp]
: bioh, all alii yiel " '
an® principles of Christ, Their response, as we have intimated, may not 1 ays s to tl ;
highest motives; hut it at least provides an entering wedge, of which Christ Himself rn.de
avail, for the beginning of larger aj - >ci tion and the appeal of finer motives. Any other
conduct hut a proper response to the doctrine, bf oelieved true, would he irrational. d-
equat vision t set futn cert air veal he : need-
ed good-sense which helps toward better things.
As falling short or presenting the highest motive the doctrine is not calculated to
stimulnt: to t;>* finer qualities of life, ’"ith an appeal to fear it exeirts a repressive
to
influence upon evil doingrather" than offers astinulus
^
Ohristi . vice, 71
Christian service is always gl wMy and ungrudingly performed; and fear is not a motive ur-
ging to the most generous forms of activity, Sut that the doctrine suffers from the limita-
f is
_
te charg linst it, it is a-' ' fo 7
fror.. other parts of the Christian system. Cur experience - if- :en, however, produces ' a
conviction that a wholesome respect for the penalties that follow upon violated la” is a
prime inducement to a needed self-restraint; and while processes cf inhibition are not the
living, they make room for the incoming of better tl ings,
To those better things the Christian doctrine cf heaven offers a larger incentive, The
sneer of the cynical that it makes an appeal to fundamental selfishness is founded on a mis-
conception of the meaning of the doctrine, made possible uy the figurative language of the
Scriptures in describing heaven and the survival or a barbarous grossness of imagination
within tfe pale of a church that has been only partially christianized. The chief cause of
heavenly blessedness, as indeed, the chief cause of earthly, is cur filial relation to Cod,
In that love to god as His children makes all men of like mind members of the same family.
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it calls for proper love of man to man. Heaven represents moreover, what e do not find on
earth, an adjustment of environment to the life of each individual into which overwork, pain,
sorrow, death and moral evil cannot enter; and an adjustment of each individual to it. it
offers perfect stability without monotony, and generous variety without surfeit both in the
nature of God and its infinite possibilities, and the marvels of liis works into which, as
we are slowly discovering, the wonders of the present universe give insight only by way of
suggestion. If to aspire to such conditions is selfishness unadulterated, then we need
more unadulterated selfishness. If to use the means to attain thes' ends be also an expres-
sion of supreme selfishness, though it involve complete self-renunciation, self-denial and
self-sacrifice, sometimes to self-immolation, then mankind should pray for its largest in-
crease. Indeed, in adopting the means we have already partially gained the desired ends;
for heaven in its essential nature is the completion of that kingdom of God the life of
which begins, as the principles of which are embraced, on earth. Put in this way the cynics
sneer becomes an absurdity. Proper self-love is always consistent with a rational altruism.
If this is a consistent universe then there must be an intrinsic relation between goodness
and final happiness. At the same time in this world the genuine Christian ever receives
sufficient test to demonstrate whether his loyalty and devotion .to. truth* to right, and to
God are bona fide or whether they are merely an expression of his belief that honesty, right-
eousness, and godliness, are the best policy; ror adequate adjustment of moral issues is not
always made in this world in individual cases. The Christian subscribes to the principles
of the kingdom or cod primarily because they are intellectually, morally, and spiritually
sound, not because subscription nets him individually a lire of external at&rajcy, or free-
dom rrom persecution and suffering. It does this in the average case, and in the long run;
and the obligation to subscription would not be rational—a consistent part of a consistent
universe in -vhich. God as loving pother and moral Governor Is sovereign,-- unless realty to
it, in a run long enough to embrace both earth and heaven, had most happy result.
Though he nctea many inequalities and injustices in this lire, the Christian presses
on in the path or duty; true rirst of all to his best nature and- his clearest light; and
knowing that, in a consistent universe, created and upheld by the good Goa, adequate
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adjustment will be made in due time and not overdue eternity,
B. Application of the criterion to the interior processes
of Christian consciousness.
The objective truths of the Christian system find confirmation in the evidences from
Christian consciousness, "hat happens in practice in the experience of a multitude of in-
dividuals thus confirms conclusions already reached; and thus Christian certainty increases
and intensifies. In his notable work ,: The System of Christian Certainty," Prof. F. R. H. Prank
considers the whole matter or Christian Certainty from the point of view of one "ho has al-
ready attained the distinctively Christian consciousness, jsut no cne ever complies with the
conditions necessary to entrance into the Christian lire, as such, unless, by she rocesses
of life and thought as a natural man, he has already achieved a measure of preliminary cer-
tainty with regard to the Christian doctrines of cod, Kan, and Revelation. Un the strength
of this preliminary certainty he embarks on the great Christian experiment; confirms m prac-
tice the truths that he has already held; adds to his stock of truths; and so enlarges his
certainty. It is for this reason re have chosen our order ox themes instead or the one taken
by prank.
7/e have used the term ’interior’ instead or ’subjective’ in connection with the piocec--
ses or Christian consciousness to avoid misconceptions rron the use of tne latter term to whibh
we have constantly alluded. The growth or tne new science or psycho log:.7, and the increase of
interest and the multiplication of volumes relating to the facts or religious experience have
established the scientific value or the evidences from the Christian consciousness . certain
great regularities obtain here as in nearly every other field or hrm-m. experience. here
such uniformities exist, re have all the objective validity ox material facts, conjoined with
the advantage or more immediate experience. The continuous experiences ox Christian conscious-
ness are as close to the centers oi thought and lire as any primary men:' 1 activity. Log-
ically they arc prior to an experience with material things. ithin the sphere of tne indi-
vidual life they attest themselves to our total inner experience by bringing a sense ox inner
harmony na consistency, of satisfaction and certainty, that cannot be ootamed elsewnere.
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They strike a fundamental note in tne validation 01 the truths concerning the transcendent
objects of the Christian faith; and, taken in connection v;ith their constant recurrence m
other lives to-day, and the testimony oi those wro have lived in past ages, they constitute
a certainty that is Impregnable
,
because wholly consistent in tneory and practice.
TVith preliminary certainty such as we hav indicated, there arises rirst of all in the
future subjects of Christian experience a conviction of sm and guilt, more or less proiound
ahd intense, in accord with constitution and temperament, age and past manner of life. This
is a characteristic of the beginning of all religious life whether we read the autobiograph-
ical record oi it in the cuneiform tablets of the .Babylonians, in the Jewish Psalms, or in
the early Christian records with tne cry voiced in many ways, "Depart from me for 1 am a sin-
ful man, U Lord or "Wretched man that 1 amj .ho shall deliver me from tne body or this
death?" A theistic faith with a doctrine oi Revelation that presupposes a solicitous and a
seeding cod on he errand or salvation through the work or his Unly begotten Eon and the
Divine Spirit, attributes this conviction to the preliminary operation or cod in awakening
the human heart ibo a sense oi need. Such need rinc.s expression in several ways : a sense of
impending penalty ror transgression; a consciousness ox guilt ror voluntary misdoing; the
realization oi personal maladjustment in the relationships oi liie; the conviction oi a deep-
lying perversion that tne htman win, with tne oest of intentions, cannot eliminate, and
%
'ivine power alone radically affect, beyond question sucn a state oi mind is generated with-
out the help or specifically Christian teaching, and tne strangest explanations orrered ror
its existence, but under Christian teaching tne consciousness becomes more intense, the
feeling of great crisis more acute, and tneistic explanation appears more reasonable.
it remans, then, to explain why, as in our own time, conviction of sm has not ap-
peared ;y.oi*e widespread and profound. Many causes of course, both theoretical and praraical,
poor€rate in bringing about such a condition. Among these we may name anti-theistic theories
or reality, the growth oi a destructive biblical criticism, the spread or an irreligious and
unethical ecclesiastism, the individual unfaithfulness of ministers, hose courage ; r.d insight
— two vitally related factors— fall short in the preaching of s trutl , the v h of whicl
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depends on intense conviction of its genuineness and the felt r -r.se ct conscious dedication
tc it. It is o note-worthy fact that theoretic 1 uncertainties, - they rationally stand,
are not the prime causes or such a sit-ution: tEe ran]-: anc file cf men are not generally able
t6 understand tl 9
_
tions at is
v
sue. Rather are they found in a scdptical atmosphere, gen-
d hj the avil 1 rt of unbelief
,
hicl r i ' .
' '
' si :
tions, • -’lose true meaning is not at all understood, and tl ich uses these in def
iuct, £] )f . 1 , i ‘ M ,
material po secessions p s " foi Ifis] is,
1 i fer e
,
apathy f 5 Sght
lute callousness. At the same time it has teen r.y experience— ‘ :d in th : nature of the rase
the individuals- erperience, by the special arranger. ont ox Providence for moral reasons, must
urt f last — tl t tl fait] PU1 11 : sacl ing of this truth, so close
' 11 tends ' i native gonisns, fi i
the lives cf many hose hearts rr stirred to such sense or burden that they cry ~£ain, ' „hat
must I do to he saved?"
7,hen such a cry issues from the human soul it is rea.'y ror the experience ~o& Lr pre-
It. It ill f i*-
'
' tl id ' fi - t, T ' 1 iy
of f i 1 hfct ill issue in loving loyalty to God as reveiled by Christ, It
.ill crave a ne- • life, the consciousness of His xavor, and the certainty or sonship in Him,
trive tc fulfill th-c- destiny Ee has purposed for it, Th< - ill
Dll victi nj Ch isti faith ir. botl ill become tl sonscioi elf-61 at itud
tpvard Him; regener tion and justification, subjective and objective aspects cf the sa
experience - ill a.ccomrany genuine faith; the uitness of the Spirit ill bring a ner sense of
certainty; and the sou? ill begin the march toward sane . ification, th- t w turity it. ex-
istence^' here it ill no longer con&ciousl; break God’s law, having -tv iu:d a proper love
Goc . id be 3 ic 1 Divine
Sorrow for sin and turning to a consciously obligatory ideal is the essence or repent-
. It is - i h 3 - li ions are faaailii r. In Christ
,
he
we find the only sufficiently adequate ideals of life concretely resented in the career of
.\
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,
I6t, ' tl only Hi ' : Infu] t. Such ] tio nd
perience proceeds, as ‘.the ideals of Christa n Living become clearer, 3 pplie ti >f
principles or Christ necessarily covers in thought an ever widening sphere of lif
,
volvinr. the pro roundest attitudes of the soul, at 6very smallest lapse grows nor', urgent,
ITe duties emerge, never considered such before, and call for Christian obedience, rhe spir-
it grows more sensitive to the demands or its ideals; it is stricken with an increasingly
greater horror at even involuntary lapse rron then; it turns again with increasingly greater
responsiveness also from such lapse to its consciously chosen ideal. Already, -• 1 ve
suggested, this process h-r. been due to ~n implicit faith, ho conviction of sin can c'r.e
unless ‘here hv been an assert, involving faith, to an obligatory ideal, from which * -e real-*
ize we have fallen short* No turning away from sin to "od and His ideals for nan follows
:o nia has been made. Theistic faith is a trustful, I 03 1, olf-
ittal If 1 Sod; hri ian fai th - this lf-sur'. 1 "o -
by J Christ, It is no m< . * Intellectu 1 as ent to "' J~ of] itic , ’ . -
be, though it 3 h 1 lied wit] kno ledge* Indeed, our preli 13 -
ary investigation revealed, faith is a presupposition of hr.- lodge: tb : hind of faith that
fir: trusts the instruments of knowledge; that, having found consistency the only possible
test of truth, is willing to apply. it.in innumerable cams with the derinit: hope of 1 ys ob-
unife u" • »] 3 1: ns c . 3 3] ' fc llj :ard*
ed; that believes that this is a cons! .tent universe; that cleaves to consistent thought and
consistent life a: further leading to truth; that, when it finds the person ox v od reveal-4
nature. His ill, and His works
—
yields itself in hearty surrender' to Him. it would seem.
sense of having fallen snort grows deeper, t£e realization of the need of repent wace, in-
ror truth and righteousnes • are but the err rest ion of His
attitude of belief in the fact of knowledge, ret, as we have seen e nevei
without implicit frith; and growth in faith must he preceded b- "or: 0 ,es r certain
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JOd i ie i th
b ] issued in fcnovdeage. properly analysed it lv . of he continuous existence
(
of a single ethical attitude that has cone to its proper end in certainty, and in. certainty
only because it has also issued in ethical conduct.
'
In accord with Christian Revelation when nan trices this attitude toward god, :od in-
itiates fundamental change in Qian’s nature, it thi int ot “be need or Christian faith
m parte coraj y it] tl 1—Cl ristis V.hlle both oper ted ie for-
mal condition of obtaining truth, the standard of consistency, both do not operate under the
see mat rial condition, the possession of the same date, "he Christian has entered a realm
of evidence into while! the non-Christian has not gone. Those e: p rienc< s, hich must strict-
ly speeding, be called Christian, cannot have the same cogency for the latter • "or the
r. If he latte al . hem as data at all, it i /aw by ’ I c the itness
of the former in ord and life: and the experiences of overs, into ‘.hich e enter merely
f
through a description or their actuality, can never possess the same meaning ror us if we
, re lly entered into them ourselves. This means "hat the non- Christian will never attribute
a the Christian is compelled to do.
Insofar as he fails in* ethical consistency, he rails ox entering into sphere or ne data.
: _ maj operate with s for: ml canon of purely intellectual consistency as m th ;• se of P. ..
Bradleyi and with the same futile results, fiut what in Bradley’s case s . . to be lack, of
insight into the logical results of his own methods, in the case of one Who haw evaded ethi-
cal issues, will result In one. or another form of practical unbelief, and 'hat must be thought
I
of as conscious or implicit, intellectual hypocrisy, in St. Paul’s view to such as "received
not the love f the truth that they might be saved" there comes "a working of error that they
should believe a lie." Here, then, we find the tragedy o? the search for truth, -.hich log-
[
ic
helj: xmr of the formal canon cf consistency, it result in falsehood, in any case the
r
•
results in the long run rill afford proper guards to cur conclusions.
_
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The practical results o 4 ‘ '•n attitude cr Christian r-ith in the individual Christian
life are hot! interior and ex teri-. r. The change ' ithin the reelm of consciousnes may dif-
*
.
-
- and temperament of the subject ion. To
been nurtured from child-hood in a Christian rtmo sphere and continually responded more or
less unconsciously to its influences, the sense of change m deliberately taking such an at-
titude is not as marked as in the case or another oho for years has been given over to the
s of evil v nic.
. At
time it must be remembered that sensitiveness to the power and virulence of evil is not the
especial possession of the gross transgressor
,
but oftentimes also the experience cf child-
ren, to whom a long career in evil, measured by the yard-stick of human standards, has been
impossible, both the Old and the Hew Testaments, though often in figurative language, pic-
ture the change in the strongest terms. That our description may be free from the suspicion
of .person.- 1 bias we use the words of another* "This uQw life involves a radical transforma-
tion ;>r the whole man. The strong language employed in the Bible to describe it is not too
strong to truly char- cterize the fact. The change is a "new creation", "a passing from death
unto life," a "resurrection, " a "new birth." The subject or it has become s "ne- man; 11 he
possesses a "new heart." It : s in truth a complete moral and spiritual revolution. Some
of our nest thoughtful modern theologians do not hesitate to translate the Biblical terms
into the technical language of philosophy, and to declare that the result of the change is
a "new personality," a "new ego" with a new silf-consciousness. Te need, it is true, to be
on our guard, lest we take these expressions, biblical and theological, with absolute lit-
eralness. The bond of pei onal identity between the old man an tl n is
The self is essentially t h - same, sne this is true also of the man’s faculties and po ers.
The subsequent struggle .ith remaining sin p roves to the Christian’s sorrow that the "old wan"
is not by any means wholly ovei-cone, but exists alongside of the now man, though dethroned
from its dominion ove the soul and excluded from the center of the reg ...err te life, never-
theless there strong terms are m re than figures cr spe ch. They strive to express the cn-
ee ding greatnas of a change, t$at to him who experiences it, is marvellous. Tven the out-
_
sider sees something of it, and is compelled, to ccnfes. that it is par lag strange.
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"T1 is in rd transformation is the beginning of redemption* It is tl e tire king f
that \ower of sin, which has held the soul captive, the restoration 6f the soul to its true
relation to God, from whom it has heen separated and alien , unde] whose displeasure
it has rested; the return of the man from false ends to his one true Chief end; the rehab-
ilitation of the divine image in him; the opening or the fountain..of .'eternal life. The man
has "come to himself" (Luke xv. 17.) He is in the way of realizing the 'end immanent in
his personality,” (L.F. Steams, "The Evidence of Christian Experience, pg , 131,1. 2.;
A change as profound as the one described by these words would naturally affect the
whole being. It often makes itself felt first in the physical const itution and so involves
the feelings. Since the whole nature or man rerlects itseir most vividly in the feelings
this is what we should expect. A strange sense of physical lightness oftentimes; a strange
sense of brightness, that resembles now inner, now outer, physical light; a new sense of
harmony and concord with all things: with God and all men, with material surroundings and
duties in life; an all-pervasive joy and gladness, that often manifests itself in exhuber-
ance ^r.d sometimes a holy hilarity— these are marks of a deep change in the feelings.
The soul goes out in love toward God; it is pervaded by a sense of warmest personal affection
and deepest regard for Christ; it is conscious of the indwelling or the Spirit of God. ~'e
do not maintain that this three-fold distinction in idea of the objects of its feeling would
be pos:ible 'without the help or the Christian Revelation. Revealtion directs the Christian’^
thought in this three-fold experience, and thus he verifies the truth f the ord in his
Own life.
'The effect of this change is also marked in the clarification or the intellectual pro-
cesses. e have noted the close relationship between the application ox the canon of con-
sistency and man’s ethical hearing, "hen tne ethic: 1 bearing is acsclutely unvitiated, it
is to be expected that this will arrect the intellect. This great truth Christ taught in
figurative language, as reported by Matthew. "The lamp or the Dody is the eye: if therefore
thine eye he single thy whole body shall be full or light, jsut if thine eye be evil, thy
whole body shall be full or darkness. If, therefore, the light that is in thee darkness.
. }
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how great is the darkness." naturalistic predjudices interfere with the processes that lead
to theistic conclusions. If, moreover, a man he insincere, he will have little experience
aiding him to believe in the sincerity or others; and ir he believe that the world-ground
be personal he will tend to question cod’s ethical attitude also. If, furthermore, a man be
selfish and self-centefed, it will be well-nigh impossible for him to believe in the self-
sacrifice of others, and especially that cod is love, cruciried bn the cross of Christ, im-
mediately, however, as multitudes testily, on assuming the proper attitude toward cod, as if
it had thrown off a great incubus, the mind increases in energy end insight. Things that
may have appeared highly questionable berore, though all the better rorces or life were driv-
ing in their direction, appear quite coherent and rail into a harmonious system.
A radical charfge, moreover, in the supreme choice of the spirit, must necessarily af-
u **
fact all minor choices, naturally directed by it, and so, in the terms of the fr culty^phy-
chology, the regenerate nan's will has been transformed. He has made Cod, His will, and Eis.
K ing-don tne supreme end ox his lixe. All other items necessarily rail into subordinate place,
and all other goals are fixed by this primary attitude, neither self, nor sense pleasure,
nor material possessions, nor personal power,— indeed, no rorm of self-gratification— is the
final aim of life. If these are sought, they are not sought as ends but as means to the great-
er goal. The old, sinful tendencies, while not totally eliminated, have had their former
dominating strength broken. The Christian may not have reached absolute freedom, but he has
the promise and potency of fre dom, the consciousness that with Cod’s help he can live in ac-
cord with the laws Immanent in his own nature,
ret in all this he is quite certain that he himself ha.s not been tne primary cause of
this great change. He may have complied with fixed prerequisites, without which tne new;
spiritual forces in his life could never have begun operation, hut he realizes that he is
not their source. Cod alone could create ana continue them. He recognizes that tne change
is due to cod’s condescension and an extension of His favor, upon him comes a consciousness
or his sonship in Cod. Here we have what the Scriptures describe as the witness of tne Spir-
it. "Ye received not the spirit ox ocndage again unto fear, but ye received the spirit of
I •*
CO
adoption whereby we cry, Abba Father, '"he Spirit Himself beareth witness with our spirit
Cod* - - .. . on into oi
• Father,” Harmonizing with these words of St. Paul, the expres ion of hi
,
1 prom .. . '
. ,
iij » .... ... : 1 lovsci j . x
ill love him and will manifest myself unto him." Considering it as to its details, the var-
ieties of religious ewpreience -'re many. As there are aberrations of the intellect, feelings,
and will in individuals in other relations than the strictly religious, depending in part on
hereditary tendency, temperament end training, in short, on the -hole constitution of man, so
the Chr i s t i on 1 ife i \ ~
the Christian attitude of faith is persisted in, that its subject continues to be a learner
"
.
’ th, Just himself in the vaj^ laticn-
- u
- ill ' disappear. sher hand
of th: differences in Christian enrorfence may well be regarded, not as due to departures from
the norm, but as cod’s provisions nor individual need, hicb c rry thei] If- vi '
pc bri j su3 certainty* often t ind thes nnot 1 j
ibed to ve by the stimulua afforded by si 3 he incen-
tive tc trial in response to need that funally brings simil r experience. Of such type of
we may consider what John Tesley called the dirfect witness of Spirit, it
an immediate testimony, bringing conviction in r r. in: malleable way—but evidently by its own
If- • : r— of our acceptance before God. 'fhe itnes of t) e * n spirit, on the
contrary, retarding to Wesley’s view, is th:. inward conclusion that on: possaeses the fruits
of the Spirit, re note in the first place that if our criterion of certainty is a correct
one that consistency pragmatically defined must be the standard that fcetts cur certainty.
Whatever be the nature of the direct witness, therefore, it must atte-’t ifsc If as harmonious
ith tl :
'
* its of our exn =rienc : 5 if wit es : th ust also
show the fruits of the Spirit” Ihus far "esley’s analysis appears tc be a correct one, for
both the direct 'itner' or th: Spirit and the harr.cn realisation of the po crassAon of the fruits
tl Spirit hav t r ii 1 in -• i n f multitude or Christians, "he lat-
" ys be nt if u2 accredit tl fe e But what St,
seeme to be

10c,
speaking of in the words we have under examination is not so much a separate witness of the
Holy Spirit and man’s spirit to the sene fact "by difrerent nodes, hut to a joint operatior
of the Spirit of sod and the spirit or man, producing the consciousner. ox sonship toward
God, By experience the direct witness or the spirit is not constant and continuous "but comes
sporadically, especially in the spiritual emergencies or life. The witness or man’s inward
conviction that he possesses the fruits of the Spirit is the product ox tne discursive pro-
cesses Of man’s intellect. Un the other hand, that consciousness or sonship which 3t. Paul
attributes to the cooperative activity of the holy Spirit ana man’s spirit is a spontaneous
conviction that remains constant as long as we preserve the attitude oi Christian raith, ' e
may say, then, that all three elements contribute to the Christian’s assurance that he lives
under God’s favor ana stands in relation to him as a son.
Breaming the predominating power or evil in regenerati n, however, does not wholly er-
adicate evil tendencies, Regeneration with its accompanying sense or sonship, constitutes
a beginning in the Christian lire and "brings its corresponding certainty. But fallowing this
there is need ox Christian growth, the development of the life to maturity, to the ideals set
by Christ, in the scriptures this process is called sanctification, 'entire sanctification
would be the achievement ox such holiness that the individual v /aid b
.
properly alju .w to
God, to the laws cf his own being, and to the demands of his neighbors welfare. It would
mean at least reaching a plane of life where lawless tendencies would not originate within
the soul, or where, when temptation or solicitation tc evil assailed from without, evil would':
he promptly repelled. This Cool- not mean that, as s finite creature, the subject or entire
3 notification is no’; liable to mistake and error. It merely r Ban that a f his know-
,
he does not consciously break Cod’s law* As regeneration, moreover, hr* "ms with
h hip i begets fili 1 love i ithin the heart, so the processes of ifi-
1 ifi ' iousi : : sonship and increases love to God and man* Entire
ianctificati;- would therefore mean in rhie connection reaching a stage of love that is per-
fect ' ithin the sphere ox i ini t cnees.
llj . ’ over long period of time, n 4
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llevf - ; 1 1 in .this life. tl
'
' isii
vidonco i •‘’or '‘’.coining to
;
veelude th - possibility of it: • ir.~ oonsu v ••• ted in t* life of
, ii f( leath. I is bout it ill 1
of attitudes and forces that made regenei* tion possible and that 1 - m t! ^.irit
slip arc. fill: 1 love: faith repentance, filial obedience, \ o idling throw. ' ' r love that begins
to . he duty a plea. v.re. Prayer, the study :r the Scriptures, the inspiration of common c.
-
ship, the 1 : lp of cooperative activity bring in their tram a growing holiness in character
and deed, an increasing knowledge and wisdom, a greater faithfulness "he. fflciency in Chris-
• i:v. s vice, A ne: alertness and insight comes to the mind, enrichment and emoblemwt to the
fe lij gs, s trengthening to the powers of the will. Until the process is complete the strug-
gle - ith sin within the soul continues ith greater intensity, though ^Iso with "oregleans of
final victory, untilevil .tendency within the sphere of self-conscicusness is removed. Until
the i of life, however
,
the si " +' evil in its varied forms in the orld -diheut must
on, tl Chri ’ irtun it; v fc thi tage to re] into ] iv
latic Df hi hiev ent in -holir . ' 1 - 1 :
vil i : lif • a a out him, and breaking o’", re -r of all unfruitful war: s of ' ' rh. . to
this. ompl ; coni platicn of r.o’s o n virtues r tt i i
that humili ' hi jci i enuincl; . i
ec ''hot his gofers ha- normally expanded nder the guidance oi ^od*s Spirit, a multitude of
pi • -tical tasks call ror his attention. .Chile he must not neglect prayer, meditation, public
.
or ship, and the instruction and study that ought to accompany there, neither ought he shirk
hose nifold duties that in the hpme, in the sbheol, in business life, in the political
world, nd in the church press upon every citizen of the kingdom of god,
L c] g in f . ... ture of . ... as pi found have ril cd it, u i id
bring ii: own certainty. The change is not duo to his own Initiative. The power accornplish-
i it, 1 e fe " quite sure, comes from God. The experiences through much h has seed con-
firm his preliminary certainties concerning God the father, Christ the Son, and the Paraclete,
E0I3 pi . T ] Itiyely bsn r§ to Dmmunic ith C c istenc
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,
be in doubt* The j ' i . our feel! s , tl ini i
ion
,
tl nl r eu nt of our menial gr
__
ad insight, 13 . stren tl jnin of tl = pe
of the . ill, the heightening of interest in the things of the Kingdom, the increr : e of an-
'
_
fo tl lives or others, the growth of Joy and glddmess in GrOd*s presence and : rvice
are not experiences oommunicable to those ••he have not passed througl them. To attempt to
of G©d*8 ] sence that con tl Icing soul - t! fi hne :f
the morning, or the consciousness of assurance that arises from duties fulfilled that rollons
in th* "brightness of mid-day, or the peace that gathers over the soul in the stillness and
quie '• of he g" tiering evening twilight to these who scoff at the realities of Christ i f n ex-
po ri~v.ee is to cast one? pearls of greatest price before the sv inish snouts of those "ho have
bul little abov the nimal, itl tl additional d . hat shall feel
tusks : tl ey turn and r nd us. But while these experiences up-on which e might enlarge^
re not designed for the uses of the discursive intelligence— other naterial and evi
which e h •v discussed at length elsewhere serving this eeded purpose— they are not without
tl air highest value. They bring their own Christian assurance—like none other save that the
criterion is the same v.-ith all;— they provide the necessary incentive for the regular duties
and emergencies of daily life; they constantly urge us to p..re :s the v ork of the Kingdom of
Christ. Without doubt they have their individual as well as their universal neJcks ; end. Cod
them to men as He sees that th sd end seek, he can urge these as necessary upon
others by the power of reason only as they have universal characteristics. At the same time
some of individual characteristics are communicable in part by the contagious power of feeling.
As they affect our own lives they spontaneously manifest themselves in our feelings, our ac-
tions, our attitudes, cur facial expressions, our manner of speech, and so tend to affect others
a? they are -Ale instinctively to interpret meanings and values. But if e r riences, which
perhaps rrr highly individualistic and can have no significance and v due *; : others, but hich
w-. ours Ives p irticularly need or cra.ve, ccr.o In due time end h sc itl God’s la of lov:
,
j in tl , deepen our convictions, face cur duties more confidently, re
fruitage of faithfulness, and thus having entered, more largely into the' n- tuw • of Christian
cer tr inty find . alec 1 r r -;e r basi? r it.

IC7.
"
' 3 th€ r u f r inv fcigatic t • ’ily
involve both theoretical and practical aspects. Our time is one of much question and doubt;
the fountains of the great deep ?re being opened; the vorld is ?gite ted by a most fearful in-
ternational conflict that again compels inquiry into the fundamentals of life, belief, faith
srtainty, 'fhrougli it - 11 the Christian^ hod no the Christ iahb faith are shining -ore
sr. Hot everything that is in hod’s Providence has been in His purpose. Bo
,
- must believe, ho - -ever, include a demand for good-trill '.on
sion . Hever can we have pt rmanent peace between men and n< tions Until at least a subst n-
tial majority cherish the spirit of genuine good-will, and never c n find peace, snd the
certainty that brings peace, in cur individual lives unless in .them is manifest also this
1hipest good ill that, finding expressions in manifold ways governed by the principle of in-
tellectual consistency, works out as it sets out to work in our practical living* Permeated
by such certainty the citizens of t'e Kingdom of Christ look back upon the past triumphs of
the faith once committed to the saints, and, with all possible confidence, face the present
and the future
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1Analysis of Intiuduction and Argument in the Form of a Brief
of Dissertation on
The llature end Basis of Christian Certainty,
Introduction: The Practical Bearing of Our Theme.
Thesis: The extension of the Kingdom of Christ depends in large part on the strength
of Chrsitian Certainty.
A. The need of greatly multiplied Christian effort.
B. The success of the Christian leaders of the past depended largely on their
strong convictions.
C. The need of an enlarged Christian certainty to-asy.
D. Tendencies to make "belief a matter of practical indifference,
1. On the plea of liberty.
2. On the score that certainty would compel obedience.
3.
The need of increased certainty to get proper practical results. /'"f
F. The relation between the theoretical and the practical evokes this essay.
Part One of Brief Proper.
I. ividence from the "subjective” aspects of our life in relation to certainty must be
regarded as having as great validity as evidence from "objective" aspects, for
A. Experience involves at once a duality of subject and object, each to be
considered equally real, for
1. The existence of the self is the fundamental datum of experience.
2. T.E. Green evidences the collapse of the sensational psychology.
3. F.E. Bradley fails to reveal the idea cf the self as inconsistent, for
a. Ee does not distinguish between the self and its contents.
b. He does not properly describe the soul as active.
4. Sensations have both subjective and objective aspects.
5. Subject and object cannot be understood without reference of the
one to the other.
B. The subjective has its regularities s.nd uniformities as has the objective.
C. Both are the outcome of the same ultimate force.
II. To the testimony of the senses we apply the criterion of consistency pragmatically
defined, implying faith in a consistent universe, for
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A* Without this test v;e v;ould he compelled to embrace solipsism.
B* With this test we distinguish between ideas and their corresponding realities,
C# he are unable to find any other satisfactory test, for
1.
Only by appeal to it can re question or approve its validity.
D. ' ithout a consistent universe the test could yield no results.
III. To the testimony of thought we apply the criterion cf consistency, pragmatically
defined, implying faith in a consistent universe, for
A, e must apply the test of consistency, thus, define:, to judgment, for
1. he must apply it to the universality of the judgment.
2. e must apply it to the necessity of the judgment.
3.
"e must apply this criterion to understand the laws of thought, for
1. he must apply it to understand the lav; of identity.
2. Vie must apply it to understand the lav; of contradiction.
3. Ve must apply it to understand the law of the excluded middle.
I
C. ITo essential difference exists between the evidence of the senses and of
thought
.
IV. To the testimony of the feelings we apply the s:.me criterion, for
A. The intellectual spects of the feelings lead us to certainty.
B* The regular, universal, and permanent feelings have objective validity as
p ieces of evidence.
C* The results ox the universal and permanent feelings are to be viewed as
an indication of the nature of ultimate reality.
Y. finally, to the testimony of the moral nature we must apply the same criterion, for
A. Here the appeal is to the missing element of s necessary whole.
B. Tor the test implies an honest universe.
C. The use of consistency as formal to t implies the us 6 of s material test,
a content to be achieved by sincere search.
j. Ii lication or the test or oonsiste cy, the wrt sup] ition i
vital faith,

3
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VI. 33 mast Cons
,
fcic llj defined, for
.
. Brdaley*fl
"Appearance and Reality” is not a consistent one, for
1. Thought haw no pover
,
save by abstraction, to separate "content 1 '
from "existence."
2. It is not the function of the judgment to apply content
ing to one existence to another, ror
A. The Judgment is not a proposition, the compound of two parts
Joined hy a copula, hut an intellectual reaction, bringing
meaning to a matter not previously understood.
3. Consistency, conceived of as absolute and all embracing individ-
uality, can never be attained by the finite.
B. In its essentials the pragnatic definition of consistency is the one to
which v;e are driven, for
1.
7/e can only know of the coincidence of our ideas with the absolute#
by appeal to concrete facts, upon which the standard of consisten-
cy is to operate.
Part Two of Brief Proper.
I. The Criterion of Christian certainty is also Consistency, pregamtically iefined,for
A. Part of the objects of Christian certainty ore also objects of certainty
in general.
B. Entrance into the Christian life docs not oh nge the nature of mental
processes or the criteria of truth, for
1. The Christian lays no claim to direct divine illumination.
2. This would make the teaching of the non-Christian ell-nigh impossible.
C. The Christian life brings us into a new sphere of evidence by efforts of
the will in practical activity, for
1. This was the teaching of the 0. T.
2. This was the teaching or jesus.
3. This was the teaching of the apostles.
T. The Christian certainty involves the element ox xaith, though more in a
person, than in truth as an ideal.
3.
The Christian certainty implies a sincere and active attitude of the will.
P, In attempting to construe life religiously we are merely entering \ dif-
ferent field of evidence, w such, as valid the field in which we enter

4when re attempt to construe it intellectually.
Part Three or Brief Proper.
I* application of our Criterion tc . she Christian doctrine or belief in God brings
certainty with regard to the truth or the latter, for
A. Prom she speculative point of view the doctrine is the most satisfac-
tory explanation or the nature ox ultimate reality, ror
1. The Common theistic arguments sustain the doctrine, for
a* A consideration of human nature as a piece of evidence favors
the Christian siew of God, for
X. Our consciousness or self-activity is the basis of our
conclusion that an ultimate reality must be regarded as
a cause of all things.
y. Adoption or consistency as a test points to the unity of
the we*.Id-ground.
z. Explanation of our own nature demands personality, as
holy love, as its cause.
b. The argument from interaction, by analogy from the interac-
tion of the parts of our own natures, demands n immanent,
yet transcendent cause.
C. The cosmological argument demands the Christian Goa as. an
adequate cause or the world-order.
d. The .telecc logical argument, rooting back in our purposive
experiences, demands a personal world-ground.
e. Man's ethical and religious nature calls for the 'Christian
God of righteousness and love.
2. The abstract anti-theistic arguments fail to satisfy intellec-
tual demands
,
ror
a. it is impossible to speak consistently or the natural op-
eration or impersonal lav;, for
x. Te cannot adequately explain the operation or natural
law by chance.
y. he cannot adequately explain the operation or natural
law by necessity, for
p. The theory or necessity destroys moral responsibility.
q. The theory or necessity destroys distinction between
truth and error.
b. Personalism alone adequately explains the nature of the
categories.
3* The common anti-theistic arguments fail adequately to explain
experience, for
'f :
.
.
.•
-
*
*
- i c. . - •.
.
,'j
:
,1. : I
.
,
*
,
Xt 1
*
.
5A
a. Positivism rails in its account of the world order, for
x. It profes. es to know nothing oi the nature ox ulrimrte reality.
y. Its doctrine or phenonena involves metaphysical questions it
seeks to avoid.
z. Its conception of law demands a science ox Psychology whose
practicability Comte would not allow. Q
b. Agnosticism, endxrng in a practical materialism, best represented
by Herbert Spencer, is an inadequate explanation of the world
order, for
w. It makes no attempt to solve epistemeologicel problems,
x. It does net maintain its doctrine of the unknowable
,
y. It does not maintain its doctrine that she absolute must stand
out of all relations.
z. Its formula of evolution is inadequate
,
for
l. It does not ns.mtain its doctrine of the conservation of
energy.
m. It does not maintain its doctrine of the instability or the
homogeneous
.
n. It gives no insight into the passage rrom the inorganic to
the organic.
6. It lends no Insight in the pas age from life to mind.
c. Pantheism is an inadequate explanation or the universe, for
v/* Objections against Materialism may in large part be urged against
it.
x. All the objections against necessit?.rism may be urged against it.
y. All the need of personalism may be urged against it.
4, All the usual attributes of cod fallow from what has gone before.
5. The doctrine of God’s omnicience, as we interpret it, can also be con-
sistently maintained, for
a. .e merely eliminate foreknowledge erf contingent events.
b. Our suggestion merely limits the influence of contingent acts
within fixed spheres.
c. It provides for cod’s foreknowledge of the future.
d. It has definite practical advantages.
U. The Christian doctrine or Cod has fixed practical advantages that empha-
sizes its truth, for
1. It emphasizes the value of moral living in attaining truth.
2. It offers the deepest incentive to the operation of our mental pro-
cesses.
3. It offers the de .pest incentive to high m ral living.
4. It alone affords the assistance to life offered by religion.
5. It alone holds out the promises or a desiraole future and helps to
eradicate pessimism.
11. Applicati nr criterion to the Christian doctrine of v 1 ti n brings cer-
tainty with regard to the truth of the latter, for
A. Human nature shews the need of a special and direct revelation, for
1. Seasoning from the natural world and human life is not sufficient, for
a. It is possible only to a few.
I
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e s s i t i e of the case.
Submitted to the tesr of The usual historical canons, the gospel records,
especially, comic.end themselves to us as historically true, for
1. The Gospels arc regarded a; genuine and autl entic 1 contei j -
aries, and did not materially alter during later generations.
2. The efforts c f some critics to *cv ti ir genuii aut
ticity has railed, for
a. The force or their case depends most largely on pantheistic and
and naturalistic pre suppositions.
b. The myth-making t Straus ill plain the up-
ernatural in the Gospels.
c. The psychological explanations cr Haur cannot cccunt for the
Fourth Gospel apart rrom Johannine authorship.
d. Renan’s theory of deliberate irr ostu're is the re&uctio ad ab-
surdum of the destructive criticism.
e. Keim, in his estimate cr the unique personality cf Jesus, is com-
pelled to begin a movement back to the orthodox position.
3. Internal evidence from the n ospels is indication of tv inccvity
of the disciples and the authenticity or their records.
.
- unique personality, nscendi 1 ir.v ti
man, for
a. unigue self-consci usnes is reve 1. ' by Christ’s claims on human-
ity in general, and his disciple in ~ articular.
b. |l unique If-cc 3ci< i vc iled by i-:is claims to pre-
existence .
c. unique self-consciousness is reve-'h;., by Mis claims t omni-
presence.
d. The sel-f-consciousnes of Jesus -.itr.esses toar. u ; of pover and
authority utterly transcending the prophetic.
e. Granting corresponding reality to * is cons ci of pers :
pre-eminence we must place Him in the category of he ity.
The doctrine cf she mcarnati n at a unique historical ev-nt is consistent
both \ilh revelation and reason.
Llany practical advantages accrue tc us from the use of the Holy Scriptures
as a. revelation from Mod, for
1. They can he s.j .1.. to it ltdtive " ' tical irectic
of man’s life"/ for
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Involving i on, la k fc
C-. Hi perience is Jiopeless enigma, if ;h Christa ;
person of Shrist are not the church ha . r a oented then.
III. Arplication of our criterion to the Christian of the Trinity brings cer-
tainty v;ith regard to the truth or the latter, for
A. ' e nay presume the doctrine to be true on theoretical grounds, -"or
1. It is presupposed by Christian revelation.
2
.
It contains no contradictory elements.
3. It is in accord vith rational explication of the nature of love.
B.
. y p] time the doctrine to he true on practical grounds, for
1. It conserves the unity af God and avoids tritheism.
2. It avoids the theoretical difficulties and practical dangers of pan-
theism.
3. It devertifies the thought of G-oa for us, and - ives sora.e insight in
which the human nind can rest.
f. ft provides an -- ropriate backgrou for 1 ise of
human fellowship,
5. It,l va] ? .
tV
.
Application or our criterion to the Christian doctrine of the nature of man in
moral matters brings certainty -it’- r g rc to rut! ' latter, i
. Cl ist ian - oi ’ 'll 5 3 nlj
of his fuhdamehtil nature, for •
1. It is the only doctrine adequate theoretically, for
a. It is the biblical theory.
b. It is the spontaneous expression of . an's nature.
c. it avoids the difficulties of non-theistic and -rti-theistic the-
ories.
d. The theory or evolution, properly understood, does not militate
against it.
2. Practically it is a needed doctrine, for
a. It calls men to live up to the highest standards.
b. it provides a concrete example in Jesus Christ.
c. /.gnosticism or positivism offer n- such advantages.
d. Hater
i
?
1 ism previc.es no proper conception of man* s dign±ty.
e. Pantheism offers no rational incitement to man's self level
and culours
.
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1, It provides an adequite theoretics' account, for
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its basis be interpreted as historical cr rahclic.
c. It cm be regarded as true on either nonogenist or polygenie t the-
ories.
2. Practically it alone stimulates to s sense f ne d of Divine rid, for
a. The doctrine of sin as a survival or animal tendency stimulates to
no such need.
b. fhe doctrine that sin is due to environment stimulates to no such
,
sense of need.
c. The theory that sin can be eliminated by education does not press
home this sense of need.
C. The doctrine of human freedom is the only adequate explanation or man’s
poirer of choice, for
1. It is the only adequate theoretic explanati n, for
a. It is in the doctrine of nan’s dignil his hall.
b. It founds itself on the primary self-experience or man as a genuine
personality.
c. To it considerations of causality are secondary.
d. It is necessary to explain ^deg^e-^ily the sense of moral responsibil-
ity, the differences betveen truth and error, and the rapidity of
some great moral transitions.
e. It is in accord vith the theory that an originative agent cannot be
involved in a cans1.1 nexus.
f. It is not contrary to the theory that presents choisee* heir to fix
future character.
g. it is not contrary to the theory that environment influences human
life.
2. It is the only proper practical stimulus to the :— se of response*- 1: ity
and to the energizing of the ill,*
D« The doctrine ofpersonal Immortality -rises in accord with tie demands of
consistency, for
1. it is needed theoretically to explain fixed elements in our experience,
for
a. It is in accord with the other elements in the Christian doctrine of
man’s nature.
b. it is in accord with Sesus’ teaching concerning the nature cr God, for
x. It accords with the direct teaching of Jesus concerning the nature
of !iOd.
,y. it accords with the theistic implications or the desire for im-
mortality.
c. It is the consistent outcome or a demand for a prevailing justice
and righteousness.
d. It is in accord with intellectual demands ror consistency.
e. it is in accord • ith the demands cr the religious nature.
f. r-itji the truth or the doctrine Jesus involves His moral integrity.
2. All practical evidences point to the truth of the doctrine, for

a. It aids in proper living here, for
x. If the doctrine is nor true, the striving after many of life’s
finest products is irrational.
The Christian doctrine of retribution is in cccrd with ail available
data,' for
1. It is in accord with available theoretical considerations, for
a. The continuance or finite personal life is conditioned upon the
will or trod.
b. The continuance ox finite hum- n life nust be regarded as depeadeJub
also upon human obedience to divinely fixed conditions,
c. Irreparable retribution is not contrary to the conception or cod
as a aod or. love and mercy.
d. Irreparaole retribution is to be conceived or as one wilfully chosen
by man.
e. The doctrine makes place for the possibility of annihilation,
2. The doctrine is of greatest practical value, for
a. It has proved of greatest practical value in the past.
b. It tells of retribution here as veil as hereafter.
c. It works now in the lgng run, if applied as it "set out to work.'
a. To lack of stress upon the doctrine r be attributed much of
the irresponsiveness of great masses of our people to-day to the
appeal or religion,
e. The doctrine helps to a much needed self-restraint of the tendencies
of our lower natures.
P, The Christian doctrine of heaven is consistent •with all the dat- fur-
nished by human experience, for
1. its appeal to a proper self-love is wholly rational.
2. It represent s the completion of love both to God and m n,
3. It is an outcome of a deep desire for a readjustment or envirom ent
with the highest ideals of life.
4. It is the product or the moral demand tor the el ini: ation or un-
necessary inequalities =nd gross injustices.
Application of our criterion to the interior processes or Christian consciousness
reveals their harmony wish both the Christian revelation and the deepest needs of
human life, and so increases the Christian certainty, for
A, The first stage or Christian experience reveals the deepest conviction
of sin and guilt, ror
1. Chile such conviction is universally manifest, it is stronger and
deeper under Christian teaching.
2. "hen presented as it ought to be the doctrine works as it set out to
work. n
B, In the progress of Christian experience, repentance itself involving faith,
follows upon conviction.
C, been implicit becomes explicit, and issues in an at-
titude of loye ’ self-committal to God as revealed by desus Christ.
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The interior transformation, supervening on faith, g css to the very
roots or man’s being, for
1. it often makes itself felt in the physic l constitution and so in-
volves the fe lings,
2. The change is marked in the clarification or she • intellectual proces
ses,
3. The change is marked in tne attitude . f the will.
Added to the s experiences there cones what St. .haul calls the witness
of the Spirit with cur spirits to scnship in sod.
Finally, if the attitude cr faith he persisted in, the processes or
spiritual growth issue in sanctification that further purifies and en-
ohles the whole being.
Changes as vital as those described must evidently bear treir self-
evidence and bring tneir own certainty, for
1. "Ley lonfirm the Christian’s preliminary certainties cc lg sod.
2, Semi-mystical experiences bring tneir satisfactions and urgencies
to the individual soul.
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